State v. Newman, No. 30690-5-II (WA 11/9/2004)
| Decision Date | 09 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 30690-5-II,30690-5-II |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. CASSANDRA NEWMAN, Respondent. |
Appeal from Superior Court of Cowlitz County. Docket No: 02-1-01201-6. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 07/16/2003. Judge signing: Hon. James E Warme.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Michelle L Shaffer, Cowlitz Co Pros Attorney Office, 312 SW 1st Ave, Kelso, WA 98626-1799.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Thad Eldred Scudder, Attorney at Law, 206 W Main St, PO Box 757, Kelso, WA 98626-0065.
Cassandra Newman was convicted of possession of methamphetamine based on evidence discovered when an officer noticed occupants of a vehicle not wearing seatbelts, learned that the driver had a suspended license, and in a search incident to arrest, found the methamphetamine. The trial court dismissed her conviction after it ruled that the seatbelt law was unconstitutionally vague. RCW 46.61.688.1 The State appeals the dismissal, claiming that the trial court applied the wrong law and failed to grant Newman's motion for a new trial instead of dismissing the case. Finding that the trial court erroneously dismissed Newman's conviction, we reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Officer Frank Black stopped a car after noticing that the occupants were not wearing seatbelts. Black then discovered that the driver had a suspended license, and while conducting a search incident to arrest, he found methamphetamine belonging to passenger Cassandra Newman.
Newman was charged with possession of methamphetamine. She was not charged with a seatbelt violation. The trial court found Newman guilty as charged on March 14, 2003. On May 21, 2003, Newman filed a `MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT AND A NEW TRIAL.' Clerk's Papers (Dec. 8, 2003) (CP) at 1. This motion recited that it was `based on CrR 7.5' and alleged that counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that the seatbelt law was unconstitutional. CP at 1. She argued that this omission CP at 2.
On July 2, 2003, after Newman was sentenced, the trial court heard argument on Newman's motion. Defense counsel argued that failure to raise the issue at trial was either ineffective assistance of counsel or an issue that could be raised for the first time on appeal. Newman claimed that the appropriate remedy was a `new trial.' Report of Proceedings (July 2, 2003) (RP) at 5.
The court agreed that the seatbelt law was unconstitutional. It then stated that this is `not a motion for a new trial, I mean, it would . . . {be a} {c}ollateral attack.' RP at 5-6. It granted `the motion to set aside the verdict' and dismissed the case. RP at 7.
The State appeals the trial court's (1) consideration of Newman's motion; (2) its grant of the motion to set aside the verdict; and (3) dismissal of the case. The State argues that CrR 7.4 did not provide a means for arresting the judgment, that the trial court erred by not considering the motion for new trial under CrR 7.5, and the trial court erred in dismissing the charge under CrR 8.3(b).
II. ANALYSIS
The State argues that CrR 7.42 is inapplicable, and thus, the trial court erred in arresting the judgment pursuant to this rule. Newman responds that the rule does apply, and that the court properly considered it.
CrR 7.4 provides that a judgment may be arrested where there is insufficient proof of a material element of the crime, but it further requires that a motion under this rule be served and filed within 10 days of the verdict, subject to the court's discretion in extending the deadline. CrR 7.4(b).
Newman filed her motion over two months after the court entered its judgment against her. The court gave no indication that it was making an exception to the CrR 7.4(b) time requirement. Further, Newman's motion did not `identify the specific reasons in fact and law as to each ground on which the motion is based' as required by the rule. CrR 7.4(b). Finally, and dispositively, neither the parties nor the court referred to CrR 7.4 during the consideration of Newman's motion.
The State also contends that the court erred in not considering Newman's motion for new trial under CrR 7.5,3 instead of dismissing the charges.
Newman argued for relief in the form of a new trial under CrR 7.5(a)(8). This rule allows a new trial where substantial justice has not been done. The same time and specificity requirements apply to motions under CrR 7.5 as apply to motions under CrR 7.4. See CrR 7.5(b). Again, Newman did not comply with either the timely filing requirement, nor did she state the grounds for relief with the required specificity.
Because the trial court did not consider either CrR 7.4 or CrR 7.5 as a basis for its decision, and because it need not have done so due to the untimely filing and inadequate pleadings under either rule, we decline further review under either rule.
During the hearing on the motion, the court stated that it considered Newman's motion a collateral attack on the judgment. A collateral attack is defined as `any form of postconviction relief other than a direct appeal.' RCW 10.73.090(2). The court's characterization of the motion was based in part on the requirement that a collateral attack can be raised within one year of the judgment. RCW 10.73.090. Collateral attacks include motions to arrest judgment, motions for new trial, and motions to vacate a judgment.4 RCW 10.73.090(2).
While the court did not specify which court rule it applied, it characterized its ruling as `grant{ing} the motion to set aside the verdict' which implies the court applied CrR 7.8(b).5 RP at 7. Under this rule, the court may relieve a party from a final judgment for any enumerated reason, or `{a}ny other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.' CrR 7.8(b)(5).
This court reviews a CrR 7.8(b) motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Littlefair, 112 Wn. App. 749, 772, 51 P.3d 116 (2002). The court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971).
Because the court did not specifically apply CrR 7.8, there is no indication of what grounds the court used to reach its decision.6 Relief from a final judgment is available under CrR 7.8(b) where (1) the judgment was obtained by mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or irregularity; (2) there is relevant newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial; (3) the judgment was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct; (4) the judgment is void; or (5) there is any other reason justifying relief.
Newman argues that her counsel was ineffective and that the seatbelt law was unconstitutional. But CrR 7.8(b) (1) is not applicable because `the incompetence or neglect of a party's own attorney generally is not `excusable neglect." State v. Gomez-Florencio, 88 Wn. App. 254, 259, 945 P.2d 228 (1997) ( Lane v. Brown & Haley, 81 Wn. App. 102, 107, 912 P. 2d 1040 (1996)). Nor has Newman brought new evidence forward that was not available prior to entry of the judgment. State v. D.T.M., 78 Wn. App. 216, 219, 896 P.2d 108 (1995); CrR 7.8(b)(2). Other superior courts ruled that the seatbelt law was unconstitutional after Newman's judgment, but these decisions were based on law available to Newman at the time of her trial. Finally, and dispositively, RCW 46.61.688 is not facially void. See State v. Eckblad, No. 74109-3, 2004 WL 2303384 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2004).
Newman does not claim or indicate fraud or misrepresentation, nor does she present any evidence that the judgment itself was void. CrR 7.8(b)(3), (4); State v. Boyd, 109 Wn. App. 244, 34 P.3d 912 (2001) (); State v. Olivera-Avila, 89 Wn. App. 313, 319, 949 P.2d 824 (1997) (). There was no assertion that the court lacked jurisdiction or the authority to find Newman guilty. See State ex rel. Turner v. Briggs, 94 Wn. App. 299, 303, 971 P.2d 581 (1999).
Finally, relief under CrR 7.8(b)(5) is limited to extraordinary circumstances that relate to fundamental irregularities in the court proceedings or extraneous to the court's action. Olivera-Avila, 89 Wn. App. at 319. It `does not apply when the circumstances justifying the relief existed at the time the judgment was entered.' Gomez-Florencio, 88 Wn. App. at 259. Newman argues that the enforcement of an unconstitutional seatbelt law led to the discovery of the methamphetamine. But our supreme court recently held that the seatbelt law is constitutional. Eckblad, 2004 WL 2303384. Thus, the police had the authority to enforce it when they made the stop. Because the stop was legal, the law's constitutionality was not a relevant consideration in the court's decision to admit evidence of the drug charge against her.
Furthermore, mistakes of law may not be corrected by a motion governing relief from judgment under CrR 7.8(b), but must, instead, be raised on appeal. Burlingame v. Consolidated Mines & Smelting Co., 106 Wn.2d 328, 336, 722 P.2d 67 (1986); State v. Dorenbos, 113 Wn. App. 494, 499, 60 P.3d 1213 (2002). And whether the seatbelt law was unconstitutional was a pure question of law, which has been resolved against Newman's position. Eckblad, 2004 WL 2303384. Consequently, since Newman's challenge encompasses both a purely legal question and facts essential to her original prosecution, any consideration of Newman's motion for relief from judgment under CrR 7.8...
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