State v. Neyrey
| Decision Date | 12 November 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 64712,64712 |
| Citation | 383 So.2d 1222 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Rene J. NEYREY. * |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Provino Mosca, Tucker & Schonekas, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Mamoulides, Dist. Atty., Abbott J. Reeves, Harry Hardin, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
Rene J. Neyrey was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. (R.S. 40:967) After his motion to suppress the cocaine was denied, he pleaded guilty to the charge, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584, (La.1976). The court sentenced the defendant to one year at hard labor, but suspended the sentence on the condition that defendant be placed on inactive probation and required to serve ninety days in parish prison. On the appeal defendant contests the trial court's ruling denying his motion to suppress evidence.
On December 14, 1978, around 1:30 a. m., Jefferson Parish Deputy Sheriff Jules Pinero received a complaint about a "suspicious person" sitting in a car in an apartment complex parking lot. Upon arrival, Mr. Rhinehart Richards, the security guard at the complex, informed the officers that the defendant had been in the car for some time with the windshield wipers on. Richards stated that the defendant was unconscious or asleep and that knocking on the windshield had failed to arouse him. Defendant did not respond when the deputy knocked on the glass, whereupon the deputy opened the car, shook the defendant awake and asked him for identification.
The defendant got out of the car, showed the officers his Louisiana State Insurance Commission card, and explained that he had been partying with friends and had fallen asleep on his way home. Deputy Pinero told the defendant to get back into his car and move it as it was blocking a doorway. While the officers were asking the security guard for his name and address, the security guard noticed that defendant's car was not moving and defendant, who was at the wheel, appeared to have his eyes closed. Deputy Pinero walked over to the car again, opened the door, and in an effort to obtain some identification with a picture on it asked the defendant to show him some additional identification, like a driver's license. The defendant got out of the car a second time. His words were slurred and he appeared intoxicated.
When defendant reached inside the left side of his sports coat for identification, a plastic bag with white powder in it fell to the ground. The deputy picked up the bag and ordered defendant to place his hands on the car. Pinero's partner then searched Neyrey and found a bulging bag containing around fifteen tablets and capsules in defendant's left pocket. After defendant was given his Miranda warning, he informed the officers that the white powder in the plastic bag was cocaine. We are concerned here only with the seizure of the cocaine, which had occurred before any arrest or search.
Essentially the defendant's first contention is that the cocaine should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful Terry search. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). C.Cr.P. art. 215.1(A)1 authorizes a police officer to stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing or has recently committed a crime and ask that person his name, address, and an explanation of his actions. The validity of the investigatory stop depends on whether the officer has adequate articulable knowledge of particular facts, enough to warrant infringement upon the individual's constitutional right to be left alone. State v. Shy, 373 So.2d 145, (La.1979); State v. Wilson, 366 So.2d 1328 (La.1978).
In the case at bar the arresting officer testified that he had no suspicion, let alone a reasonable suspicion, that defendant Neyrey had committed a crime or was committing a crime. Therefore, the stop and subsequent seizure cannot be justified under Article 215.1(A).
However, the articulable suspicion requirement of C.Cr.P. art 215.1(A), Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is necessary only where the stop is forcible. See Terry v. Ohio, supra ; State v. Saia, 302 So.2d 869, (La.1974). Police officers do not need probable cause to arrest, or reasonable cause to detain, in order to converse with citizens. State v. Shy, supra, at 147. The fact that police approach a citizen and address him does not compel the citizen to respond to the officer. The citizen has the legal right to walk away from the encounter, or simply not to respond. State v. Shy, supra ; State v. Brown, 370 So.2d 547 (La.1979). Under the circumstances of this case we do not think it was unreasonable for the officers to open the door and shake the defendant awake so that they could talk to him.
Policemen in the course of their duties initiate or respond to a wide variety of encounters, many of which are not related to the pursuit of criminals providing first aid, mediating disputes or just talking to citizens. Policemen may defuse arguments. They may act as good Samaritans in checking to see if someone is in trouble, sick, too drunk to care for themselves and in need of assistance.
Policemen could not perform such valuable non-prosecutorial services nor could they effectively pursue criminals if they did not initiate or respond to encounters with citizens. While unsolicited assistance, unasked for conversation, and unrequested advice are not always welcome, the Constitution provides no protection from these everyday annoyances whether the source of irritation is a policeman or a citizen.2 The citizen's remedy in either instance is the same, decline the assistance, refuse to converse, or walk away. State v. Shy, supra.
In the case at bar the officers were called to an apartment house because a security guard complained of a "suspicious" person sitting in a car. The security guard explained that the person was sleeping or unconscious and failed to respond when the security guard knocked on the car window. The security guard was also concerned because the defendant's car was blocking the doorway to the apartment house. There was no question that the officers had the right to be on the apartment house premises.
When the officer first knocked on the window, he had no intention to arrest the defendant or to forcibly detain him. The testimony of the arresting officer and the security guard indicates that the officer wanted to make sure that the defendant was sufficiently awake to drive home safely and that the car was moved from the driveway so that it no longer blocked the apartment house door.
After the defendant did not move the car and apparently passed out again, the officers were justified in asking the defendant for better identification where the defendant had given no indication that he objected to their questioning. At no time did the defendant attempt to leave the area or request that the police not talk to him. State v. Shy, supra. He readily consented to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Griffin
...We agree. For a detailed description of the search warrant requirement and the "plain view" exception thereto, see State v. Neyrey, 383 So.2d 1222 (La.1979); State v. Huston, 445 So.2d 67 (La.App.2d Cir.1984); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). In......
-
State v. Allen
...of particular facts, sufficient to warrant infringement upon the individual's constitutional right to be left alone. State v. Neyrey, 383 So.2d 1222, 1223-24 (La.1979). In determining if this [95-1754 La. 5] adequate articulable knowledge exists, courts must consider the totality of the cir......
-
State v. Tucker
...unlawfully seized evidence are intended to protect individuals from unwarranted, "forcible" governmental interference. State v. Neyrey, 383 So.2d 1222, 1224 (La.1979). These protections are not implicated, therefore, when an individual encountered by a law enforcement officer remains free t......
-
State v. Jones
...subsequent cases involving reservations of similar Fourth Amendment claims. E. g., State v. Lewis, 385 So.2d 226 (La.1980); State v. Neyrey, 383 So.2d 1222 (La.1980); State v. Hutchinson, 349 So.2d 1252 (La.1977); State v. Lain, 347 So.2d 167 (La.1977). This is the most common context in wh......