State v. Nixon

• Decision Date: 09 February 1911
• Citation: 232 Mo. 496,134 S.W. 538
• Parties: STATE ex rel. ST. LOUIS DRESSED BEEF & PROVISION CO. v. NIXON et al., Judges.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

134 S.W. 538

232 Mo. 496

STATE ex rel. ST. LOUIS DRESSED BEEF & PROVISION CO. v. NIXON et al., Judges.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

February 9, 1911.

1. COURTS (§ 485)—TRANSFER OF CAUSE— COURT OF APPEALS—JURISDICTION.

Under Const. art. 6 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 212), providing that the jurisdiction of the St. Louis and Kansas City Courts of Appeals shall be co-extensive with the counties assigned to each court, and Rev. St. 1909, § 3926, providing that the jurisdiction of the Springfield Court of Appeals shall be co-extensive with enumerated counties, each Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals arising within its territorial limits, but no jurisdiction of appeals arising without such limits, and section 3939, authorizing the transfer of cases from one court to another, is void.

2. APPEARANCE (§ 19) — JURISDICTION ACQUIRED.

Where the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, want of jurisdiction of the person is cured by appearance.

3. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 21)—CONSENT TO JURISDICTION—COURT OF APPEALS.

The Springfield Court of Appeals is not a court of general inherent jurisdiction, but it has only appellate jurisdiction of cases arising within its territorial limits, and the parties to a case arising outside of such limits may not, by consent, confer jurisdiction on it.

4. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 21)—CONSENT TO JURISDICTION—JURISDICTION.

The jurisdiction of an appellate court limited by law to appeals arising within fixed territorial limits cannot be enlarged by consent of parties, so as to draw within it a case arising outside of such limits, though within such limits the court has jurisdiction of appeals involving the subject-matter of the appeal.

5. COURTS (§ 17) — "JURISDICTION" — SUBJECT-MATTER.

The subject-matter presented to a Court of Appeals is the action of the trial court as

shown by its rulings and judgment as preserved in the record, and where it has no power to review the action of the trial court of a county outside of its territorial limits, it has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the appeal; "jurisdiction" being the power which one has to do justice in cases brought before him.

Valliant, C. J., and Lamm, J., dissenting.

In banc. Prohibition by the State, on the relation of the St. Louis Dressed Beef & Provision Company against J. P. Nixon and others, Judges of the Springfield Court of Appeals, and a Judge of the St. Louis Circuit Court. Writ awarded.

This is an application for a writ of prohibition against the judges of the Springfield Court of Appeals and a judge of the St. Louis circuit court, to prevent further action in this case, which was transferred to the Springfield Court of Appeals from the St. Louis Court of Appeals. The application is based upon the following facts: At the October term, 1906, of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, one William Moudy, as plaintiff, obtained a judgment against the St. Louis Dressed Beef & Provision Company, a corporation, for personal injuries, in the sum of $5,000. The case was appealed to this court, and was later transferred from this court to the St. Louis Court of Appeals. Subsequently to this, and while the case was pending in the St. Louis Court of Appeals, it was transferred to the Springfield Court of Appeals by virtue of the provisions of section 3939, Rev. St. 1909, authorizing such transfers. Thereafter the case was docketed in the Springfield Court of Appeals, and the original defendant, petitioner in this case, appeared by counsel and orally argued the same. The Springfield Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, and has sent its mandate to the last-named court. Relator contends that, notwithstanding its appearance in the Springfield Court of Appeals, that court had no jurisdiction to decide the case, and that consequently its judgment and mandate are void.

W. B. & Ford W. Thompson, Fred Armstrong, Jr., and Ralph Crews, for relator.

FERRISS, J. (after stating the facts as above).

Article 6 of the Constitution (Ann. St. 1906, p. 212) provides that the jurisdiction of the St. Louis Court of Appeals and the Kansas City Court of Appeals shall be "co-extensive" with the counties assigned to each court, respectively. A similar provision is made by the act (section 3926, Rev. St. 1909) creating the Springfield Court of Appeals. In the recent case of State ex. rel. Dunham v. Nixon et al., 133 S. W. 336, this court, referring to said article 6, said: "When jurisdiction of a certain character is by that article conferred on a particular court, the jurisdiction so conferred is exclusive." It follows from this that each Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals arising within its territorial limits, and, necessarily, no jurisdiction of appeals arising within the territorial limits of either of the other Courts of Appeals. This court said further, in the above case, that "unless expressly authorized to do so, a court is without authority to transfer a case from it to another court"; that "the conferring of jurisdiction belongs to the law-making power of the state." This court held that the above act (section 3939) was unconstitutional and void, and therefore concluded, that, inasmuch as the act was void, the act of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in attempting to transfer the cause to the Springfield Court of Appeals was void, and that such attempt to transfer was without force or effect, and failed to confer jurisdiction on the Springfield Court of Appeals. It follows from the decision of this court in the above case that the case at bar is still pending in the St. Louis Court of Appeals, unless it has been removed to the Springfield court by consent of the parties.

It is urged that, inasmuch as the Springfield Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of causes of a similar nature to the one at bar, i. e., of causes arising from personal injuries, it therefore had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, and that objections to the jurisdiction of the persons were waived by appearance. This proposition is based on the well-known rule that want of jurisdiction of the person is cured by appearance, where the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter. In the light of this rule, however, we get but a superficial view of the matter. The real question lies deeper. It is this: Can the parties, by consent, invest a court with power not authorized by law or conferred upon it by the Constitution?

The Springfield Court of Appeals possesses limited powers. It is not a court of general inherent jurisdiction. In cases of the class to which belongs the case at bar, it has appellate jurisdiction only. Under the law as construed by this court, the Springfield court has no jurisdiction or power to review cases arising outside its present territorial limits. Such power has not been conferred by the Constitution. The Legislature has not given, and cannot give, such power, nor can such jurisdiction be acquired by transfer from another appellate court. The only method by which the Legislature can invest that court with jurisdiction of causes arising outside its present territorial limits is by changing and enlarging such limits. State ex rel. Dunham v. Nixon, supra. There is, then, an absolute want of jurisdiction, either general or special, in the Springfield court to hear this appeal from the St. Louis circuit court. Can the parties by consent bring into being that which is without existence? To hold that parties may by consent select an appellate court of their choice, and confer on such court a power not granted by the Constitution—a power which the Legislature cannot grant—would be a startling innovation upon the course of constitutional and orderly legal procedure. In view of the importance of the question under consideration, we will refer to the following cases.

The law of Tennessee provided that appeals and writs of error should lie from inferior courts within each of three divisions of the state to the Supreme Court of that division. A case, by consent of the parties, was appealed from one division to the Supreme Court of another division. The Supreme Court of each division had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of causes—using that term in its ordinary sense—but by statute had jurisdiction only of appeals arising within its district. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the case should be stricken from the docket, because the appeal arose outside the territorial limits of the division. Memphis Freight Co. v. Mayor of Memphis, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 249.

The Constitution of Connecticut, art. 5, § 1, provides: "The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court of Errors, a superior court, and such inferior courts as the General Assembly shall, from time to time, ordain and establish; the powers and jurisdiction of which courts shall be defined by law." The Legislature of that state enacted that "writs of error for errors in matters of law only may be brought from the judgments and decrees of the superior court, court of common pleas, and any city court, to the Supreme Court of Errors, in the judicial district or county where the judgments are rendered." Section 1145, Gen. St. Conn. 1888. A writ of error from the judgment of the superior court in New Haven county was brought to the Supreme Court of Errors in the First judicial district, and was heard there by consent of the parties. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut ruled as follows: "The case must be erased from the docket. The Supreme Court of Errors in the First judicial district has no jurisdiction to hear a writ of error from a judgment of the superior court in New Haven county, that county being in the Third judicial district." The court further said: "One court never has the power to pronounce the judgment of any other court to be...