State v. Noble
Decision Date | 20 September 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 2507,2507 |
Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Andrew Milo NOBLE, Appellant. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., William P. Dixon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.
Crampton & Keppel, P.C. by James H. Keppel, Scottsdale, for appellant.
Defendant Andrew Noble was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to a term of not less than ten nor more than twelve years in the Arizona State Prison. From this he appeals.
The pertinent facts are as follows: The defendant was charged with the armed robbery of the Dana Brothers Gas Station, of which Ed Moran was in charge. Several minutes after the incident, the defendant was picked up by the police as a suspect and driven back to the scene of the robbery for identification. The victim Ed Moran identified the defendant as one of the robbers, including the grey striped pants he was wearing at the time of the robbery and at the on-the-scene identification.
At the trial defense counsel attempted to introduce as evidence certain articles of clothing (including some green pants) allegedly belonging to the defendant and which he was wearing at the time he was booked into Maricopa County Jail approximately twenty hours after his arrest. The State objected on the grounds that it was irrelevant, immaterial, and lacking proper foundation. The court sustained the objection although some of the State's case regarding identification of the defendant hinged upon the victim's recollection that, at the time of the robbery, the defendant was wearing grey striped pants.
After both sides had rested, and after the opening portion of the State's summation, the court recessed. During the recess, the defendant made a demand to testify on his own behalf to a Deputy Sheriff. The matter was brought to the attention of the Deputy County Attorney who disclosed the situation to the Court and defense counsel. At this time a hearing was had without the defendant's presence, where the court tried to determine from defense counsel whether the defendant waived his right to testify. The court then proceeded with the closing arguments, instructions and submission of the case to the jury.
The defendant first claims that the trial court erred in its failure to have the defendant present at the hearing regarding the voluntariness of his waiver of his right to testify.
It is well established that in criminal prosecutions an accused has the right to testify in his own behalf. Ariz.Const.Art. 2 § 24, A.R.S.; State v. Tillery, 107 Ariz. 34, 481 P.2d 271 (1971); State v. Martin, 102 Ariz. 142, 426 P.2d 639 (1967).
The facts in the instant case are similar to those in State v. Galbreath, 97 Ariz. 361, 400 P.2d 842 (1965). In Galbreath, the record contained a certificate wherein the defendant's attorney stated the reason why he did not permit the defendant to take the stand, as well as the fact that the defendant had two prior felony convictions and had served sentences in the Arizona State Prison.
In the present case, Noble's attorneys, at the hearing on this matter, testified as follows:
'MR. WORTMAN: Your Honor, during our preparation for the trial of this case, discussing with the defendant the effect of his taking the stand in his own behalf or not taking the stand in his own behalf, and that was by way of passing, the Defendant until the conversation with the jailer, which we then had just a brief moment to discuss with the defendant after court recessed this morning but before counsel came into chambers at the Judge's behest, It had not become known to us prior to that time that the defendant bore a deep feeling with regard to testifying in this case, and so it had just come up upon the Court taking its recess, and that being just this morning.
* * *
* * *
'I'd say we talked to him for approximately 10 minutes, and the result of that conversation was to the effect that the Defendant withdrew his request to us that he be allowed to take the stand and give testimony in his own behalf, and acquiesced, if not agreed, with the advice of counsel that he not.
Noble did not voice his wish to testify until after the opening portion of the county attorney's closing argument to the jury. Apparently, he expressed no desire to testify prior to this time. Noble never told the judge but rather informed a guard. As we said in State v. Tillery, Supra:
107 Ariz. at 37, 481 P.2d at 274.
Furthermore, the county attorney filed a 'Motion to Add Allegation of Prior Conviction as an Addendum to the Information' in which is found the allegations that the defendant was convicted on two counts of perjury, both...
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People v. Curtis
...right, "the best means of demonstrating the defendant's state of mind are his own declarations" on the record. State v. Noble, 109 Ariz. 539, 541, 514 P.2d 460, 462 (1973). In summary we hold that waiver of the right to testify must be voluntary, knowing and intentional, and the existence o......
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Alicea v. Gagnon
...352 F.2d 639 (D.C.Cir.1965), as have several state courts. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1973); State v. Noble, 109 Ariz. 539, 514 P.2d 460 (1973); People v. Robles, 2 Cal.3d 205, 466 P.2d 710, 85 Cal.Rptr. 166 (1970); People v. Mosqueda, 5 Cal.App.3d 540, 85 Cal.Rptr. 3......
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State v. Douglas
...329, 253 N.E.2d 266 (1969); People v. Farrar, 36 Mich.App. 294, 304-305 n. 20, 193 N.W.2d 363, 369 (1972). See also State v. Noble, 109 Ariz. 539, 514 P.2d 460 (1973) (resting on the Arizona Constitution, which guarantees the right to testify). See also Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.1(e) (the failure to......
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State v. Albright
...(1976) (basis of right not expressed); Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115 (Alaska, 1973) (basis of right not expressed); State v. Noble, 109 Ariz. 539, 514 P.2d 460 (1973); People v. Knox, 58 Ill.App.3d 761, 16 Ill.Dec. 182, 374 N.E.2d 957 (1978); People v. Robles, 2 Cal.3d 205, 85 Cal.Rptr. 16......