State v. Nordstrom

• Decision Date: 11 June 1920
• Docket Number: No. 21,786.,21,786.
• Parties: STATE v. VICTOR NORDSTROM.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 136

146 Minn. 136

STATE v. VICTOR NORDSTROM.¹

No. 21,786.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 11, 1920.

Defendant was indicted by the grand jury of Hennepin county, charged with the crime of manufacturing intoxicating liquor, tried in the district court for that county before Jelley, J., and a jury, and found guilty as charged in the indictment. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied. From the order denying his motion for a new trial, and from the judgment sentencing him to pay a fine of $500, or in default thereof to be confined in the workhouse until the fine was paid, not exceeding

the term of one year, defendant appealed. Judgment and sentence modified.

H. K. Chance, for appellant.

Clifford L. Hilton, Attorney General, James E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Nash, County Attorney, and Arthur Markve, Assistant County Attorney, for respondent.

HALLAM, J.

1. Defendant was convicted of the charge of manufacturing intoxicating liquor contrary to the provision of chapter 455, p. 438, Laws of 1919, and he takes this appeal.

The statute reads as follows:

"The manufacture * * * of intoxicating liquor of any kind in any quantity whatever is prohibited within this state; provided that nothing in this act shall prevent the manufacture, sale or transportation of methyl or denatured alcohol, and provided further that nothing in this act shall prevent the manufacture, sale or transportation of methyl alcohol for chemical, mechanical, medicinal, pharmaceutical, scientific or industrial purposes, or of liquor for medicinal purposes, or of wine for sacramental purposes [or the use of so much alcohol as is necessary for legitimate purposes of extraction, solution or preservation in the manufacture of anything other than a beverage]."

The indictment charges that defendant "did wilfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully, manufacture one quart of intoxicating liquor, commonly called whiskey, to be used as a beverage and not to be used for chemical, mechanical, pharmaceutical, sacramental, scientific or industrial purposes; said whiskey then and there containing more than one-half of one per cent of alcohol by volume, said liquor not being a United States pharmacopoeia or national formulary preparation."

Defendant contends the indictment is defective because it does not negative the last exception in the statute which is inclosed in brackets. The contention is not well taken. In State v. Corcoran, 70 Minn. 12, 15, 72 N. W. 732, it was held that the test to determine whether an exception or proviso must be negatived in an indictment, is whether it is descriptive of the offense. If it is, it must be met by an allegation in the indictment, otherwise not. See also State v. Minor, 137 Minn. 254, 163 N. W. 514. The exception, which merely permits the use of alcohol in the manufacture of certain other articles, is in no sense descriptive of the offense of illegal manufacture of intoxicating liquor.

2. There was evidence that defendant made a confession of guilt. Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court to charge the jury that if defendant made the confession under the influence of "fear and duress and expected favor" because of said statements, then the confession should be disregarded. This request was rightfully refused, because there was no evidence that defendant made the confession attributed to him under the influence of fear, duress or expected favor. There is evidence that he was very much "scared" when apprehended with the implements and products of manufacture all about him, but this fact has no tendency to prove duress.

3. Section 8462, G. S. 1913, provides that: "A confession of the defendant shall not be sufficient to warrant his conviction without evidence that the offense charged has been committed."

Defendant contends that the foundation required by this statute was not laid. This statute is confirmatory of a common law rule quite well established in this country. Wigmore, Ev. §§ 2070, 2071; Underhill, Crim. Ev. § 147; Elliott, Ev. § 292. Under this common law rule it is not considered necessary that the evidence independent of the confession should establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. The confession may be received if there is other evidence reasonably tending to prove the corpus delicti, and, if the confession and other evidence together make proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that is sufficient. Flower v. United States, 116 Fed. 241, 53 C. C. A. 271. Daeche v. United States, 250 Fed. 566, 162 C. C. A. 582; People v. Harrison, 261 Ill. 517, 104 N. E. 259; State v. Skibiski, 245 Mo. 459, 150 S. W. 1038; Davis v. State, 141 Ala. 62, 37 South. 676; State v. Banusik, 84 N. J. Law, 640, 64 Atl. 994. We think the rule should be the same under our statute. In State v. Laliyer, 4 Minn. 277, 284 (368), the court held otherwise of a statute (Comp. St. 1849-1858, c. 118, § 6), which is the same as our present statute, except that in place of the present provision that a confession shall not be...