State v. Norman

• Decision Date: 15 October 1907
• Citation: 113 N.W. 340,135 Iowa 483
• Parties: STATE v. NORMAN.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

135 Iowa 483

113 N.W. 340

STATE

v.NORMAN.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 15, 1907.

Appeal from District Court, Decatur County; H. K. Evans, Judge.

Defendant was convicted of the larceny of domestic fowls in the nighttime from inclosed premises, under chapter 133, p. 122, Acts 30th Gen. Assem., and, from sentence of imprisonment in the penitentiary, as authorized by that act, he takes this appeal. Affirmed.C. W. Hoffman, Marion Woodard, and V. R. McGinnis, for appellant.

H. W. Byers, Atty. Gen., and Charles W. Lyon, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

McCLAIN, J.

1. The defendant challenged a juror on the ground that he was incompetent under Code, § 332, because not in full possession of the sense of seeing; but the only showing in the record is that the juror had a little defect in one eye. As it does not appear that this defect was such as to deprive him in any degree of his sight, in the usual sense of the term, we think the court was fully justified in overruling the objection.

2. One who was drawn as a juror was challenged by the state on the ground that he had formed and expressed an opinion, which would disqualify him from serving under the provisions of Code, § 3560. After an examination of the juror as to his qualification in this respect, the court sustained the challenge, and of this the defendant complains; but the rulings of the court as to the grounds of challenge will not be interfered with, unless there is an abuse of the discretion with which it is vested, and, on reading the record, we are satisfied that the ruling of the court was correct. Moreover, defendant cannot complain of the exclusion of a juror by the court, unless some prejudice is made to appear; and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the defendant was unable to secure a fair and impartial trial by reason of the exclusion of the challenged juror from the jury box.

3. Witnesses testified as to tracks which were found on the morning following the commission of the crime near the place where it was committed, and to finding corresponding tracks in front of the premises of a neighbor, and it is contended that this evidence was erroneously admitted. But the evidence for the state, of which that above referred to was a part, tended to connect the defendant with the crime charged by tracing him, by means of the tracks of a spring wagon, from the place where the crime was committed to the defendant's residence, and by identifying the footprints left near the place of the commission of the crime with those of the defendant and another person who was seen with him in a spring wagon during the night along a road which led from the place of the crime to the defendant's residence. The evidence was therefore clearly competent, and its weight was for the jury. A similar conclusion must be reached with reference to the evidence objected to by the defendant that the road along which the spring wagon was traced from the place of the crime to the defendant's residence was not the usual traveled highway, but a byroad, which was not likely to be used in driving from one place to the other. If the defendant had taken an unusual route to reach his destination, that fact would have some bearing on the question whether he was engaged in a legitimate enterprise at the time, or was, on the other hand, attempting to avoid observation, or otherwise carry out the general plan involved in committing the crime charged.

4. Complaint is made that the witnesses called by the state to impeach the reputation for truth and veracity of one of defendant's witnesses were allowed to speak with reference to his reputation in the community in which he lived nine months prior to the trial; but, as his residence in the meantime was not far removed from the place where he resided nine months before, we are unable to see that there was any error. The whole matter was largely within the discretion of the trial court, and there is nothing to indicate that the witness had any different reputation in the locality of his more recent residence than that which he had enjoyed where he formerly resided. There is no arbitrary rule fixing...