State v. Norval Hotel Co.
| Decision Date | 04 October 1921 |
| Docket Number | 16871 |
| Citation | 133 N.E. 75,103 Ohio St. 361 |
| Parties | The State Of Ohio v. The Norval Hotel Co. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Hotels - Regulation by public authorities - Constitutional law - Police power Section 843-1 et seq., General Code - Schedule of room rates - Increasing without notifying state fire marshal - Criminal law.
1. Where property is devoted to the business of a hotel and is held out to the public as a place where transient persons will be received and entertained as guests for compensation it is affected with a public interest and the business and use are subject to reasonable public regulation.
2. The provisions of Sections 843-1, 843-3, 843-8 and 843-18 General Code, regulating the business of hotel-keeping, were passed in the reasonable exercise of the police power and are not in conflict with any of the provisions of the State or Federal Constitutions.
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The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. E T. Lippincott, prosecuting attorney; Mr. John L. Cable; Mr John G. Price, attorney general, and Mr. Ray Martin, for the exceptions.
Mr. H. O. Bentley, against the exceptions.
The Hotel Company was indicted by the grand jury of Allen county. The indictment charged that in September, 1920, the company wilfully, * * * unlawfully, without serving notice on the state fire marshal of Ohio, required by Section 843-18, General Code, raised the rates of rooms in the hotel and did charge one Schwartz the sun' of $48 for the rental of one room from the 6th to the 10th of September, whereas the schedule of prices filed with the state fire marshal, as required by the statute, was $4 per day for the rental Of said room, or $16 in all.
The defendant company filed a general demurrer to the indictment, which was sustained by the court of common pleas.
The sections of the Code upon which the indictment was based are Sections 843-1 et seq., General Code. Section 843-1 contains a general definition of the term "hotel." By Section 843-3 it is provided that on or before May 1,1920, and the first day of January in each year thereafter, a license should be procured for each hotel conducted as described in the statute. Section 843-18 (108 O. L., pt. 1, 292) provides that the owner or manager of each hotel shall post in a conspicuous place in each room thereof a card or sign stating the price per day of such room, and shall file with the state fire marshal a diagram or list showing the price of each room in said hotel, and no advance shall be made in this schedule without twenty-days written notice to the state fire marshal.
It is contended that the sections of the statute under which this prosecution was instituted are unconstitutional because they interfere with the use of private property, in violation of Section 19, Article I of the Constitution of Ohio; that the statute is - not of uniform application throughout the state, in violation of Section 26, Article II of the Constitution of Ohio; and that the penalty which the law provides does not apply to the act charged in the indictment.
The business of keeping a hotel is closely related to the health and welfare of the public and has long been regarded as a thing affected with a public interest. At the common law an inn has been defined as a house which is held out to the public as a place where transient persons who come will be received and entertained as guests for compensation; as a public house for entertainment for all who choose to visit it. 14 R.C.L. 493.
License statutes have been adopted in many states, under which the keepers of hotels are required to be licensed, and regulations are prescribed concerning the maintenance and operation of hotels in the interest of the public health and welfare. No principle is better established than that when an owner devotes private property to the public use he so devotes it bound with notice that it will be subject to public regulation, both as to its use and as to the compensation to be paid for it. (Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113.) As was said by the court in German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, Supt. of insurance, 233 U.S. 389, in referring to former decisions of that court, they
The authority of the general assembly to regulate occupations by license and compel the payment of a reasonable license fee was sustained in Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio St. 63. In State, ex rel. Zielonka, City Solicitor, v. Carrel, Auditor, 99 Ohio St. 220, the amendment to Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, adopted in 1912, was under consideration, and it 'was there held that the state, under the provisions of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, has authority to levy excise taxes in the form of an occupational tax. The license or occupational tax is in no sense a tax on the property, but is a tax on the right to carry on the trade or to transact the business for which the license is granted. In Savers v. Smith, Secy. of State, 101 Ohio St. 132, it was held that under the general grant of legislative power conferred by Section 1, Article II of the Constitution, the legislature may tax rights, privileges and franchises, -
that an excise is a tax imposed upon the performance of an act, the engaging in an occupation, or the enjoyment of a privilege, and that by the provisions of Section 10, Article Kit of the Constitution, specific authority has been conferred for the levying of such a tax.
The thing charged against the defendant company in this case is that it had fixed 'one schedule of prices for its rooms in the schedule filed with the state fire...
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