State v. Nowlin
| Decision Date | 14 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D10-0172.,1D10-0172. |
| Citation | 50 So.3d 79 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Kayla Diane NOWLIN, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
STATE of Florida, Appellant,
v.
Kayla Diane NOWLIN, Appellee.
No. 1D10-0172.
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
First District.
Dec. 14, 2010.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Michael T. Kennett, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Lisa A. Anderson of Lisa A. Anderson Law, Panama City, for Appellee.
MARSTILLER, J.
Seventeen-year-old Kayla Diane Nowlin was at her home babysitting a neighbor's two-year old daughter on March 9, 2009. She had been caring for the child for approximately two weeks while the child's mother worked. Nowlin was under instruction by the mother not to keep the child in Nowlin's home because she owned a pit bull. The dog had bitten another neighborhood child in October 2008, although the two-year-old in Nowlin's care had been around the dog several times without incident. At some point on March 9, Nowlin and the child left Nowlin's home. Upon returning, Nowlin opened the front gate to her fenced yard, placed the toddler on the ground, and walked ahead of her toward the front door of the house. Moments later Nowlin heard the child screaming and turned around to see the
The State charged Nowlin with neglect of a child causing great bodily harm, a second-degree felony under section 827.03(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2009). Nowlin moved to dismiss the charge pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), and the trial court granted the motion. The court determined Nowlin cannot be held criminally liable for child neglect because she was a juvenile when the dog attack occurred and thus was not a "caregiver" as defined in chapter 39, Florida Statutes. The court also found the facts do not show that Nowlin's conduct constitutes culpable negligence. Reviewing the dismissal de novo, see State v. Sholl, 18 So.3d 1158, 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), we conclude the trial court incorrectly relied on the definition of "caregiver" in chapter 39, and that the undisputed facts create a jury question precluding the granting of Nowlin's motion to dismiss.
Under Rule 3.190(c)(4), a criminal charge can be dismissed if "[t]here are no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant." As we explained in Sholl, supra:
To avoid dismissal under Rule 3.190(c)(4), the State must present sufficient facts that, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, show a reasonable jury could find in its favor. See State v. Terma, 997 So.2d 1174, 1177-78 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (stating the State is entitled to the most favorable construction of the facts possible); State v. Ortiz, 766 So.2d 1137, 1141-42 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (stating that when considering a Rule 3.190(c)(4) motion, "the [S]tate is entitled to the most favorable construction of the evidence with all inferences being resolved against the defendant").18 So.3d at 1160. Nowlin was charged with child neglect causing great bodily harm under section 827.03(3), which provides in pertinent part:
(3)(a) "Neglect of a child" means:
1. A caregiver's failure or omission to provide a child with the care, supervision, and services necessary to maintain the child's physical and mental health, including, but not limited to, food, nutrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, medicine, and medical services that a prudent person would consider essential for the well-being of the child; ...
Neglect of a child may be based on repeated conduct or on a single incident or omission that results in, or could reasonably be expected to result in, serious physical or mental injury, or a substantial risk of death, to a child.
(b) A person who willfully or by culpable negligence neglects a child and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.§ 827.03(3), Fla. Stat. (2009). As used in chapter 827, a "caregiver" is "a parent, adult household member, or other person responsible for a child's welfare." § 827.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2009).
In its Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the trial court determined the "other person responsible for a child's welfare" portion of the definition of "caregiver" in section 827.01(1) "does not encompass the seventeen (17) year old Defendant in this case." Without articulating a reason, the court looked to section 39.01(47), Florida Statutes (2009), which for purposes of chapter 39 defines
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