State v. Noyes, 38584
| Decision Date | 29 September 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 38584,38584 |
| Citation | 418 P.2d 471,69 Wn.2d 441 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Sam NOYES, Appellant. |
Horrigan, Sullivan & McKinlay, Edward H. McKinlay, Pasco, for appellant.
C. J. Rabideau, Pros. Atty., Pasco, for respondent.
*
Appellant was charged with second degree murder. The jury found him guilty of manslaughter. His alternative motions in arrest and for a new trial were denied. He appeals from the judgment of conviction entered on the verdict.
Appellant and the deceased, Mrs. Renetta Smith, had maintained an illicit relationship for several years. While they lived together for short periods, her permanent residence was in Pasco, in eastern Washington, while appellant lived in Seattle, Tacoma or Olympia, according to his employment. Appellant would frequently drive across the mountains on weekends to see her. The state's evidence tended to show that appellant was jealous, and on occasion accused decedent and quarreled with her about associating with other men. On the evening of July 2, 1965, appellant left Olympia for Pasco, arriving at decedent's home in the early morning hours of July 3rd. The state's evidence was that a quarrel followed, during which appellant said, 'Woman, I've got a gun,' and 'I'm going to kill you.' This was followed by a shot, after which appellant fled. Deceased was found lying on the floor of her bedroom. She had been shot through the heart, and died in a very short time.
Appellant's version at the trial was that he was bringing the gun (a .22 caliber revolver) over from Olympia to give to the deceased for her protection; that on his arrival at her home, she got out of bed to admit him, then returned to bed, and he sat quietly in a rocking chair while they talked for a while. He denied any argument or quarrel, or threatening the deceased in any way. He then started to put the gun in a dresser drawer, deceased jumped out of bed, reached for the gun, and during a struggle for its possession, it was accidentally discharged and she fell to the floor. Appellant then panicked and fled, without stopping to ascertain her condition.
After leaving Pasco, appellant threw the gun, holster and a box of ammunition into a vacant field, then drove on. At Mesa, some 35 miles from Pasco, he turned himself in to the city marshall, told him of the shooting and claimed it was an accident. This was about 5:15 a.m. The marshall telephoned the sheriff's office, was told that the victim was dead, and was requested to hold appellant in custody.
Under sheriff Hood arrived there about 6 a.m., informed appellant of his right to counsel and that he did not have to make any statement until he talked to his attorney. Appellant said that he wanted an attorney as soon as he got back to Pasco, and then went right on talking. Mr. Hood placed appellant in the sheriff's car and started to close the door, but appellant said 'No, get in, I want to talk to you,' so Mr. Hood got in the back seat with him. Appellant told him of his reason for bringing the gun over from Olympia, his version of the shooting during the struggle for its possession, and described the place where he had thrown the gun out of the car near the cemetery,--all generally consistent with appellant's testimony at the trial.
The sheriffs then took appellant to the field near the cemetery where appellant said he had thrown the gun. At this point, they were met by Pasco police, and the sheriffs and police then searched for the gun, aided by the directions of appellant. Appellant soon said that he felt that he was going to be sick, and requested to be taken to the jail and locked up. This was done.
Thereafter and while in custody, the appellant was interrogated by Captain Hutton of the Pasco Police Department; a statement was obtained and was admitted in evidence. This forms the basis of appellant's eleventh assignment of error.
About 10 o'clock on the same morning (the 3rd), Captain Hutton, in ignorance of the request that appellant had made for counsel, interviewed him in the jail. He first advised appellant of his constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent, to have the assistance of counsel, and warned him that any statement he did make could be used against him in court. To this advice the appellant made no comment. The interview lasted some 2 hours and a statement was written down in question and answer form. Since the appellant was unable to read, Captain Hutton read the statement to him and he signed it.
That afternoon appellant requested counsel, and Captain Hutton telephoned the attorney whom appellant had requested. The attorney, however, did not see appellant until the following day.
There is no claim that at any time during the interrogation or otherwise there was any compulsion or coercion exerted upon appellant, that his statements to the officers were involuntary, that he did not understand his right to remain silent, his right to counsel, and that any statement could be used against him. At the trial, on cross-examination, appellant admitted making the statements to the officers substantially as they testified to them, with few exceptions. Chief among these was Captain Hutton's testimony that appellant told him that just before the shooting he had said to decedent that she ought to be ashamed of herself and that people were talking about her; appellant denied making this statement. There was also some discrepancy in the details of the shooting between the statement to the officers and appellant's testimony at the trial. In all substantial details, however, the appellant's testimony at the trial corresponded with the statements he had made to the officers, and he did not deny that these statements were voluntarily made.
During the trial, the court conducted a hearing in the absence of the jury pursuant to the requirement of Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 101.20W, RCW vol. O. At this time, the trial court was of the view that the appellant's statement to Captain Hutton was not a confession, but was rather an exculpatory statement, and did not enter written findings and conclusions until January 2, 1966. These findings recite the trial on September 13, 1965, appellant's objection during the trial to the admissibility of the statement obtained by Captain Hutton, the taking of testimony pursuant to the requirements of Rule 101.20W, and the advice by the court to the appellant of his right to testify at this hearing and his election in open court not to do so. The findings then set forth the relevant facts relating to the statement. Findings of fact Nos. 3 and 6 are as follows:
That prior to asking defendant, Sam Noyes, any questions, Kenneth W. Hutton orally advised defendant of his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as follows:
(a) Right to counsel at the time of questioning and at trial;
(b) Right to trial;
(c) Right to remain silent;
(d) That anything said by defendant could be later used against defendant in a Court of law; and, that defendant Sam Noyes advised Kenneth W. Hutton at that time that defendant understood his rights aforementioned. Finding of Fact No. 3.
That defendant did not demand the assistance of an attorney for advice during the questioning on July 3, 1965 by Kenneth W. Hutton. Finding of Fact No. 6.
The court concluded that the written statement, exhibit 19, was admissible and it was thereafter admitted in evidence.
The appeal in this cause was argued to this court June 14, 1966, the day following the announcement...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Carson
...jury altogether, a defendant may not waive his right to a unanimous verdict should the defendant elect a jury trial. State v. Noyes, 69 Wash.2d 441, 446, 418 P.2d 471 (1966) (When a hung jury stands 11 to 1 for acquittal, defendant is not permitted to waive a unanimous verdict and accept th......
-
State v. Rajnai
...Mich. 104, 211 N.W.2d 193, 200 (Sup.Ct.1973); State v. Harris, 106 R.I. 643, 262 A.2d 374, 376 (Sup.Ct.1970); State v. Noyes, 69 Wash.2d 441, 418 P.2d 471, 475 (Sup.Ct.1966), cert. den. 386 U.S. 968, 87 S.Ct. 1053, 18 L.Ed.2d 122 (1967). See also, 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3 ed. 1940), § 13 at 3......
-
State v. Rudd
...1, 222 N.E.2d 620, 628 (Sup.Ct.1966); Reimers v. State, 31 Wis.2d 457, 143 N.W.2d 525, 530 (Sup.Ct.1966); State v. Noyes, 69 Wash.Dec.2d 444, 418 P.2d 471, 474 (Sup.Ct.1966). In any event, we do not consider that Miranda, even if applicable, would bar the statement or seizure made at the de......
-
State v. Tishchenko, No. 38471-0-II (Wash. App. 4/13/2010)
...not have a duty to give a limiting instruction sua sponte. State v. Myers, 133 Wn.2d 26, 36, 941 P.2d 1102 (1997); State v. Noyes, 69 Wn.2d 441, 446-47, 418 P.2d 471 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 968 (1967). Moreover, "[i]n the absence of either a violation of constitutional right or a req......