State v. Oakley

• Decision Date: 21 July 2003
• Docket Number: No. 50782-6-I, No. 50783-4-I.
• Citation: 117 Wash.App. 730,72 P.3d 1114
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. James Gregory OAKLEY, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Cynthia Chadwick and Robert M. Asui, Respondents.

72 P.3d 1114

117 Wash.App. 730

STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. James Gregory OAKLEY, Respondent.

State of Washington, Appellant, v. Cynthia Chadwick and Robert M. Asui, Respondents.

Nos. 50782-6-I, 50783-4-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

July 21, 2003.

Christy J. Craig, King County Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Peter A. Camiel, Mair & Camiel, P.S., Seattle, WA, for Respondent James Gregory Oakley.

William A. Bowman, Andrea T. King, Fox, Bowman, Duarte, PLLC, Bellevue, WA, for Respondent Cynthia Chadwick.

Terri Ann Pollock, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Respondent Robert M. Asui.

COLEMAN, J.

The State demanded jury trials for each of the misdemeanor defendants in this case. The district court denied each demand because the defendants waived their rights to a jury trial and elected instead to proceed with a bench trial. The State filed writs of certiorari with the superior court. The superior court denied the writs, ruling that Washington statutes and court rules do not grant the State the right to demand a jury trial over a defendant's objection, and to the extent they do so, they violate the state constitution. We reverse. Washington statutes unambiguously require district courts to hold a jury trial when the State demands one. And those statutes are not unconstitutional because the Washington Constitution only guarantees defendants a jury trial, not the right to demand a bench trial.

FACTS

In three separate matters, the State filed misdemeanor charges against James Oakley, Cynthia Chadwick, and Robert Asui. In each case, the defendants signed a written waiver of their right to jury trial, but the State made a timely demand for a jury trial under CrRLJ 6.1.1. A district court judge denied each of the State's jury trial demands. The State filed writs of certiorari in the superior court for each case. The superior court consolidated the three cases for oral argument. After hearing argument, the superior court denied the State's writs. This court granted discretionary review and consolidated the cases on appeal in order to address the significant question of constitutional law and public interest they raise.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Respondents first argue that Washington statutes and court rules are ambiguous or in conflict as to whether, in criminal cases, a district court must impanel a jury when the State demands one and the defendant objects. But the legislature's intent is not ambiguous. The State has a statutory right to demand a jury trial in district court, even over a defendant's objection.

When construing a statute, our goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent. We look first to the statute's plain language. Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wash.2d 801, 807, 16 P.3d 583 (2001). When a statute's language is unambiguous, we will not alter its plain meaning by construction. State v. Bostrom, 127 Wash.2d 580, 586-87, 902 P.2d 157 (1995).

Where two criminal statutes, when read together, are susceptible to more than one reasonable, but irreconcilable, interpretation, the rule of lenity applies. Under that rule, we strictly construe the statutes in favor of the defendant. In re Sentence of Kindberg, 97 Wash.App. 287, 294, 983 P.2d 684 (1999). But we will not apply the rule of lenity where statutes are unambiguous or can be reconciled in a way that reflects the legislature's clear intent. See State v. O'Brien, 115 Wash.App. 599, 603, 63 P.3d 181 (2003).

Both RCW 3.66.010 and 10.04.050 unambiguously grant the State the right to demand a jury trial in district court. RCW 3.66.010 provides that "[t]he district court shall, upon the demand of either party, impanel a jury to try any civil or criminal case[.]" RCW 10.04.050 likewise provides that in district court trials, "the defendant or the state may demand a jury[.]" The trial court construed this language to mean that the court should only honor the State's jury demand if the defendant consents. But that construction overlooks the plain meaning of the word "demand" and ignores the plain language in RCW 3.66.010 directing that the court "shall" impanel a jury when either party demands one. There is simply no other reasonable construction of this language other than one giving the State the right to compel a jury trial in district court.¹

The defendants also argue that Washington statutes and court rules regarding jury trial waiver are in conflict. They are not. RCW 10.01.060 allows a criminal defendant to waive the right to jury trial with the court's consent:

No person informed against or indicted for a crime shall be convicted thereof, unless by admitting the truth of the charge in his plea, by confession in open court, or by the verdict of a jury, accepted and recorded by the court: PROVIDED HOWEVER, That except in capital cases, where the person informed against or indicted for a crime is represented by counsel, such person may, with the assent of the court, waive trial by jury and submit to trial by the court.

Respondents argue that this statute represents a legislative decision to give the judge and defendant the only voices in determining whether the defendant's trial will be by jury or by judge. They therefore argue that this statute is in irreconcilable conflict with the requirement in RCW 3.66.010 that the court impanel a jury when the State demands one. They further urge us to construe the court rules in their favor and hold, as did the trial court, that RCW 3.66.010 and RCW 10.04.050 grant the State the right to demand a jury trial only when the defendant consents.

But RCW 10.01.060, while silent on the State's right to demand a jury trial, does not purport to grant a defendant the right to demand a bench trial. The statute merely allows the court to proceed without a jury in the event that defendants "waive" the right to jury and "submit" to trial by the court. RCW 10.01.060. The use of those words neither expresses nor implies the establishment of a right on the part of the defendant, but instead addresses the appropriateness of the court proceeding without a jury when the defendant gives up the right to have one. There is nothing inconsistent about stating in one place that a defendant may give up a right, while stating in another place that the State may assert the same right.

We therefore hold that Washington statutes unambiguously require the district court to impanel a jury when the State timely demands one.² The question that remains is whether the legislature violated the Washington Constitution by granting the State the right to make such a demand over a defendant's objection.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Respondents argue that the above interpretation of Washington statutes and court rules violates the Washington Constitution. But a defendant's right to trial by jury does not give the defendant the opposite right to demand a bench trial. The legislature therefore did not violate the state constitution when it granted the State the right to demand a jury trial over the defendant's objection.

When this court analyzes the constitutionality of a statute, we begin with the presumption that a legislative act is constitutional. State v. Heckel, 143 Wash.2d 824, 832, 24 P.3d 404 (2001). The party challenging the statute has the burden of proving it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Heckel, 143 Wash.2d at 832, 24 P.3d 404. This high burden recognizes a degree of deference to the legislature, which is a co-equal branch of government sworn to uphold the constitution and presumed to have considered the constitutionality of its enactments. Island County v. State, 135 Wash.2d 141, 147, 955 P.2d 377 (1998). In addition, the state constitution gives the legislature the authority to prescribe the jurisdiction and powers of courts of limited jurisdiction. Const. art. 4, § 12. District courts must therefore abide by the procedures set forth by the legislature unless those procedures are unconstitutional.

In Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965), the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has no right to a nonjury trial under the federal Constitution. In Singer, the Court upheld a federal rule of criminal procedure requiring the government's consent for a criminal defendant's jury trial waiver. Respondents argue that Singer is distinguishable because Washington statutes give the court the sole discretion to decide whether to accept or reject a defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial. But as we have concluded above, Washington statutes give the State the right to demand a jury trial in district court criminal proceedings. There is no functional difference, in terms of a constitutional analysis, between a statute that conditions waiver on State approval and a statute allowing the State to make its own demand for a jury trial. The result in both cases is that the State may force a defendant to undergo a jury trial despite his or her preference for a bench trial. Singer, therefore, is indistinguishable and highly persuasive in our analysis under the Washington Constitution. See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 60-61, 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (quoting State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982) (Handler, J., concurring) ("The opinions of the Supreme Court, while not controlling on state courts construing their own constitutions, are nevertheless important guides on the subjects which they squarely address.")).

Washington courts have repeatedly cited Singer for the proposition that there is no constitutional right to a nonjury trial. In State v. Jones, 70 Wash.2d 591, 594, 424 P.2d 665 (1967), the state Supreme Court held that the trial court had the discretion to deny a defendant's request for a nonjury trial. The Jones court noted that "[t]he defendants were afforded their constitutional rights to a trial by a jury of their peers." Jones, 70 Wash.2d at 594,424 P.2d 665. In State v. Maloney, 78 Wash.2d 922, 927,...