State v. Oates

• Decision Date: 22 February 2000
• Parties: (Mo.banc 2000) . State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Reuben Darnell Oates, Appellant. Case Number: SC81977 Supreme Court of Missouri Handdown Date: 0
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

12 S.W.3d 307 (Mo.banc 2000)

This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.

State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Reuben Darnell Oates, Appellant.

Case Number: SC81977

Supreme Court of Missouri

Handdown Date: 02/22/2000

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Jackson County, Hon. Ronald R. Holliger

Counsel for Appellant: John R. Cullom

Counsel for Respondent: Philip M. Koppe

Opinion Summary:

During an argument, Reuben Darnell Oates shot a co-employee who attacked him. Oates was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and armed criminal action. He appeals.

AFFIRMED.

Court en banc holds:

(1) The trial court did not err when it disallowed questions to the venire panel regarding whether they could consider a self-defense claim where the victim was shot in the back of the head. Being shot in the back of the head does not rise to the level of a critical fact. While the circumstances pose substantial obstacles to the defense, the obstacles do not stem from preconceived bias among the venire.

(2) The trial court did not err in prohibiting closing argument that you can pursue your assailant until you secure yourself from danger. As the facts of this case do not involve the issue of withdrawal, the case relied upon by Oates is not on point.

(3) Because Oates offered direct evidence of his victim's bad acts to support his self-defense theory, he cannot complain that his character was subject to the same scrutiny by his prior bad acts, namely assaults that did not result in conviction.

(4) The court did not err when it asked the jury whether it could agree on the level of punishment before asking whether the jury found Oates guilty or not. The jury had already made it clear that it had reached a guilty verdict by informing the court that it had reached a verdict and asking whether the court could impose sentence. Also, afterwards, when the court asked the foreperson, the foreperson said the jury found Oates guilty.

Opinion Author: Ronnie L. White, Judge

Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED. All concur.

Opinion:

Appellant, Reuben Darnell Oates, was convicted after a jury trial of one count of voluntary manslaughter and one count of armed criminal action. Oates was sentenced to nine years imprisonment for voluntary manslaughter and three years for armed criminal action, to be served concurrently. This Court granted transfer of the case under article V, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution and Rule 83.03. We affirm.

Oates and Tyrus Hopkins, the victim, worked together at the Service Oil Station at Troost and Armour Boulevard in Kansas City. While working at the service station on the night of September 5, 1996, the two men became embroiled in an argument. Mr. Nathaniel Brown, a witness who was walking by the station, testified that he saw Hopkins grab Oates and place him in a full-nelson hold.¹ He further testified that the deceased appeared to be attempting to drag Oates into the service station. Oates broke free, pulled a handgun out of his pants, and began firing at Hopkins, shooting him once in the chin. Hopkins ran into the service station with Oates pursuing him and shooting at him.

Brown noticed a police cruiser driving by and flagged it down. Officer Briggs exited the cruiser just as Oates emerged from the service station still holding the handgun. Officer Briggs ordered Oates to drop his weapon and raise his hands in the air. Oates intitially ignored Officer Briggs' order, but complied after Officer Briggs repeated the order several times. After placing Oates under arrest, Officer Briggs entered the service station and noticed Hopkins lying in a fetal position on the floor in a closet. An autopsy later revealed that Hopkins had been shot once in the chin and once in the back of his head.

During voir dire, Oates' attorney asked, "[w]ould anybody on the panel believe that the fact that the person is shot in the back of the head automatically would defeat a self-defense claim?" The prosecution objected on the grounds that it asked for a commitment from the venirepersons. Oates' attorney offered two alternative phrasings for the question. First, he asked if anyone would be "unable to sit as a fair and impartial juror if they hear evidence that the deceased was shot in the back of the head." Alternatively, he suggested that he be permitted to ask, "[i]f the evidence comes in that there's a shot in the back of the head, can you still follow the self-defense instruction?" The trial court sustained objections against the question in all of these forms.

In his testimony at trial, Oates recounted the events before the shooting. He stated that he and Hopkins began arguing when neither man was willing to make change for a customer trying to pay for $10.00 worth of gasoline with a $100.00 bill. As the two men argued, the customer drove off without paying. Realizing that a $10 shortage in the receipts for the service station would result, Oates claims that Hopkins threatened him saying, "[i]f we come up short, I'm going to hurt you, I'm going to do something bad to you, I'm going to kill you." Oates testified that after the argument ended, Hopkins tackled him unexpectedly from his blind side as he sat on one of the concrete islands. When Oates finally escaped Hopkins grasp, Hopkins tried to hit Oates with his fist and again told him that he was going to kill him. Oates ducked the blow and Hopkins hit a wooden cigarette box on one of the concrete islands. As Hopkins again moved towards Oates, Oates pulled out his handgun and threatened to shoot Hopkins should it be necessary to protect his life. When Hopkins continued towards him, Oates shot Hopkins in the chin. Hopkins ran into the service station. Knowing that Hopkins kept a handgun in the desk drawer of the service station, Oates testified that he followed Hopkins into the service station and shot him in the back of the head as he was reaching in the drawer for the handgun.

I.

A defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial jury.² A necessary component of a guarantee for an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire that identifies unqualified jurors.³ However, the trial judge is vested with the discretion to judge the appropriateness of specific questions,⁴ and is generally vested with wide discretion in the conduct of voir dire.⁵ The judge is in the best position to determine "whether a disclosure of facts on voir dire sufficiently assures the defendant of an impartial jury without at the same time amounting to a prejudicial presentation of the evidence."⁶ Rulings by the trial court are reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.⁷ An appellate court will find reversible error only where an abuse of discretion is found and the defendant can demonstrate prejudice.⁸ Where an appellant claims that a trial court abused its discretion in conducting the voir dire, he has the burden of showing a "real probability" that he was prejudiced by the abuse.⁹

Oates first argues that the trial court erred when it disallowed questions to the venire panel during voir dire regarding whether they could consider his self-defense claim if the evidence showed the victim was shot in the back of the head. As mere general fairness questions are rarely sufficient to shed light on possible preconceived prejudices,¹⁰ it is important to permit a defendant to reveal critical facts in order to protect his right to search the venire panel for possible prejudice or bias. However, not every fact should be disclosed to the venire.¹¹ Only critical facts, those facts with a substantial potential for disqualifying bias, need be revealed.¹²

Oates contends that the shot in the back of the head constitutes a critical fact that should have been submitted to the venire panel. In support of his assertion, Oates points to State v. Clark¹³ for support regarding what constitutes a critical fact. In Clark, the defendant sought to ask the venire panel if they could fairly and objectively decide a case where one of the murder victims was three years old. The State filed a motion in limine, asking the court to prohibit the defense counsel from "seeking a commitment" from the venire by informing them of specific facts in the case. The trial court sustained the motion and ruled that the defendant was not entitled to voir dire on the specifics of the case. This Court determined that the trial court improperly limited the scope of voir dire and reversed the conviction. We determined that the age of the victim in Clark created a substantial potential for disqualifying bias that must be disclosed to the venire panel in the search for bias and partiality.¹⁴

The facts of this case are distinguishable from Clark. The critical fact in Clark involved the brutal murder of a very young child. There exists a prevalent perception among society that the killing of an innocent child is never justified, regardless of any extenuating circumstances. It is by virtue of this common perception that the circumstances of the murder in Clark constitute a critical fact that necessitates allowing the defense to probe the venire panel during voir dire. In contrast, being shot in the back of the head, while certainly a difficult fact for the defense to refute, does not rise to the level of a critical fact. Had the jury believed Oates' testimony that Hopkins was reaching into the drawer for a weapon with his back to Oates, a jury could determine that Oates was still in danger of serious harm or even death, despite the fatal shot to the back of head. Such circumstances might justify Oates' actions in the mind of a reasonable juror.

While the circumstances surrounding this case pose substantial obstacles to the defense, the obstacles do not stem from any preconceived bias among the venire. This case included undisputed evidence that the accused shot his unarmed victim once, followed the wounded victim inside the service station with a firearm, and then shot him again in the back of the head. There is also...