State v. Obeta, No. A08-1419 (Minn. App. 8/25/2009), A08-1419
| Decision Date | 25 August 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. A08-1419,A08-1419 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Nathan NMN Obeta, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court, Ramsey County, File No. 62-K9-07-003955.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, (for respondent)
Marie L. Wolf, Interim Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and Muehlberg, Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Following a jury trial, appellant Nathan Obeta was acquitted of kidnapping but convicted of first- and third-degree criminal sexual conduct. He was charged after 22-year-old M.B. reported to police that appellant raped her in the backseat of a Ford Bronco on the afternoon of April 26, 2007. Appellant claimed that M.B. consented to having sexual intercourse with him.
On appeal, appellant challenges a number of the district court's evidentiary rulings, which he claims prejudiced his ability to present a complete defense. Appellant further claims that the cumulative effect of the errors prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Because we are left with the firm impression that appellant did not receive a fair trial due to the cumulative effect of the district court's erroneous rulings, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
M.B. spent the evening of April 25, 2007, at the home of her friend, E.K. E.K. had invited two men, appellant and his friend A.S., to her home in Isanti after making contact with them on the "Live Links" phone chat service. The group listened to music, hung out, and drank alcohol. The men stayed at E.K.'s until the early morning hours of April 26, when M.B. decided to leave with them. Within a few blocks of E.K.'s home, A.S. ran a stop sign and was pulled over and arrested. The Bronco in which the three were riding was impounded, leaving M.A. and appellant without a vehicle, so M.B. decided to call her former boyfriend, T.G., for help. M.B. asked T.G. to help the group pick up A.S., who had been released from the Isanti County jail, and to drive to St. Paul, where the men lived, to pick up the vehicle's owner and obtain some money so that they could retrieve the Bronco from the impound lot in Braham. T.G. agreed to help and the group set out on their mission, which took most of the day.
During her opening statement, the prosecutor described M.B.'s relationship with T.G. as "volatile." M.B. testified that her relationship with T.G. was "abusive" and that T.G. was a "jealous man." M.B. claimed that while T.G. was driving the group around, he became more and more upset with her, and called her a whore and a bitch. M.B. denied flirting with any of the men, although she admitted that at one point she pretended to lift up her shirt (or "flash") the men in an effort to tease T.G. While the details of their testimony were not always consistent, T.G., A.S., and appellant all tended to agree that M.B. was flirting with the men, that she flashed them at least once, and that she seemed to be enjoying herself.
By the time the group returned to the impound lot in Braham to retrieve the Bronco, it was late afternoon on April 26. M.B. explained that she decided to get into the Bronco, rather than into T.G.'s vehicle, because she was afraid of T.G. A.S. testified that appellant claimed she wanted to go with them because T.G. beat her. Appellant testified that M.B. simply preferred to ride with him and his friends. T.G. acknowledged that he was upset at that point and testified that M.B. was "happy to go with" appellant and his group.
T.G. left in his vehicle and returned to his home in Isanti. The others drove back to St. Paul in the Bronco, with its owner driving, A.S. in the front passenger seat, and appellant and M.B. in the back seat. M.B. claimed that she kept asking to be brought home and that she became "uneasy" and eventually scared when the men kept driving toward St. Paul. M.B. also testified that at one point appellant told her that there was a gun in the car. Appellant and A.S., however, denied any talk about a gun and claimed that M.B. did not appear scared or ask to go home. They testified that everyone was smoking cigars and having fun, particularly M.B., who was dancing and who again flashed them.
After A.S. and the owner of the Bronco were dropped off at various locations in St. Paul, appellant drove to a parking lot in Roseville. M.B. claimed that appellant got into the back seat and forced her to have sex; appellant claimed that the intercourse was consensual. M.B. acknowledged that she did not fight or scream, but claimed that she asked appellant to stop.
Afterward, M.B. got out of the Bronco and went to a nearby gas station where she used the bathroom. M.B. testified that when she came out, appellant had driven away. Appellant testified that M.B. asked him for a ride back to Isanti, but that he had already told her he would not drive her back. Appellant testified that M.B. threatened to tell the police that appellant had raped her if he did not bring her home, but that he told her to go ahead because he knew he had not done anything wrong. Appellant claimed that M.B. laughed and walked away.
M.B. called several people in an attempt to find a ride home, but could not reach anyone. She was able to reach at least one friend, who testified that he did not intend to come and pick her up and that he merely told T.G. to go and get her. After realizing that her friend was not coming, M.B. flagged down a police car and reported that she had been raped.
The officer testified that M.B. "was very upset" and "crying," and that her "shoulders were slumped forward." M.B. was transported to the hospital, where she was examined by a sexual assault nurse. The nurse testified that M.B. was "very upset, very quiet, shaking at times." The nurse found several scratches on M.B.'s back and arms, but she did not discover any injuries to M.B.'s vaginal area. The nurse's audiotape interview of M.B. was replayed for the jury, with some redactions.
A police detective was assigned to investigate the case. Appellant came in voluntarily and during an interview told the detective that the sex was consensual, that M.B. had told him that she would find her own way home, but that she became upset after the sex when he refused to drive her back to Isanti.
During its deliberations, the jury asked several questions regarding M.B.'s interview with the nurse, and portions of the audiotape were replayed several times. The jury eventually acquitted appellant of kidnapping, but found him guilty of first- and third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the sexual assault nurse to testify about common injuries to and characteristics of sexual assault victims and to imply that because M.B. fit those characteristics she was such a victim. Appellant asserts that the testimony was improper expert testimony and that the nurse was vouching for M.B.'s credibility.1
To be admissible, expert testimony must be "helpful" to the jury and be based on special knowledge or training that laypeople and jurors do not have. Minn. R. Evid. 702; State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Minn. 1982). Because matters of witness credibility are generally within the competence and common experience of most jurors, the use of an expert's opinion to bolster the credibility of a witness is discouraged. See State v. Morales-Mulato, 744 N.W.2d 679, 687 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 2008). This is particularly true in cases involving sexual assault of an adult victim when the issue is consent; the state may not present testimony on typical reactions or experiences of rape victims. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229-30. "[S]uch testimony is of no help to the jury" because it is irrelevant whether the alleged victim "react[s] in a typical manner to the incident," and she "need not display the typical post-rape symptoms. . . to convince the jury that her view of the facts is the truth." Id. at 229.
In this case, the nurse and the detective were not asked their opinions about whether they believed M.B. was a sexual assault victim or whether they believed she was telling the truth. To that extent, the statements were not offered as true "expert" opinions and did not constitute "vouching" testimony. But the nurse and the detective were allowed to testify that, based on their experience, most women who are assaulted "have significant fear and don't fight back," that "they just lay there and wait for it to be over with for fear of being injured more," and that "there's a delay" in reporting in "the majority" of sexual assault cases, thus permitting the jury to infer that M.B. was a typical victim.
In Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229, the jury heard "discussion of the stages a rape victim typically goes through . . . essentially an explanation of `rape trauma syndrome.'" Although the statements of the nurse and the detective in this case were not so extensive and did not specifically refer to a syndrome, the statements were indirectly offered to explain M.B.'s reactions and symptoms and to allow the jury to draw inferences that M.B. was a typical rape victim. We therefore conclude that this testimony improperly invaded the province of the jury and the district court erred in allowing it over the continuing objections of defense counsel. See id. at 232; State v. Vue, 606 N.W.2d 719, 723 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied . Compare State v. Dunkel, single question to refute inference of late reporting and noting that state did not argue rape trauma syndrome in closing argument).
Appellant argues...
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