State v. Ocasio
Decision Date | 30 May 2000 |
Docket Number | (SC 16049) |
Citation | 253 Conn. 375,751 A.2d 825 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANGEL OCASIO |
McDonald, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Sullivan, Js.
Ronald G. Weller, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, and Carl E. Taylor, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).
Neal Cone, assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant).
The issues on this certified appeal are: (1) "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that literal, rather than substantial, compliance is required in order for a defendant's plea of guilty to be valid under Practice Book § 39-20?"; and (2) "If the answer to the first question is no, was there substantial compliance with Practice Book § 39-20 [in this case]?" State v. Ocasio, 247 Conn. 947, 723 A.2d 322 (1998). We answer the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The facts of this case as set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court are as follows: "On April 12, 1995, the state filed a five count information to which the defendant [Angel Ocasio] pleaded not guilty. On May 22, 1996, the day that jury selection began, the state filed a fifteen count substitute information. On May 23, 1996, pursuant to a plea agreement, the state filed a substitute information charging the defendant with one count of conspiracy to sell narcotics in violation of [General Statutes] §§ 21a-277 (a) and 53a-481 and one count of violating the Corrupt Organizations and Racketeering Activity Act in violation of [General Statutes] § 53-395 (c),2 to which the defendant entered a plea of guilty. "The trial court canvassed the defendant, pursuant to Practice Book §§ 711 through 722, now § § 39-18 through 39-28, and asked, `[I]s this plea voluntary?' to which the defendant stated, `Yes.' Further, the trial court informed the defendant of the impact of pleading guilty3 on his constitutional rights and then asked, `is that what you want, sir,' to which the defendant responded, `Yes.'
"The trial court accepted the defendant's plea of guilty and found it was `entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, with a full understanding of the offenses charged, as well as the possible consequences thereof, and after adequate and effective assistance of counsel.'" State v. Ocasio, 50 Conn. App. 748, 749-50, 718 A.2d 1018 (1998).
The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court claiming that the trial court improperly had accepted his guilty plea because it failed to ensure that the plea was voluntary, as required by Practice Book § 39-20, formerly Practice Book § 712.4 The Appellate Court agreed, holding that the trial court improperly had failed to inquire if the defendant's guilty plea was "`the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement'"; id., 756; and that that failure required reversal of the trial court's judgment. Id., 757. We granted the state's petition for certification; State v. Ocasio, supra, 247 Conn. 947; and we now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
This court has held repeatedly that Practice Book § 39-195 requires only substantial compliance. See State v. Domian, 235 Conn. 679, 689, 668 A.2d 1333 (1996) ( ); id., 688 ( ); State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 418, 512 A.2d 160, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940, 107 S. Ct. 423, 93 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1986) ( ); State v. Suggs, 194 Conn. 223, 226-27, 478 A.2d 1008 (1984) ( ); State v. Godek, 182 Conn. 353, 360, 438 A.2d 114 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031, 101 S. Ct. 1741, 68 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1981) ( ).
We can see no reason to apply a different standard of compliance to § 39-20. The Appellate Court reasoned that, Practice Book § 39-27 (1)6 provides that compliance with § 39-19 need only be "substantial" for a guilty plea to be valid; State v. Ocasio, supra, 50 Conn. App. 752-53; and the substantial compliance standard is inappropriate for § 39-20, because § 39-27 (2) contains no such qualifier. Section 39-27 (2) provides simply that a guilty plea may be withdrawn if "[t]he plea was involuntary...." The voluntariness of the plea, however, does not depend on the court's strict compliance with § 39-20.
As noted in Judge Shea's dissent from the Appellate Court's opinion, both § 39-19 and § 39-20 relate to the waiver of significant constitutional rights by a defendant in a criminal case. State v. Ocasio, supra, 50 Conn. App. 758 (Shea, J., dissenting). We stated in State v. Badgett, supra, 200 Conn. 418, that "[a] defendant can voluntarily and understandingly waive these rights without literal compliance with the prophylactic safeguards of Practice Book [§§ 39-19 and 39-20]." The defendant argues that this statement was dictum. We need not decide whether the statement was dictum, however, because we hold in this case that only substantial, rather than literal, compliance with § 39-20 is required in order to validate a defendant's plea of guilty.
We further conclude that the test for substantial compliance is whether, in light of all of the circumstances, the trial court's literal compliance with § 39-20 would have made any difference in the trial court's determination that the plea was voluntary. See State v. Domian, supra, 235 Conn. 688 ( ). In light of all of the circumstances of the defendant's guilty plea, we conclude that the trial court substantially complied with § 39-20. We note that the trial court thoroughly canvassed the defendant before accepting his plea and that the defendant explicitly stated that his plea was voluntary. The record contains nothing to suggest that the defendant would have responded affirmatively if the trial court had asked whether his guilty plea was the result of force or threats or promises apart from the plea agreement. He made no claim of any threats or promises, and he has not made such a claim on appeal.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court.
1. General Statutes § 21a-277 (a) provides: "Any person who manufactures, distributes, sells, prescribes, dispenses, compounds, transports with the intent to sell or dispense, possesses with the intent to sell or dispense, offers, gives or administers to another person any controlled substance which is a hallucinogenic substance other than marijuana, or a narcotic substance, except as authorized in this chapter, for a first offense, shall be imprisoned not more than fifteen years and may be fined not more than fifty thousand dollars or be both fined and imprisoned; and for a second offense shall be imprisoned not more than thirty years and may be fined not more than one...
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