State v. Suggs

• Decision Date: 07 August 1984
• Citation: 194 Conn. 223,478 A.2d 1008
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Leamond SUGGS.

Page 1008

478 A.2d 1008

194 Conn. 223

STATE of Connecticut v. Leamond SUGGS.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 1, 1984.

Decided Aug. 7, 1984.

Clarence E. Sawyer, Jr., Sp. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Julia D. Dewey, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Arnold Markle, State's Atty., Michael Dearington, Chief Asst. State's Atty., and Jill Fisch, legal intern, for appellee (state).

Before SPEZIALE, C.J., and PETERS, ARTHUR H. HEALEY, PARSKEY and SHEA, JJ.

SPEZIALE, Chief Judge.

The defendant, Leamond Suggs, pleaded guilty to a charge of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c. On appeal from the judgment rendered, the defendant claims that the trial court did not fully advise him of the constitutional rights he was waiving before it accepted his plea of guilty. We find no error.

The factual basis for the defendant's guilty plea is not in dispute. On December 10, 1981, the defendant and Leslie Bailey entered a market in New Haven. Each was armed with a handgun. After emptying the cash register and a cash box, one of the men shot and killed one of the market's owners. Both men then fled. Subsequently, Leslie Bailey was apprehended and implicated the defendant as the person who had fired the fatal shot.

The defendant entered a not guilty plea on March 1, 1982, to the felony murder charge. On October 4, 1982, the defendant withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). Before accepting the guilty plea, the trial court canvassed the defendant in accordance with Practice Book § 711. ¹ The trial court determined that the defendant understood the Alford doctrine, the felony murder charge, and the maximum sentence the trial court could impose. It also inquired into the defendant's educational background and asked whether the defendant was satisfied with his relationship with his attorney. The trial court then advised the defendant that he was waiving certain constitutional rights including the right to trial by court or jury, the right to "face" his accusers in the courtroom, and the right against self-incrimination. ²

After a recitation of the factual basis for the guilty plea by the assistant state's attorney, the trial court accepted the defendant's guilty plea. On January 25, 1983, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment of thirty years.

The defendant claims on appeal that his guilty plea must be vacated due to the trial court's failure to advise him that he had the right: to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, to plead not guilty or to persist in a not guilty plea if one has been made, and to have the assistance of counsel at a trial. See Practice Book § 711. We find that there has been substantial compliance with Practice Book § 711 and that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights.

" 'In order for a plea of guilty to be constitutionally valid, the record must affirmatively disclose that the defendant entered the plea voluntarily and intelligently. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 [1969]; Blue v. Robinson, 173 Conn. 360, 373, 377 A.2d 1108 [1977]; Consiglio v. Warden, 160 Conn. 151, 162, 276 A.2d 773 [1970].' State v. Marra, 174 Conn. 338, 340, 387 A.2d 550 (1978); see State v. Collins, 176 Conn. 7, 9, 404 A.2d 871 (1978)." State v. Godek, 182 Conn. 353, 356-57, 438 A.2d 114 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031, 101 S.Ct. 1741, 68 L.Ed.2d 226 (1981). Practice Book § 711 was promulgated to ensure that such guilty pleas are made voluntarily and with full knowledge of the waiver of constitutional rights. State v. Godek, supra. Not every deviation from the specific requirements of a Practice Book rule necessitates reversal. "[W]here there has been a substantial compliance with [§ 711], such that none of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights has been infringed upon, the failure to comply with each and every requirement of [§ 711] does not automatically require the vacating of the defendant's plea." State v. Godek, supra, 182 Conn. 360, 438 A.2d 114.

In Boykin v. Alabama, supra, three federal constitutional rights waived by a plea of guilty were identified: "First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reasons of the Fourteenth [Amendment].... Second, is the right to trial by jury.... Third, is the right to confront one's accusers." ³ Id., 395 U.S. 243, 89 S.Ct. 1712.

The record in this case indicates that none of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights has been infringed upon. The defendant argues that the trial court's questions of the defendant whether he was waiving his "right to face your accuser here in the courtroom" were insufficient to advise the defendant of his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. We disagree. The commonly understood meaning of the word confront is "to face." Indeed, a defendant unsophisticated in the law might be better informed of the right to confront witnesses by the use of the more commonly understood term, "face." ⁴ The trial court did not err in advising the defendant that he had the right to "face" his accusers rather than "confront" his accusers.

The defendant also argues that he was not informed by the trial court of his right to counsel during trial. The record shows that the defendant had the advice and assistance of counsel throughout the plea bargaining negotiations. The trial court thoroughly inquired whether the defendant had discussed the plea with counsel and whether the defendant was satisfied with his counsel. The defendant was aware of his right to counsel. See State v. Gethers, 193 Conn. 526, 480 A.2d 435 (1984).

The defendant's final claim is that he was not informed of his right to enter, or persist in, a not guilty plea. The trial court did canvass the defendant's reasons for entering a guilty plea and the defendant explained that he believed he would be found guilty if the case went to trial. The colloquy between the trial court and the defendant clearly demonstrated the defendant's awareness that he could plead not guilty and undergo a trial. ⁵

The record indicates that there has been substantial compliance with Practice Book § 711 and that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his constitutional rights in entering his plea of guilty.

There is no error.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Practice Book § 711 provides: "The judicial authority shall not accept the plea without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that he fully understands:

"(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered;

"(2) The mandatory minimum sentence, if any;

"(3) The fact that the statute for the particular offense does not permit the sentence to be suspended;

"(4) The maximum possible sentence on the charge, including, if there are several charges, the maximum sentence possible from consecutive sentences and including, when applicable, the fact that a different or additional punishment may be authorized by reason of a previous conviction; and

"(5) The fact that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, and the fact that he has the right to be tried by a jury or a judge and that at that trial he has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against...