State v. Ockij
Citation | 145 N.W. 486,165 Iowa 237 |
Parties | STATE v. OCKIJ. |
Decision Date | 10 February 1914 |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Monroe County; D. M. Anderson, Judge.
Defendant was indicted, charged with the crime of assault with intent to commit murder, was convicted of assault with intent to inflict a great bodily injury, and appeals. Affirmed.John T. Clarkson and N. E. Kendall, both of Albia, and David Streiff, for appellant.
George Cosson, Atty. Gen., and John Fletcher, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
[1] 1. It is said the court erred in overruling defendant's motion for a continuance. The motion was based upon the absence of one Gulic, who was desired by defendant as a witness. It appears there were six persons present at the time of the shooting, four besides the defendant and the prosecuting witness. Of these, the prosecuting witness and one other testified for the state, and the defendant for himself. Of the three others, defendant claims two were friendly to the state. Of these two, one had gone to New Mexico, and the whereabouts of the other was unknown. The other, Gulic, was desired as a witness for defendant. It is shown that Gulic left Buxton, in Monroe county, and went to Illinois some two months before the trial; that he promised to return and testify for defendant at the trial, but, instead, went to Pennsylvania.
On April 21, 1913, the case was assigned for trial and set for May 7, 1913. The motion was not made until the day set for trial. The indictment was returned September 19, 1912. It is shown that the defense knew some time before the trial that Gulic was going to leave the state. There was no showing of any attempt to reach the witness, either by mail, telegraph, or by service of subpœna. There is no showing of any effort to locate the witness in Pennsylvania, nor is it shown that his whereabouts in Pennsylvania are known, or any probability that the testimony could be procured if the case had been continued. Under the circumstances, there was no abuse of discretion in overruling the motion.
2. The court did not instruct as to included offenses below that for which defendant was convicted. It is contended by appellant that the court should have instructed as to assault and battery and simple assault, and that, for the failure to do so, there was error. It seems to be admitted by counsel for both the defendant and the state that the test is whether there was any evidence tending to support the lower degrees or grades of the charge in the indictment, and, if so, then the court should not assume the functions of the jury, but should instruct as to such lower degrees of which there is evidence, even though such evidence is not strong.
[2] The court must determine whether there is any substantial evidence of such lower degrees, and, if there is none, it is not error to fail to instruct as to them. It is undoubtedly true that in many cases where a person is charged with assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury, or a higher assault, the lower degrees of assault and battery and simple assault would be included. But this depends upon the character of the assault, the weapon used, the character of the injury, and in the intent.
[3] Because of the verdict, it is not necessary to discuss the higher degrees than that for which the conviction was had. A great bodily injury is an injury to the person of a more grave and serious character than an ordinary battery, but it cannot be definitely defined. State v. Gillett, 56 Iowa, 459, 9 N. W. 362.
[4] Where a person makes an assault on another and inflicts upon him an injury of a more grave and serious character than an ordinary battery, the presumption is warranted that he intended to inflict a great bodily injury, if there is no evidence tending to show that he intended a less injury. State v. Gillett, supra.
[5] The question is: Was there in this case any evidence tending to show that defendant intended less than a great bodily injury, or any evidence upon which a verdict of assault and battery or simple assault could be sustained?
The shooting occurred about June 22, 1912. Andrew Zeber, who is also referred to in the record as Zever, the prosecuting witness, had been expelled or suspended from some lodge or society a week or two before this shooting for nonpayment of dues. As to the transaction in question, he testified that on the night of the shooting he went home to his boarding house, through the room where the shooting afterwards took place, and went on upstairs to his own room. Later he went downstairs and inquired of Green, the proprietor, whether his buddy had come yet, and was told he had not come. That defendant and two or three others were talking about lodge, and Zeber told them it was no use to talk about that there, but to go and talk at the meeting. Defendant said, “Hello, Andrew,” and Zeber said, “Hello.” Continuing in the language of the witness:
On cross-examination, he further testified:
Zeber was a foreigner, and did not, perhaps, express himself as we would, but we take this last evidence of his to mean that defendant aimed the pistol directly at his head. Another witness gives the distance between them as six feet. Another witness for the state corroborates this witness in these matters. It is clear that Zeber put his arm up before his face when he saw the pistol, just before the shot. This is shown by Zeber's evidence and by the medical evidence. The physician who dressed the wound testifies that Zeber was shot through the forearm and that there was an abrasion on his cheek. He says:
Defendant testified in regard to the transaction:
On cross-examination, he testified: ...
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State v. Williams
...on lessor included offenses is required, it must be justified by the evidence. Quoting from another Iowa case, State v. Ockij, 165 Iowa 237, 145 N.W. 486 (1914), the court "The jury ought not to be allowed to speculate upon a supposed state of facts, of which there is no evidence, in order ......
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State v. Schmidt
...not in itself determinative of the intent, may be considered as bearing thereon. State v. Gillett, 56 Iowa 459, 9 N.W. 362; State v. Ockij, 165 Iowa 237, 145 N.W. 486; State v. Dickson, 200 Iowa 17, 202 N.W. 225; State v. Grimm, 206 Iowa 1178, 221 N.W. 804; State v. Crandall, 227 Iowa 311, ......