State v. Oliver

• Decision Date: 01 September 1984
• Docket Number: No. 109,109
• Citation: 302 Md. 592,490 A.2d 242
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. Harrison OLIVER, Danny Lee Oliver, Harrison Lee Oliver, III, Ralph Ray Kolb, Irene Katherine Kolb. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 592

302 Md. 592

490 A.2d 242

STATE of Maryland v. Harrison OLIVER, Danny Lee Oliver, Harrison Lee Oliver, III, Ralph Ray Kolb, Irene Katherine Kolb.

No. 109, Sept. Term, 1984.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 8, 1985.

Stephanie J. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Mark Colvin, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender and Barbara L. Matthews, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellees.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE and RODOWSKY, JJ., and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals (retired), Specially Assigned.

CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals (retired) Specially Assigned.

Harrison Oliver, also known as Harrison Lee Oliver, III, ¹ Danny Lee Oliver, Ralph Ray Kolb and Irene Katherine Kolb had a common complaint. They believed that the Whether the trial court could properly impose separate five year periods of probation running consecutively on Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1984 Cum.Supp.) Article 27, § 641A provides:

                Circuit Court for Carroll County erred in imposing, as to each of them, consecutive periods of probation which in the aggregate were in excess of five years. 2  They took their complaint to the Court of Special Appeals by way of direct appeals.   That court shared their belief.   It held that the sentencing judge erred when he imposed consecutive terms of probation so that the total probationary period was in excess of five years.   Oliver v. State, 59 Md.App. 383, 391, 475 A.2d 1230 (1984).   The court vacated the sentences as imposed on Harrison Oliver, Ralph Ray Kolb and Irene Katherine Kolb and remanded the cases for resentencing.   As to Danny Lee Oliver, it determined that the probationary period did not in fact exceed five years and affirmed the judgment of the trial court as to him.   Id.  The State was aggrieved by the action of the Court of Special Appeals in vacating the sentences.   It filed a petition with this Court for the issuance of a writ of certiorari.   We were willing that the record and proceedings be certified to us and issued an order granting the writ as requested. 3  The sole question on this appeal is, as set out in the State's petition for a writ of certiorari
                each count in an indictment consistent with Art. 27, § 641A(a) where each count involved an offense taking place at a different time and in a different location?   4
                

(a) Suspension of sentence; probation.--Upon entering a judgment of conviction, the court having jurisdiction may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. The court may impose a sentence for a specified period and provide that a lesser period be served in confinement, suspend the remainder of the sentence and grant probation for a period longer than the sentence but not in excess of 5 years. However, if the defendant consents in writing, the court may grant probation in excess of 5 years, but only for purposes of making restitution.

(b) Probation when offense punishable by fine and imprisonment; limitation, revocation or modification.--Probation may be granted whether the offense is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. If the offense is punishable by both fine and imprisonment, the court may impose a fine and place the defendant on probation as to the imprisonment. Probation may be limited to one or more (c) Commencement of probation on date of release as a condition.--If a sentence of imprisonment is imposed, a portion of it is suspended, and the defendant is placed on probation, the court may impose as a condition of probation that the probation commence on the date the defendant is actually released from imprisonment.

                counts or indictments, but, in the absence of express limitation, shall extend to the entire sentence and judgment.   The court may revoke or modify any condition of probation or may reduce the period of probation
                

We hold that a judge exercising the authority bestowed by § 641A shall not grant probation for a period to run consecutively to any other period of probation if the total of the probationary periods exceeds five years, unless, as the statute expressly provides, the defendant, for the purpose of making restitution, consents in writing to a longer period. The holding applies when probation is granted under one conviction and when it is granted with respect to each of a number of convictions even though those convictions were for crimes committed in the jurisdiction of other courts, at different times, and in different places, against the person or property of different persons and presented in separate charging documents containing multi-counts. Whether the grants of probation were in one sentencing proceeding or several different proceedings, and whether the outstanding periods of probation emanated in the jurisdiction of the current sentencing court or in some other jurisdiction is immaterial.

This is not to say that a defendant will never be under probation for more than five years except for restitutional purposes. Although a probationary period may not be imposed in the face of an outstanding probationary period to commence at the termination of the outstanding period, that is, consecutively, unless the aggregate period is less than five years, it may be imposed to commence at the effective date of the subsequent period of probation (either at the date of the grant or upon the defendant's actual release from imprisonment, see Art. 27, § 641A(c)) to run When the question presented in the certiorari petition is considered in the light of our holding, the answer to the question is "no." We explain how we reached our holding.

                concurrently with the outstanding period of probation even if the result is that the aggregate period is more than five years.   For example, a defendant is placed on probation for five years.   Six months later, upon another conviction, he is granted five years probation.   That probation must run concurrently with the former probation.   But he will actually be under probation in such circumstance for five years and six [490 A.2d 245] months.   This is consistent with our holding.   Otherwise, a defendant who had completed four years and eleven months of a five year probationary period at the time he was convicted of another offense, could be placed on probation under the new conviction for only one month.   This is not what our holding contemplates
                

The History of the Case

In order to put the question presented and the particular facts of the instant cases in proper perspective, we point out that some of the charges as to Harrison Oliver and Irene Katherine Kolb on which the challenged sentences were imposed originated in Frederick County. They were charged in three informations filed in that county with the daytime housebreaking of and theft from three residences in that county. They pleaded guilty to certain of the charges. The cases were transferred to Carroll County for sentencing pursuant to Maryland Rule 732 (now Rule 4-244). Each of the Respondents was also charged with a number of crimes committed in Carroll County. Irene Katherine Kolb was charged in one information containing 25 counts with the breaking of 11 different places and with related offenses committed at various times between 24 February 1979 and 1 January 1980. Harrison Oliver was charged in one information containing 13 counts with the breaking of 6 different places and with related offenses committed at various times between 30 November and 23 December 1979. Ralph Ray Kolb was charged in one The sentencing judge did not grant probation in excess of five years upon suspending the sentence imposed on any one conviction. But he directed that the probationary periods, for the most part five years each, run consecutively. Thus, the total probation time for each of the Respondents was far in excess of five years--30 years for Harrison, 15 years for Ralph Ray Kolb following his release from prison under sentences totaling 13 years, eight years of which were suspended, and 50 years for Irene Katherine Kolb following her release from prison under sentences totaling 73 years, 63 years of which were suspended. ⁵

                information containing seven counts with the breaking of three different places and with related crimes committed at various times between 30 November 1979 and 1 January 1980.   Each Respondent was convicted of certain of the offenses charged
                

The question presented, therefore, is in the frame of reference of convictions, suspension of the execution of sentences imposed thereon, and grants of probation with respect to crimes committed in two counties, at different times and different places against the property of different persons and charged in separate charging documents containing multi-counts. As to each Respondent, the punishments were imposed at one sentencing proceeding.

The resolution of the question requires the construction of § 641A. "We have repeated time and again that the cardinal principle of statutory construction is to determine the legislative intent. To do this we look first to the language in the statute. If it is clear, then we need look no further. If it is unclear and ambiguous, we seek other aids

                in uncovering the legislative intent or in recognizing the legislative purpose."   Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Spitz, 300 Md. 466, 474, 479 A.2d 363 (1984) (citations omitted)
                

The Language of the Statute

Both the State and the Respondents express a belief that § 641A is clear and unambiguous, although the Respondents do so more adamantly than does the State. The fact is, however, that the State and the Respondents are at odds with what they believe is the clear import of the statute. The State asserts that "the Legislature by its express language limited the grant of...