State v. Oliver
Decision Date | 02 October 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 2002-CA-00820-SCT.,2002-CA-00820-SCT. |
Parties | STATE of Mississippi v. Darrell OLIVER. |
Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
G. Gilmore Martin, Vicksburg, attorney for appellant.
Patrick Joseph McNamara, Jr., attorney for appellee.
EN BANC.
¶ 1. The State of Mississippi appeals the dismissal by the Circuit Court of Warren County of the indictment charging Darrell Oliver with possession of cocaine. Because the trial court's dismissal of a petition to revoke a previously imposed suspended sentence based upon new criminal charges does not prevent a subsequent indictment and trial on the same criminal charges, we reverse and remand.
¶ 2. On July 10, 2001, officers of the Vicksburg Police Department were dispatched to the Relax Inn because of a reported disturbance caused by an irate female. Upon their arrival, the female was not in sight but a trail of blood led the police officers to Room 406. The officers knocked on the door of the room, and it was opened by Darrell Oliver. After a conversation with Oliver on the walkway outside of the room, Sergeant William Combs entered the room to check on the well-being of the unnamed female. After a brief search of the bathroom, Officer Combs discovered the female hiding in the shower. Officer Combs further discovered on a table a green leafy substance that had the appearance and smell of marijuana. Oliver then acknowledged that he was on probation and gave the officers the name of his probation officer. Combs obtained verbal consent to search the room; however, he soon became suspicious, due to the actions of Oliver, that Oliver might have some substance on his person. Combs then instructed Oliver to enter the bathroom and submit to a body cavity search. Upon entering the bathroom, Oliver threw into the toilet a substance which had been concealed on his person. The officers alleged this substance was cocaine. A struggle ensued, resulting in Oliver's arrest for possession of cocaine. Oliver was subsequently charged by the Vicksburg Police Department with possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver.
¶ 3. Inasmuch as Oliver was a prior convicted felon still under a suspended sentence and supervised probation at the time of the events of July 10, 2001, the State, on August 22, 2001, filed a petition to revoke Oliver's prior suspended sentence, alleging that he had committed a new offense in violation of the terms of the previously imposed suspended sentence and supervised probation.1 On August 24, 2001, a revocation hearing was held in the Circuit Court of Warren County involving the alleged violations of probation. Oliver, who was represented by counsel at the revocation hearing, waived the required five-day notice. At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Oliver moved to dismiss the charges. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the State failed to prove cocaine possession with the intent to deliver because no crime lab report was introduced into evidence establishing that the substance was in fact cocaine.
¶ 4. Subsequently on October 16, 2001, Oliver was indicted by the Warren County Grand Jury on the charge of possession of cocaine, enhanced as a subsequent drug offender under Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-147 (Rev.2001). Oliver then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment or, in the alternative, to suppress evidence. A hearing was held on January 25, 2002, and on March 7, 2002, the trial court granted Oliver's motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of collateral estoppel. The trial court reaffirmed its decision on April 19, 2002. The State timely perfected this appeal citing only one issue for this Court's consideration—whether the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment charging Darrell Oliver with possession of cocaine on the grounds of collateral estoppel.
¶ 5. In considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court should consider the evidence fairly and should dismiss the case only if it would find for the defendant. Alexander v. Brown, 793 So.2d 601, 603 (Miss.2001) (citing Stewart v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 700 So.2d 255, 259 (Miss. 1997)). The court must deny a motion to dismiss "only if the judge would be obliged to find for the [State] if the evidence were all the evidence offered in the case." Id. Therefore, this Court applies the "substantial evidence/manifest error" standards to an appeal of a grant or denial of a motion to dismiss. Id.
¶ 6. The State argues the trial court erred by dismissing the indictment on the grounds of collateral estoppel. The State also argues that where there is no violation of the double jeopardy clause of either the United States Constitution or the Mississippi Constitution, then collateral estoppel is inapplicable.
¶ 7. The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that an issue of ultimate fact determined by a prior judgment may not be relitigated between the same parties in a subsequent action. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1193, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). Because Ashe and its progeny construe collateral estoppel to mean much more, this Court, although it has followed Ashe and its progeny, has not extended the protection beyond that provided by double jeopardy. Sanders v. State, 429 So.2d 245, 250 (Miss.1983). In Sanders this court stated:
Id. at 251. In Sanders, this Court adopted the collateral estoppel analysis of Ashe only because "it has become so firmly embedded in federal criminal constitutional procedural jurisprudence—illogical though it is." Id.
Because collateral estoppel does not work in [all] criminal cases, "[W]e would prefer to cast the Court's decision here in pure double jeopardy terms, never mentioning collateral estoppel." Sanders v. State, 429 So.2d 245, 251 (Miss. 1983). Whether framed in terms of "collateral estoppel"—that the issue of fact has been previously decided unfavorably to the [S]tate—or in terms of "double jeopardy"—successive prosecutions for the same criminal conduct—the analysis is identical.
Griffin v. State, 545 So.2d 729, 734 n. 1 (Miss.1989) (emphasis added).
¶ 8. Because of the different issues in a revocation hearing and trial on the indictment, the different burdens of proof, the different arbiters of fact, and issues of public policy, collateral estoppel does not forbid subsequent prosecution. The specific issue litigated in a revocation hearing differs from that of a trial on the merits. A revocation hearing is conducted to enforce the court's order imposing conditions on a defendant under a suspended sentence. The issue to be determined at trial on the indictment is whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the charge. These are very different issues; therefore, collateral estoppel does not apply.
¶ 9. A revocation hearing requires proof showing a defendant more likely than not violated the terms of probation. Wallace v. State, 607 So.2d 1184, 1190 (Miss.1992). This decreased burden of proof also allows for a relaxed rules of evidence and procedure. See Williams v. State, 409 So.2d 1331, 1332 (Miss.1982) (). The sole determiner of fact is a judge. This Court has also held that "[a]n order revoking a suspension of sentence or revoking probation is not appealable." Pipkin v. State, 292 So.2d 181, 182 (Miss.1974). See also Beasley v. State, 795 So.2d 539, 540 (Miss.2001).
¶ 10. A revocation hearing is comparable to a preliminary hearing. Both hearings are conducted to determine probable cause, and both hearings are decided by a single arbiter of fact. Like a revocation hearing, a preliminary hearing also involves relaxed rules of evidence. Pursuant to URCCC 6.04, the dismissal of a charge at a preliminary hearing does not bar further prosecution by the State for the same offense.
¶ 11. Williams, 409 So.2d at 1331-32. Because the subsequent indictment was not barred by the dismissal of the prior probation revocation...
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