State v. Olson
| Decision Date | 07 July 1911 |
| Docket Number | 17,076,17,077 - (7,6) |
| Citation | 131 N.W. 1084,115 Minn. 153 |
| Parties | STATE v. JOHN OLSON |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
John Olson was convicted in the municipal court of Minneapolis of disorderly conduct and sentenced to hard labor in the workhouse for a term not exceeding thirty days. From an order, Leary, J., denying defendant's motion for a new trial and to vacate and modify the judgment, he appealed. Affirmed.
Complaint sufficient.
The complaint against defendant, charging him with disorderly conduct in violation of the ordinances of the city of Minneapolis, as entered in the records of the court below held sufficiently specific and definite, within the meaning of section 17, c. 34, Sp. Laws 1889.
Municipal court of Minneapolis.
The purpose of that statute was to simplify municipal court procedure in petty offenses, and is not unconstitutional.
Brief statement of offense.
The "brief statement" of the offense there authorized to be entered by the clerk in the records of the court, and to "stand in the place of the complaint," need not be as full and specific as a formal written complaint. State v. Swanson, 106 Minn. 288, distinguished and limited.
Withdrawal of plea.
An application to be permitted to withdraw a plea of guilty to a criminal charge after judgment of conviction thereon is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Discretion of court.
In refusing the relief in this case, it is held that the court did not abuse its discretion.
Mead & Bryngelson, for appellants.
Daniel Fish and William G. Compton, for the state.
Defendant was prosecuted and convicted of disorderly conduct, in violation of the ordinances of the city of Minneapolis, and appealed from the judgment.
Upon being arrested and brought before the court, an oral complaint was made against defendant by one Burke, and entered by the clerk of the court in the court records. As so entered the complaint sufficiently charged a violation of the ordinance against disorderly conduct, and defendant interposed a plea of not guilty. The case was then adjourned to the following day, when defendant appeared personally and by counsel, and withdrew the plea of not guilty, and entered a plea of guilty, whereupon the court sentenced him to thirty days in the workhouse. Thereafter defendant employed new counsel, who moved the court for an order vacating the judgment, for leave to withdraw the plea of guilty, for a new trial, and for other relief. The motion was denied.
Defendant contends: (1) That the complaint charging disorderly conduct does not state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense; and (2) that the plea of guilty was obtained from defendant by fraud and duress, and that it should have been set aside and a new trial granted. We dispose of these points in the order stated.
1. The contention that the complaint is insufficient rests in part upon the theory that the only complaint made against defendant appears upon the "court tab," a memorandum made by some officer of the court, giving the date of arrest, the charge, "disorderly conduct," when defendant was arraigned in court, and the plea entered. But in this contention counsel are in error. The records of the court, kept by the clerk, recite that on "January 19th, 1911, H. M. Burke duly makes complaint against defendant and says: That at and within the corporate limits of the city of Minneapolis, on the 18th day of January, 1911, the defendant, then and there being, did wilfully, unlawfully and wrongfully make, aid, countenance and assist in making a noise, riot, disturbance and improper diversion in a public place, * * *" contrary to the ordinance of the city. In view of this record, which cannot be impeached by affidavit, it cannot be held that the court "tab" was the only complaint lodged against defendant.
But defendant also claims that the complaint so recorded in the minutes of the court was insufficient. The question whether the recorded complaint was a compliance with the law is controlled by the provisions of section 17, c. 34, p. 609 Sp. Laws 1889, an act relating to the municipal court of the city of Minneapolis. The statute provides: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial