State v. One (1) Ford Van, Econoline, White, Bearing Delaware Registration C80-195 S/N-E14GHR09151

• Decision Date: 17 November 1977
• Citation: 381 A.2d 387,154 N.J.Super. 326
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ONE (1) FORD VAN, ECONOLINE, White, Bearing Delaware Registration C80-195 S/N E14GHR09151 in possession of Edward H. Kurth; Edward H. Kurth, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 326

154 N.J.Super. 326

381 A.2d 387

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ONE (1) FORD VAN, ECONOLINE, White, Bearing Delaware Registration C80-195 S/N E14GHR09151 in possession of Edward H. Kurth; Edward H. Kurth Defendant-Appellant.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued Oct. 12, 1977.

Decided Nov. 17, 1977.

Edward H. Kurth pro se.

William F. Bolan, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-respondent (William F. Hyland, Atty. Gen., attorney).

Before Judges MATTHEWS, CRANE and ANTELL.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ANTELL, J. A. D.

Appellant is the registered owner of a motor vehicle adjudged forfeited to the State of New Jersey pursuant to N.J.S.A. 24:21-35 b(4). The trial judge found that it had been used for the transportation of marijuana, a controlled dangerous substance, and the material facts are recited in its written opinion reported at 143 N.J.Super. 512, 363 A.2d 928 (Law Div. 1976). Briefly, appellant gave unrestricted use of the vehicle to his son who, in turn, lent it to Mark Stenerson, knowing that it would be used for the illicit purpose. Finding that Kurth, Jr., and not Kurth, Sr., who "(u)nquestionably" did not know of the transaction, was the "true owner" of the car, the judge concluded that the case did not come within the exception from forfeiture provided for "the owner" of the vehicle who establishes that he had no knowledge of the transaction. N.J.S.A. 24:21-35(b)(4)(b).

On this appeal the questions presented are: (1) who was the owner of the vehicle within the meaning of the statute? If Kurth, Sr. was the owner, (2) does his lack of knowledge bring the case within the exception? If the case does not fall within the exception, (3) is the judgment of forfeiture nevertheless subject to attack on due process grounds arising from the 14-month delay between seizure of the vehicle and institution of the forfeiture proceeding?

As the trial judge correctly observed, the Legislature obviously intended the sanction of forfeiture as a means of deterring the traffic in illicit drugs. But it clearly manifested its belief that forfeiture of a vehicle would not serve the statutory policy where the owner thereof was of innocent knowledge. It did so by excepting such vehicles in specified cases explained infra. When called upon to specify what the Legislature intended by "owner" the trial judge drew heavily on the assumption that by defining the term conducively to forfeiture it would be fulfilling its primary duty of effectuating the underlying statutory policy. As he wrote at page 517, 363 A.2d at page 930 of his opinion:

N.J.S.A. 24:21-35b(4)(b) is but a section of the New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substance Act adopted by L. 1970, c. 226, and must to the greatest extent possible be given consideration and effect sensitive to the spirit of the legislative direction and thus we must not blindly follow the literal sense of the terms. State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 342 A.2d 841 (1975).

To accept and apply the limited and technical definition of the word "owner" and hold it to be restricted to the registered title owner would be an open subversion of the legislative intent. The eradication of drug traffic and its promiscuous use is a matter of grave concern to society in general, and to our courts and Legislature in particular. That is the obvious, reasonable and clear intent and purpose of the New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substance Act.

The conclusion reached below was evidently induced by the belief that "eradication of drug traffic and its promiscuous use" as a legislative goal was a proper factor to be weighed in ascertaining who the "owner" was. In fact, the two are unrelated. As we noted, the Legislature determined that forfeiture of an innocent owner's vehicle would not serve the purposes of the New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substance Act. Yet the judge's inquiry was largely governed by the aim of fostering that very policy which the lawmakers said should not apply to an innocent "owner." He first decided which of the two Kurths had guilty knowledge, and then concluded that given its choice the Legislature would want that person found to be the owner.

Would the result here have been the same if it were Kurth Sr. and not Kurth Jr. who had guilty knowledge? Apparently not. The judge found Kurth Jr. to be the owner because appellant had released "the benefits of ownership" to his son, including "custody," "use" and "control." But resting upon the uncontradicted facts that appellant paid for the vehicle, retained title in his name, purchased insurance on the car in his name as owner, paid for repairs, paid for gas and oil in the form of an allowance to his son, and taking into account the lack of any understanding between father and son that the latter would be the owner, the judge could just as plausibly have found appellant to be the owner. The Legislature did not intend the courts to have such broad license to grant or withhold relief from forfeiture in this conveniently opaque situation.

While it is true that forfeiture statutes, like all statutes, must be fairly and reasonably construed, it should be remembered that generally forfeitures are not favored in the law, particularly where the Legislature has provided appropriate exceptions from the scope of the forfeiture provision.

Statutes designed to relieve from the rigors of forfeiture are looked on warmly and construed liberally, so as to afford the maximum relief, and where a liberal construction of a statute will avoid the imposition of a forfeiture it will be so construed. On the other hand, a statute imposing a forfeiture should be construed strictly and in a manner as favorable to the person whose property is to be seized as is consistent with the fair principles of interpretation. . . . The courts will not search for a construction to bring about a forfeiture; nor will a constrained construction be indulged in in order to create a forfeiture. (37 C.J.S., Forfeitures, § 4b.)

Also see, 36 Am.Jur.2d, Forfeitures and Penalties, § 8; U.S. v. One 1936 Model Ford, 307 U.S. 219, 226, 59 S.Ct. 861, 83 L.Ed. 1249 (1939); State v. Garcia, 114 N.J.Super. 444, 447, 276 A.2d 880 (Law Div. 1971); State v. La Bella, 88 N.J.Super. 330, 338, 212 A.2d 192 (Law Div. 1965). What governs in each case is the intent of the lawmakers. We take note that State v. Moriarty, 97 N.J.Super. 458, 474, 235 A.2d 247 (Law Div. 1967), aff'd 102 N.J.Super. 579, 246 A.2d 476 (App.Div. 1968), aff'd sub nom. Farley v. $168,400.97, 55 N.J. 31, 259 A.2d 201 (1969), is to the effect that forfeiture statutes are not to be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. The observation there made, however, was not essential to the court's opinion and the particular point was not specifically passed upon by either of the appellate courts which reviewed that decision. Furthermore, the forfeiture statute there involved did not contain an excepting provision as in the case before us.

By providing an exception in the case of innocent "owners" the Legislature intended to provide a standard of fixed and precise meaning unaffected by the vagarious factual patterns as they might arise in the individual cases. Under N.J.S.A. 39:1-1 the word "owner" is defined to mean "a person who holds the legal title of a vehicle." While it is true that the definition is provided for use "in this subtitle," we have held that the registered owner "is presumptively the real owner." Tinsman v. Parsekian,65 N.J.Super. 217, 222, 167 A.2d 407 (App.Div. 1961). In this connection the following discussion in Merchant's Indemnity Corp. of N.Y. v. Eggleston, 68 N.J.Super. 235, 172 A.2d 206 (App.Div. 1961), aff'd 37 N.J. 114, 179 A.2d 505 (1962), is apposite:

* * * Nor can we say, objectively, that the holder of legal title is not the "owner" in one proper sense of the term. Both common usage and our Motor Vehicle Registration Law, N.J.S.A. 39:3-3 et seq., so recognize him. Moreover, our Supreme Court, in a number of cases in recent years, has held that the above statutes constitute the official reflector of ownership of a motor vehicle. See National City Bank of New York v. Del Sordo, 16 N.J. 530 (109 A.2d 631) (1954), involving the recording of chattel mortgages on motor vehicles; Eggerding v. Bicknell, 20 N.J. 106, (118 A.2d 820) (1955), holding that an automobile dealer which had yet to transfer title to one of its vehicles in accordance with the statutory procedure was still the "owner" thereof for purposes of insurance coverage under the terms of its policy; and Norris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 437, (170 A.2d 33) (1961), also holding that the named assured had acquired "ownership" of a vehicle within the meaning of a liability clause when he acquired statutory title thereto, even if it were shown that the car was in fact used exclusively by his son and intended as a gift for the son. The important point concerning these cases, and distinguishing them from the instant matter, is that no assertion of fraud or misrepresentation with respect to ownership was involved. The decisions simply recognized the proposition, with which we are in full accord, that the holder of statutory title to a motor vehicle is in a real sense the "owner" thereof. * * * (at 247-248, 172 A.2d at 212.)

American Hardware Mutual v. Muller & Ladd, 98 N.J.Super. 119, 236 A.2d 182 (Ch.Div.1967), aff'd 103 N.J.Super. 9, 246 A.2d 493 (App.Div.1968), certif. den. 53 N.J. 85, 248 A.2d 437 (1968), and State v. Closter Village, 31 N.J.Super. 566, 107 A.2d 433 (Cty.Ct.1954), aff'd 18 N.J. 179, 113 A.2d 169 (1935), relied upon by the trial judge, are distinguishable. The former was a declaratory judgment action to determine coverage under an insurance policy. There the insured was held to be the "owner" of the vehicle where it was purchased, paid for and maintained by him, even though it was titled in the name of his son in order to obtain financing, and where the insured...