State v. One Certain Ford Coupe Auto.
| Decision Date | 06 March 1928 |
| Docket Number | 38838 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Appellant, v. ONE CERTAIN FORD COUPE AUTOMOBILE; MRS. C. S. EASTMAN, Intervener, Appellee |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Black Hawk District Court.--H. B. BOIES, Judge.
Proceedings under the statute for the condemnation of a conveyance claimed to have been unlawfully used in the transportation of intoxicating liquors. A petition of intervention was filed by one claiming ownership of the property. The court ordered the conveyance released to the intervener, and the State appeals.
Affirmed.
John Fletcher, Attorney-general, Neil Garrett, Assistant Attorney-general, F. W. Edwards, County Attorney, and Ralph William Travis, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
No appearance for appellees.
This proceeding is had under Chapter 97 of the Code of 1924. An information was filed, as provided by Code Section 2005, charging that a certain Ford coupe had been unlawfully employed in the transportation of intoxicating liquors, and that said coupe had been seized, and was now in the custody of the sheriff, and alleging, on information and belief, that said conveyance belonged to one Charles Eastman. Eastman appeared, and filed an answer to said information, denying that he owned said coupe. The wife of Eastman filed a petition of intervention, alleging that she was the owner of said coupe, and that the said Charles Eastman had no interest therein, and denying that she had ever used the same for the unlawful transportation of liquor, and also alleging that she had "never given her consent to anyone to so use said car." The State filed an answer, containing a general denial of the petition of intervention, and the case proceeded to trial. The evidence is in conflict; but there is evidence tending to show that Eastman had used the Ford coupe in question at various times in the transportation of liquor unlawfully. There was also evidence tending to show that the intervener, Mrs. Eastman, had been with her husband in the car on the 27th day of March, 1927, at a time when said parties unlawfully transported 25 gallons of liquor in said coupe from the place of one Williams. The conveyance in question was seized three days later. At the time the car was seized, there was no liquor found in it. It appeared that, prior to the 27th day of March, Eastman had been arrested for violation of the liquor laws, and had had a preliminary trial, at which the intervener, his wife, was present. She also testified that she knew that Eastman was using said car. The trial court found that the said coupe was the property of the intervener, and also found that:
"The undisputed evidence further establishes that no intoxicating liquors were found in or on said Ford coupe when so seized."
The court further found that:
"The presumption contemplated by Subdivision 4 of Section 2010 of the Code does not arise, and that, under the pleadings and evidence in this case, an order of forfeiture would not be warranted."
I. We at once meet the proposition as to whether or not there can be a forfeiture of a conveyance that has been used in the unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor where no such liquor is found in the automobile at the time of the seizure. Code Section 2001 is as follows:
"A peace officer who discovers that intoxicating liquor has been or is being transported in violation of law, shall summarily arrest the offender and likewise seize said liquor and the conveyance used to effect said transportation."
This section clearly covers a situation where a conveyance "has been used in the transportation of intoxicating liquor." The law does not require that the intoxicating liquor must be found in the conveyance at the very instant that the conveyance is seized. If a conveyance is used for the unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor, and the liquor has been delivered and removed from the conveyance before the seizure, it would be a clear perversion of the statute to hold that the conveyance was not subject to seizure and condemnation thereafter, merely because the liquor was not in the conveyance at the very moment of seizure. The statute expressly covers the case of a conveyance that "has been used" for the transportation of intoxicating liquor.
II. On the question of proof, however, where a claim to the conveyance is asserted, the statute provides (Code Section 2010, Paragraph 4):
"If it be made to appear that any intoxicating liquors were found in or on said conveyance when it was seized, it shall be presumed that the conveyance was, when seized, employed with the knowledge and consent of all claimants, in the unlawful transportation of such liquors."
This provision of the statute refers only to the question of the presumption that arises where the intoxicating liquors are "found in or on said conveyance when it was seized." The existence of the intoxicating liquor in or on the conveyance at the very time of the seizure raises the presumption, under the statute, that the conveyance was, when seized, employed, with the knowledge and consent of all claimants, in the unlawful transportation of said liquor. But where the evidence shows that the conveyance in fact "has been used" in the unlawful transportation of the intoxicating liquors, and is seized under the statute for condemnation because of such use, even though no intoxicating liquors are found in the conveyance at the moment of the seizure, and the presumption under the statute does not arise because thereof,...
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