State v. Orendain
| Decision Date | 11 February 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. CR-96-0161-PR,CR-96-0161-PR |
| Citation | 188 Ariz. 54,932 P.2d 1325 |
| Parties | , 236 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 8 STATE of Arizona, Appellee. v. Ruben Renteria ORENDAIN, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Defendant Ruben Renteria Orendain was tried and convicted on drug charges. In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed the convictions and held that the trial court committed structural error when it gave a non-standard "possession of marijuana" instruction to the jury. State v. Orendain, 185 Ariz. 348, 352-53, 916 P.2d 1064, 1068-69 (App.1996). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), A.R.S. § 12-120.24, and Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.19. We vacate that part of the court of appeals' opinion concerning the jury instructions and affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.
The facts relevant to defendant's arrest and indictment are set forth in the court of appeals' opinion. Orendain, 185 Ariz. at 350, 916 P.2d at 1066. For purposes of this opinion, it is sufficient to state that defendant was the subject of a highway vehicular stop, following which an investigation disclosed a quantity of marijuana concealed in the vehicle . Accordingly, defendant was arrested and duly charged. At the start of a two-day trial, the court stated to the jury: At the close of evidence, the court gave the jury a series of instructions, including Recommended Arizona Jury Instruction (RAJI) Standard Criminal 5, which states:
The law does not require a defendant to prove innocence. Every defendant is presumed by law to be innocent. The State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This means the State must prove each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If you conclude that the State has not met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, then reasonable doubt exists, and the defendant must be acquitted of that charge.
(Emphasis added). The court further instructed the jury that defendant's pleas of "not guilty" required the State to prove "every part of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis added).
A separate non-standard instruction on possession of marijuana, which defendant now argues constituted structural error, consisted of four parts. First, the court instructed the jury that "[p]ossession requires either actual physical possession or constructive possession." Second, the court defined constructive possession as "mean[ing] that the marijuana was found in a place under the defendant's dominion and control." Third, the court instructed that
[b]oth direct and circumstantial evidence may be used to show possession of marijuana. The evidence must link the defendant to the marijuana in a manner and to an extent that a reasonable inference arises that the defendant knew of the existence and whereabouts of the marijuana and that he had dominion and control of the marijuana.
(Emphasis added).
Fourth, the court instructed the jury that
[t]he mere presence of the defendant at the scene where marijuana is found is not sufficient by itself to show that the defendant possessed the marijuana. There must be presented specific facts [from] which it may be reasonably inferred that the defendant knew of the marijuana's existence and whereabouts.
(Emphasis added).
At trial, defendant objected to part two of the possession instruction on the ground that it did not adequately reflect the legal standard for constructive possession set forth in State v. Villalobos Alvarez, 155 Ariz. 244, 245, 745 P.2d 991, 992 (App.1987). The court overruled the objection.
On appeal, however, defendant argued for the first time that, by incorporating the terms "reasonable inference" and "reasonably inferred" in parts three and four of the instruction, the trial court diminished the State's requisite burden of proof, thus committing structural error. 1 The court of appeals agreed and held that use of the terms "reasonable" and "reasonably" in the instruction that "possession" may be proved by inference, drawn either from direct or circumstantial evidence, constituted structural error. Because of its fundamental nature, structural error can be raised for the first time on appeal, and, the appellate court reasoned, required reversal of defendant's conviction. Orendain, 185 Ariz. at 353, 916 P.2d at 1069, citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993).
We review de novo whether these instructions to the jury properly stated the law. United States v. Sterner, 23 F.3d 250, 252 (9th Cir.1994). After review of the record, we conclude that the challenged instruction did not amount to structural or fundamental error.
Before instructing the jury on actual or constructive possession of marijuana, the court, without objection, gave the following instruction on the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence and the appropriate function of the jury in assessing or weighing either form of evidence:
Direct evidence is the testimony of a witness that saw an event. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of a fact from which the existence of another fact may be inferred. You must determine the weight to be given to all the evidence without regard to whether it is direct or circumstantial.
RAJI Standard Criminal 24 (1989) (emphasis added).
Defendant's argument on appeal with regard to the possession instruction ignores the fact that the challenged instruction referred explicitly to direct as well as circumstantial evidence: "Both direct and circumstantial evidence may be used to show possession of marijuana." We believe that the "reasonable inference" language, on the facts of this case, did nothing more than strengthen the essence of the circumstantial evidence language, thereby placing the instruction, which the jury had heard only moments before, in a context fully in harmony with the expressed standard for constructive possession of marijuana.
A circumstantial evidence instruction is not fundamental error when given with a legally sound reasonable doubt instruction. See State v. Jensen, 106 Ariz. 421, 423, 477 P.2d 252, 254 (1970). The reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not deficient. The jury was properly instructed that it must acquit defendant if the State failed to prove even a single element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, and we have previously held and continue to believe that this instruction meets requisite constitutional standards. State v....
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