State v. Ornelas

Decision Date05 November 1937
Docket Number4296.
PartiesSTATE v. ORNELAS.
CourtNew Mexico Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1938.

Appeal from District Court, San Miguel County; Luis E. Armijo Judge.

Eulalio Ornelas, also known as Jose Rodriguez, was convicted of unlawfully exploding a charge of dynamite, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Nathaniel Lloyd, of Las Vegas, for appellant.

Frank H. Patton, Atty. Gen., and Richard E. Manson, Asst. Atty Gen., for the State.

BICKLEY Justice.

Appellant was charged with unlawfully, feloniously, and maliciously exploding a charge of dynamite at or near a water tank used to supply the town of Terrero and the mining operations therein, with intent to injure or destroy said water tank whereby said water tank was in fact destroyed, and with intent to injure, intimidate, and terrify human beings within the said town of Terrero, contrary to the form of section 35-2516, N.M.S.A.1929, which is a part of chapter 115, Laws of 1923. He was tried and convicted and judgment pronounced upon him, from which he appeals.

Appellant's first point is: "That the judgment of the court is erroneous for the reason that the statute under which defendant was convicted is in violation of section 16, art. 4, of the Constitution of New Mexico, in that the act creating the offense charged is an act 'embracing more than one subject."'

We may not refuse effect to a statute unless it is clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt unconstitutional. The act in question is as follows:

"An act making it a felony to transport or place a bomb, dynamite, or other high explosive in or upon any public service passenger coach or passenger train, or to maliciously use or handle dynamite or other explosive.
"Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of New Mexico:
"Section 1. Any person who knowingly transports or takes into or upon any public service passenger car or passenger coach in the State of New Mexico, any bomb, dynamite, nitroglycerine, vigorite, Giant or Hercules powder, gunpowder or other chemical compound or explosive, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than three years nor more than five years.
"Sec. 2. Any person who maliciously uses, puts, places, deposits, explodes or attempts to explode, at, in, under or near, or maliciously takes into or near any building, railroad, or any train or car, or any depot, stable, carhouse, theater, school, church, dwelling house, or other place where human beings usually frequent, inhabit, assemble or pass, any bomb, dynamite, nitro-glycerine, vigorite, Giant or Hercules powder, gunpowder or other chemicals, chemical compound or explosive, with intent to injure or destroy such building, train, car or other structure, or with the intent to injure, intimidate, or terrify any human being, or by means of which any human being is injured or endangered, or by means of which any property is injured or destroyed, is guilty of felony, and punishable by imprisonment for a term not less than three years nor more than thirty years." Chapter 115, Laws 1923.

The act, is directed against the unlawful handling of explosives. The first section inveighs against certain methods of transportation of explosives. The second section makes it a public offense to handle such explosives maliciously in, at, or near "any building, railroad, or any train or car, or any depot, stable, carhouse, theater, school, church, dwelling house, or other place where human beings usually frequent, inhabit, assemble or pass."

The constitutional provision said to be invaded by this act is contained in section 16, art. 4, and is as follows: "And no bill embracing more than one subject shall be passed except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification or revision of the laws."

It is apparent that the object of this legislation is to restrain the dangerous handling of explosives, whether by transportation thereof or otherwise.

Violation of the inhibitions is visited with punishment graded according to whether the explosives are handled by the offender with or without malice. We see no duplicity of subjects. If it be conceded that in a narrow sense the transportation of explosives is one subject and depositing the same near the structures enumerated, with the intent that it may destroy property or terrify people, is another, yet they are not dissimilar and discordant subjects, but on the other hand they relate to and are germane to each other and to the main subject of the act, namely, the control of the handling of explosives. See State v. Ingalls, 18 N.M. 211, 135 P. 1177; State v. Miller, 33 N.M. 200, 263 P. 510; State ex rel. Taylor v. Mirabal, 33 N.M. 553, 273 P. 928.

Appellant's attack upon the statute upon constitutional grounds is without merit.

Appellant also seeks reversal of the...

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