State v. Page

Decision Date05 September 2000
Docket NumberNo. 24960.,24960.
Citation16 P.3d 890,135 Idaho 214
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Rodney Benson PAGE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Matthews Law Offices, Boise, for appellant. Ellison M. Matthews argued.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgenson argued.

SCHROEDER, Justice.

Rodney Benson Page (Page) appeals the judgment of conviction and sentence entered against him for the crime of aggravated assault.

I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Around 1:00 a.m., on August 31, 1997, James Atkinson (Atkinson) was driving a Dodge Stealth in which Page was the only passenger. Atkinson "peeled-out" while in a downtown parking lot in Boise which drew the attention of the Boise City Police Officers who were on duty that night.

Officers Bill Smith and Chris Rogers approached the vehicle while it was still in the parking lot. They identified themselves as police officers and asked Atkinson to stop the vehicle. Atkinson continued to move the vehicle forward slowly. The officers insisted repeatedly that Atkinson stop the vehicle, but he increased his speed and drove towards Sixth Street.

When the vehicle reached Sixth Street, Officer Smith grabbed Atkinson's arm through the open car window and ordered him to stop. When Atkinson continued, Rogers dove in the vehicle's open window, knocking Smith aside, and pulled-back on the emergency brake in an effort to stop the vehicle. Although Rogers was partially inside the vehicle, Atkinson accelerated southbound toward Front Street. According to Rogers, Page yelled, "Go, go, go." Rogers continued to order Atkinson to stop. Rogers testified that as the vehicle sped along the street, Page yelled, "Scrape him off, scrape him off." Rogers attempted to grab the steering wheel with his left hand, but he was not able to control the vehicle. After another effort to get the driver to stop, Rogers fired a single shot from his pistol into Atkinson's head, killing him.

Page was charged with aggravated assault pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-901, I.C. § 18-905(a) and/or (b), and I.C. § 18-204. He was found guilty of aggravated assault. The district court sentenced Page to prison in the custody of the State Board of Corrections for a term of ten years, with the first five years being fixed, and the remaining five years being indeterminate. The district court applied the sentencing provisions of I.C. § 18-915.

Page filed a motion for a new trial which the district court denied. Page appealed to this Court.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING ROGERS TO TESTIFY AS TO ATKINSON'S PERCEPTIONS.

Page asserts that the district court improperly allowed Rogers to testify about James Atkinson's mental perception. The State argues that the questions were directed toward Atkinson's actions. The following questions were asked by the State during its direct examination of Rogers:

Q: [By Mr. Rosenthal]: Officer Rogers, as you were going down 6th Street hung up on that car, who was controlling the vehicle?
A: The driver.
Q: Is it your view and testimony that the passenger was directing the driver, at least a portion of his activities?
A: Yes, he did.
Q: And upon those directions did the driver respond and do the things the passenger said?
[Mr. Matthews]: I object, Your Honor. That's calling for speculation by this witness. His observations, Your Honor.
[The Court]: I will overrule this objection.
Q: [By Mr. Rosenthal]: Answer?
A: Yes, he did.

While the form of the question is couched in terms of Rogers testifying as to what was in Atkinson's mind, a reasonable interpretation of the question is that Rogers was called upon to state what happened. All Rogers could know was what he heard and saw. He had previously testified to those facts. The form of the question is problematic, but no one would be misled to believe that Rogers could read Atkinson's mind. The district judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the question and answer.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR BY ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF PAGE'S PRIOR CONVICTION.

Page argues that the district court erred in allowing evidence of a prior felony, conspiracy to commit robbery, to be introduced in cross-examination to impeach him.

Rule 609, of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, provides, in pertinent part:

(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and the nature of the felony shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record, but only if the court determines in a hearing outside the presence of the jury that the fact of the prior conviction or the nature of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant to the credibility of the witness and that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the party offering the witness.
I.R.E. 609(a).

Under this rule the trial court must apply a two-prong test to determine whether evidence of the prior conviction should be admitted: (1) the court must determine whether the fact or nature of the conviction is relevant to the witness' credibility; and (2) if so, the court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact. State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 630, 977 P.2d 890, 892 (1999). In reviewing the trial court's decision as to the first prong concerning relevance, the standard of review is de novo. Id. (citing State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 766, 864 P.2d 596, 604 (1993)). In reviewing the trial court's decision as to the second prong concerning whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. Id. at 630, 977 P.2d at 892. When reviewing an exercise of discretion on appeal, this Court conducts the following inquiry: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer bounds of such discretion and consistent with legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).

In State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 634 P.2d 435 (1981), the Court recognized that different felonies have different degrees of probative value on the issue of credibility. Robbery was noted as one of the felonies that bears on credibility. The district judge in this case determined that there was no significant difference between robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery so far as the question of credibility is concerned. This Court agrees.

Page argues that the district court should only have permitted evidence of the fact of the prior conviction and not the nature of the prior conviction. In State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 31, 951 P.2d 1249, 1257 (1997), this Court stated that "the determination whether evidence of a particular felony conviction is relevant to credibility depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case and must therefore be decided on a case-by-case basis." The district court made the following statement concerning the decision to allow evidence of the nature, but not circumstances, of the prior felony:

The prejudicial impact of the prior felony was lessened by the fact that the State was not permitted to question the Defendant or offer evidence regarding the circumstances of the felony. The State contended that the Defendant and another had conspired to rob a bar and rape the female bartender. The shock value of the prior conviction was much less than the shock value of the facts presented in the instant case. Rather than merely conspiring to commit a crime in the future, the evidence in this case showed that the Defendant encouraged the driver of the car to scrape Officer Rogers off the car under circumstances which could easily have killed the driver. This Court is not convinced that it erred in ruling that the State could impeach the Defendant by offering evidence that the Defendant had been convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery.

The district court recognized that it had discretion in determining the use of the prior felony; it acted within the outer bounds of that discretion, consistent with legal standards; and, it exercised reason in reaching its decision.

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING PHOTOGRAPHS OFFERED BY PAGE WERE IRRELEVANT BUT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING THE PHOTOGRAPHS ON THE BASIS THAT THEIR PREJUDICIAL IMPACT OUTWEIGHED THEIR PROBATIVE VALUE.

Page argues that the district court erred in excluding two photographs of the crime scene which he maintains provide evidence bearing upon the extent of his injuries and the accuracy of Rogers' testimony concerning his position in the vehicle. The district court excluded the exhibits on the basis that they were irrelevant.

Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401; State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 597, 603, 977 P.2d 211, 217 (Ct.App.1998). Whether evidence is relevant is an issue of law. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct.App.1993). State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 632, 945 P.2d 1, 3 (1997). This Court's standard of review on issues of relevance is de novo.

Evidence, although relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. I.R.E. 403. The trial court's conclusions of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Matthews, 124 Idaho 806, 809, 864 P.2d 644, 647 (Ct.App.1993).

Exhibit H is a photograph of Page being treated for injuries sustained in...

To continue reading

Request your trial
42 cases
  • State v. Lankford
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • July 3, 2017
    ...enumerated in the statute are the exclusive grounds upon which a defendant's motion for new trial may be granted. State v. Page , 135 Idaho 214, 223, 16 P.3d 890, 899 (2000). Likewise, we have held that Idaho Criminal Rule 346 "does not provide and independent ground for a new trial." State......
  • State v. Sheahan
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • August 4, 2003
    ...Likewise, it is misconduct for the prosecution to make personal attacks on defense counsel in closing argument. See State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 223, 16 P.3d 890, 899 (2000); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 9 & n. 7, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1043 & n. 7, 84 L.Ed.2d 1, 8 (1985). The threshold qu......
  • State v. Severson
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • May 29, 2009
    ...(2007); State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 163 P.3d 1175 (2007); State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956 (2003); State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 16 P.3d 890 (2000); State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999). Further, the court of appeals has found that prosecutorial misco......
  • State v. Stevens
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • July 23, 2008
    ...the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 219, 16 P.3d 890, 895 (2000). This Court has adopted a three part test for determining whether the district court abused its discretion: (1) whether the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT