State v. Palmer

Decision Date24 September 2014
Docket NumberNo. 5198.,5198.
Citation758 S.E.2d 195,408 S.C. 218
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. Robert PALMER and Julia Gorman, Appellants. Appellate Case No. 2011–203707.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appellate Defenders Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for Appellant Robert Palmer, and Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia, for Appellant Julia Gorman.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of Columbia, for Respondent.

FEW, C.J.

Robert Palmer and Julia Gorman were convicted in a joint trial of homicide by child abuse, aiding and abetting homicide by child abuse, and unlawful conduct toward a child, in connection with the death of Gorman's seventeen-month old grandson. The State proved conclusively that the child died from blunt force head trauma while in the exclusive custody of Palmer and Gorman. Palmer and Gorman contend, however, the trial court erred in denying their directed verdict motions because the State's evidence was insufficient to prove (1) which defendant inflicted the child's injuries, and (2) that either of them aided or abetted the other.1 We affirm their convictions for homicide by child abuse and unlawful conduct toward a child. However, we find insufficient evidence of aiding and abetting, and therefore, we reverse those convictions. We affirm all other issues pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

I. Standard of Review

Our task on appeal is to determine whether the trial court committed an error of law in denying Palmer and Gorman's motions for a directed verdict. See State v. Cope, 405 S.C. 317, 334, 748 S.E.2d 194, 203 (2013) (“In criminal cases, the appellate court sits solely to review errors of law.”); State v. Williams, 405 S.C. 263, 272, 747 S.E.2d 194, 199 (Ct.App.2013) (stating “the appellate court sits to review errors of law only”). Our supreme court recently summarized the standard we employ in reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a motion for a directed verdict:

In cases where the State has failed to present evidence of the offense charged, a criminal defendant is entitled to a directed verdict. During trial, when ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight. The trial court should grant the directed verdict motion when the evidence merely raises a suspicion that the accused is guilty, as suspicion implies a belief or opinion as to guilt based upon facts or circumstances which do not amount to proof. On the other hand, a trial judge is not required to find that the evidence infers guilt to the exclusion of any other reasonable hypothesis.

On appeal, when reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this Court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the state. See State v. Mitchell, 341 S.C. 406, 409, 535 S.E.2d 126, 127 (2000) (finding that when ruling on cases in which the state has relied exclusively on circumstantial evidence, appellate courts are likewise only concerned with the existence of the evidence and not its weight). If the state has presented ... substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, this Court must affirm the trial court's decision to submit the case to the jury. Cf. Mitchell, 341 S.C. at 409, 535 S.E.2d at 127 (“The trial judge is required to submit the case to the jury if there is ‘any substantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced.’) (emphasis removed) (citation omitted).

State v. Hepburn, 406 S.C. 416, 429, 753 S.E.2d 402, 408–09 (2013) (some citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

II. Facts and Procedural History

On July 2, 2008, the child's mother—Gorman's daughter—left the child in Palmer and Gorman's custody under a temporary guardianship.2 On the evening of July 14, 2008, Gorman made a 911 call from her home reporting the child had “shortness of breath.” A member of the Horry County Fire and Rescue team testified that when he arrived at Gorman and Palmer's home, the child was seizing and in “a pretty grave condition.” A doctor who treated the child at Conway Medical Center testified the child showed signs of “severe neurological injury,” the cause of which “would have to be tremendous force to the skull.” A CT scan of the child's head revealed skull fractures and swelling of the brain, which the doctor indicated “raise[d] the concern of child abuse.” Due to the severity of the injuries, the child was flown to the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC), where he was kept on life support for two days. His parents decided to cease support, and the child died July 16, 2008.

A forensic pathologist performed an autopsy on the child and found skull fractures on both sides of the child's head. She concluded the child died from blunt force head trauma, and the manner of death was homicide.

A. Palmer's and Gorman's Statements to Police

On July 18, 2008, Palmer and Gorman gave statements to the police. Palmer told police he did not know what happened to the child and denied hurting him. Similarly, Gorman told police she did not know how the injury occurred, but neither she nor Palmer hurt the child.

When asked whether the child's injuries could have been caused by being shaken, Gorman denied ever shaking the child. However, after the police continued to question her, she admitted she may have shaken the child and demonstrated how she shook him. She stated she did not think she shook him hard and denied shaking him the day he went to the hospital.

Palmer and Gorman both gave police a timeline of what occurred the day of July 14. According to Gorman's statement, she checked on the child at approximately 5:30 a.m. before she left for work and found him sleeping. According to Palmer's statement, he woke the child at 9:30 a.m., fed him breakfast and lunch, then laid the child down for a nap at 3:30 p.m. Gorman confirmed this, stating Palmer called and told her that he fed the child in the morning and again around noon. Gorman and Palmer both stated Palmer was alone with the child all day while Gorman was at work.

Gorman arrived home between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m. Gorman claimed she checked on the child as soon as she got home, and, similarly, Palmer stated he and Gorman walked to the “edge of the door” and “peeked in” the child's room to check on him. Gorman stated the child “was breathing fine, everything was fine.” She also told police that “a little bit later,” she and Palmer checked on him again and “still everything was fine.” Palmer's statement, however, does not mention that they checked on the child a second time. Instead, he claims they went outside to talk “for a little bit” and then Gorman prepared dinner, which they ate around 6:00 p.m.

Gorman told police that after dinner, Palmer took the dog outside while she went to wake the child. Palmer did not mention walking the dog, but only that after dinner, Gorman went to check on the child. According to Gorman, when she entered the child's room, she heard him making “really strange noises” and noticed he was “slack looking,” with saliva coming from his mouth. She claimed she picked him up and “leaned him over [her] arm because [she] didn't know if he was choking or if he was going to throw up.” She called out to Palmer that something was wrong. Palmer came to her and discovered the child was having a seizure. Gorman called 911 while Palmer held the child.

B. Medical Evidence

At trial, the State introduced medical experts who testified to the extent of the child's injuries. Dr. Donna Roberts, a neuro-radiologist with MUSC, testified the child had skull fractures on both sides of his head, which resulted from severe trauma that occurred the day the child arrived at the hospital. She testified it “required severe force to create [the skull fractures],” and likened it to falling from a three-story window or being involved in a car accident. She stated the fractures could not have been caused by merely shaking the child. She also testified a person with these injuries “would be immediately severely symptomatic” and display a loss of consciousness, alteration in breathing, seizures, and foaming at the mouth.

The State also called Dr. Ann Abel, the director of the Violence Intervention and Prevention Division in the pediatric department of MUSC, who testified that she spoke with Gorman and Palmer at MUSC to gain more information about the child. She claimed they both denied that any injury or accident occurred the day the child went to the hospital. Medical evidence, however, indicated the injuries must have occurred sometime that day. Dr. Abel testified that, in her medical opinion, the head injury occurred no more than three hours before the child arrived at the hospital.

Dr. Abel further testified the child suffered “massive” blows to both sides of the head that could have been inflicted in “less than a minute.” She stated that a person observing the injuries take place “would perceive that this was a tremendous force” inflicted upon the child. However, she also testified that a person who did not see the force applied may not appreciate that something had happened to the child. She explained a person may be unable to discern whether the child was sleeping or unconsciousif the person was not aware the head trauma had occurred.

Three of the State's witnesses testified they noticed bruises on the child while he was in the hospital, and Gorman could not account for them in her testimony. Dr. Abel testified the child had multiple bruises in places that were atypical for “normal childhood falling.” Similarly, one of the nurses who treated the child in the emergency room testified she saw bruises on the child's body that “you wouldn't [typically] see.” Additionally, a Department of Social...

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