State v. Paradis

• Decision Date: 18 February 1941
• Citation: 18 A.2d 342
• Parties: STATE v. PARADIS et al. and four other cases.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

18 A.2d 342

STATE

v. PARADIS et al. and four other cases.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 18, 1941.

Edgar H. Paradis, Robert Gauthier, William J. Conley, Patrick J. McConaghy, Joseph McCaughey, and others, were indicted on charges of conspiracy. The Superior Court ruled adversely on defendants' pleas in abatement of, and their motions to quash, the indictment, and refused to certify various constitutional questions, and the defendants ask leave to file in Supreme Court petitions for certiorari.

Request to file petitions denied.

Louis V. Jackvony, Atty. Gen., and James O. Watts, Third Asst. Atty. Gen, for the State.

Hurley, Moriarty & Connly, George Hurley, Walter V. Moriarty, John W. Moakler, Jr., and William S. Flynn, all of Providence, for petitioners.

PER CURIAM.

These petitioners asked leave to file in this court petitions for certiorari to the superior court to bring up for review, in advance of trial, adverse rulings of that court on their pleas in abatement of, and their motions to quash, certain indictments returned against them by the grand jury for the counties of Providence and Bristol.

Petitioners also based their request on the further ground of the denial by the superior court of their motions to certify to this court the question of the constitutionality of sees. 11, 14, 18, 29 and 35 of Gen.Laws 1938, c. 506, as amended by section 1, chapter 700, Public Laws 1939, providing for the drawing of jurors, their obligations under their oaths, the composition of the grand jury for Providence and Bristol counties as one grand jury for both counties, and the continuous sitting of such grand jury beyond its normal term at the request of the Attorney General.

After an informal examination of the numerous and involved allegations in the petitions, we issued citations to the petitioners to show cause why this court should exercise its discretion and permit the petitions to be filed. Notice of these citations was duly given to the Attorney General. Pursuant thereto the petitioners and the Attorney General appeared and were heard and briefs were submitted on the question as to whether we should issue the writ. Supplemental briefs of both parties were filed later, with our permission.

Ordinarily, on a request for leave to file a petition for certiorari, a prompt reply is given either denying or granting it. However, on account of the number of serious questions inherent in the petitions and of other extrinsic matters, it has not been possible to do so in this instance. In coming to our conclusion, it has been necessary to weigh and consider carefully the authorities cited to us and to make some further investigation on our own account. This has consumed much time; more than we would ordinarily give to a matter of this kind. But we felt compelled to devote such time and research to these petitions because petitioners' counsel most strenuously urged that grave consequences would follow, if petitioners were required to await the determination of trials under these indictments on their merits before bringing to this court for review the alleged errors of the superior court.

Petitions for certiorari are addressed to our discretion. Ordinarily the writ will not be issued where there is another adequate remedy available to review the alleged errors of the court below or where the ruling or decision below is interlocutory. Petitioners concede these principles but they urge that their cases fall within the category of the following cases in which this court has, in the exercise of its final revisory and supervisory powers to correct and to prevent errors and abuses, treated certain circumstances as presenting an exception to the general rule and has granted the writ. In re James' Estate, R.I, 11 A.2d 289; Brickie v. Quinn, R.I, 7 A.2d 890; Conte v. Roberts, 58 R.I. 353, 192 A. 814; Union Mortgage Co. v. Rocheleau, 51 R.I. 345, 154 A. 658; Atlantic Mills v. Superior Court, 32 R.I. 285, 79 A. 577.

All of these cases were deemed by this court to be exceptions to the general rule, and in the interest of justice called for the issuance of writs of certiorari despite the fact that another remedy would have ultimately been available to review the alleged errors of the court below. However, this was because the court, under the circumstances before it in those cases, concluded that the ordinary remedy would not be really adequate. We think that this is particularly true of the above-cited Brickie, Union Mortgage Co. and Atlantic Mills cases which had to do with questions of pleading.

The case of Conte v. Roberts, supra [58 R.I. 353, 192 A. 817], was put on the much stronger ground of preventing irreparable injury to the public welfare that would result from the sweeping character of an ex parte restraining order against the bureau of police and fire of the city of Providence, which petitioners alleged had been erroneously or improvidently issued by the superior court. In the face of such a danger we said that the petition presented questions "affected with a distinct public interest involving a public policy of proper enforcement of the criminal statutes." And we further concluded that such questions also made the case an exceptional one.

It ought to be observed here that while we issued the writ in the case of In re James' Estate, supra, on the face of the allegations contained in the petition, we afterward quashed the writ, following an opportunity to examine the record, because we found from such examination that the action of the court below was not final but interlocutory and that there were no exceptional circumstances to take the case out of the general rule. That case does not really belong in the list of those above cited, as our decision was tantamount to a refusal of the writ, although we had allowed the petition to be filed to bring up the record.

Petitioners in the instant cases seek first of all to bring themselves within the category of the above exceptional cases. They contend that their cases are clearly of this nature because they say that, if they are forced to go to trial before the alleged errors of the superior court are reviewed, they will suffer grave and unusual burdens; that severe hardships will be imposed upon them by the necessity, under which they will labor, of defending themselves against the unusual type of offense with which they are charged; that because there are one hundred sixty-five defendants like themselves, these cases are most exceptional; and finally, that because of such number of defendants and the novelty and uncertainty of the questions raised, it is in the public interest and for the welfare of the state that these questions be determined by this court in advance of trial and thus probably save the state great and needless expense. In support of this last contention petitioners cite O'Neil v. Demers, 44 R.I. 504, 118 A. 677, as an example of what was done on an occasion when the question of the validity of a new statute was brought in question on the record in the prosecution of several criminal complaints under such statute in the district court of the sixth judicial district. Petitioners' counsel stated that in that instance all further prosecutions were suspended by the then Attorney General until the questions which had been certified to this court were determined.

We. are unable to agree with the above contentions. At first...