State v. Parish
| Decision Date | 30 June 1878 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. J. C. PARISH. |
INDICTMENT for Larceny tried at May Term, 1878, of WAKE Criminal Court, before Strong, J.
It was in evidence that John Jones had lost two sheep between the 20th and 28th of August, 1876, and that the defendant at that time owned no sheep. One Dick Yonng, a witness for the State, testified that soon after Jones lost them he saw the sheep shut up in an old out house in possession of defendant, and a short distance from his residence; that when he saw them he was in company with his son, Thomas Young, the witness next introduced, whose testimony corroborated the above, and during whose examination he was ordered by the Court to stop, but failing to do so, was ordered several times by the defendant's counsel in a loud and disrespectful manner, to stop. The State next proposed to prove by one Lewis Jones, in order to confirm the evidence of the two first witnesses, that Thomas Young, shortly after the loss of the sheep and before the defendant had been accused of the larceny or receiving, &c., had made the same statement to the witness that he had given to the jury. The defendant objected to the evidence, the Court overruled the objection, and the witness said that Young had made the same statement to him.
It was also in evidence that John Jones lived one mile from the defendant and owned a large number of sheep, among them the particular ones alleged to have been stolen by the defendant; that for several months before their loss, they were in the habit of grazing in defendant's field where the out house was situated in which the sheep were seen by the witness as aforesaid; that about the time they were lost, one Crawford bought two sheep of defendant, corresponding in description with them; Crawford at that time was living about eight miles from Raleigh, and while on his way to Raleigh about daylight carrying beef to market, he was overtaken by defendant, also going to Raleigh, with the sheep, and after some conversation in regard to the price, he bought them of defendant in the presence of one Nowell, and left them with one Johnston who lived by the road side to keep for him until his return from Raleigh; that upon Crawford's proposing to put them in an enclosure surrounded by a fence, the defendant said he had better put them in a stable or confine them in some other place, that they were mischievous and might get away; that they were tied and left inside the fence where they could have been seen by passers-by.
It was further in evidence that the defendant since the indictment was found had denied to Crawford that he bought the sheep from him, and accused Crawford of stealing them himself; but one Stills, a butcher, testified that about the last of August, 1876, the defendant told him he had two sheep to sell, (described as those in question) and that soon afterwards on asking the defendant where they were, he replied that he had sold them to Crawford.
The defendant's counsel requested the Court to instruct the jury that there was no evidence that defendant had received the sheep knowing them to have been stolen, which was refused, and the defendant excepted. There was a verdict of not guilty of larceny, but guilty of receiving, &c. Judgment. Appeal by the defendant.
Attorney General, D. G. Fowle and W. H. Pace, for the State .
Mr. T. M. Argo, for the defendant .
It can scarcely be satisfactory to any mind to say that if a witness testifies to a statement to day under oath, it strengthens the statement to prove that he said the same thing yesterday when not under oath. If the proposition were reversed, as if one make a statement to day not under oath, it strengthens the statement to show that he said the same yesterday under oath, it would be conceded because of the sanction of the oath. And yet it must be conceded that it is settled by the weight of authority both of text writers and decided cases that when a witness testifies to a statement under oath, and the witness is impeached, he may be supported by proving that on a former occasion he had made the same statement, although not...
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