State v. Park

• Decision Date: 31 July 1974
• Docket Number: Nos. 5453,5476,s. 5453
• Citation: 525 P.2d 586,55 Haw. 610
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Myron PARK et al., Defendant-Appellees. STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jim COREY et al., Defendant-Appellees.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 586

525 P.2d 586

55 Haw. 610

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Myron PARK et al., Defendant-Appellees.

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jim COREY et al., Defendant-Appellees.

Nos. 5453, 5476.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

July 31, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

1. It is well settled and established in this jurisdiction that courts are required to construe and interpret a statute where it is ambiguous, or, absent such ambiguity, where the literal application of the statute causes an absurd or unjust result and such literal application is clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute.

2. On the other hand, where there is no ambiguity in the language of a statute, and the literal application of the language would not produce an absurd or unjust result, clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute, there is no room for judicial construction or interpretation, and the statute must be given effect according to its plain and obvious meaning.

3. The term 'primary election' as used in HRS § 11-193 (Supp.1972) and as commonly and ordinarily understood means that elections which closely precedes the general election for the election of candidates for public offices, and this view would not be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies on candidates' expenses as expressed by the legislature in subpart B, part XII, chapter 11, HRS (Supp.1972).

4. The application of Hawaii Penal Code § 236 to a criminal case would clearly be defense, as it would negative penal liability, and this defense is expressly made applicable by the code's § 101(2)(a), to an offense committed before the code became effective.

5. Before a judge can properly dismiss a criminal case under Hawaii Panal Code § 236, de minimis infractions, all of the relevant facts bearing upon the conduct of the defendant and the nature the conduct of the circumstances regarding the commission of the offense should be disclosed to the judge, so that he can intelligently exercise a sound discretion, consistent with the public interest.

6. The authority expressly conferred and vested in the courts under Hawaii Penal Code § 236(1)(b) is a judicial power as distinguished from a legislative or executive power, and the provision thereof, does not contravene the doctrine of separation of powers.

Charlotte E. Libman, Deputy Pros. Atty. (Barry Chung, Pros. Atty., City & County of Honolulu, Honolulu, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant State of Hawaii.

Victor Agmata, Jr., Honolulu, for defendants-appellant Alcon, Carr and Mina.

James F. Ventura, Honolulu, for defendant-Appellee Tiwanak.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and LEVINSON, KOBAYASHI, OGATA and MENOR, JJ.

OGATA, Justice.

The appellant, the State, has appealed these two criminal cases (Case No. 5453, and Case No. 5476), pursuant to HRS §§ 641-1 and 641-13(1) (Supp.1973) and Rule 43(d) of the District Court Rules of Penal Procedure, from two separate written decisions and judgments of the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu Division, dismissing all the charges against 20 defendants-appellees.

These 20 defendants-appellees were candidates in the primary election of 1972, and each was charged in the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu Division, by the deputy prosecuting attorney of the City and County of Honolulu with the commission of the offense of failure to file a statement of expenses in violation of HRS § 11-193 (Supp.1972), ¹ which is a misdemeanor under 19-6(10) (Supp.1972), ² punishable by a fine not exceeding $500, or by imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both, under 19-7 (Supp.1972). ³ In Case No. 5453, the State charged that each of the defendants-appellees, Myron Park, Gerald V. Inforzato, David Awong, Don Miguel, Emilio S. Alcon, Norma Carr, Richard Kageyama, Danny K. Kamalani, Peter T. McGovern, Ted Mina, Eugene Ressencourt, Alex Suenaga, Eugene Tiwanak and Elmer D. S. Tyau, did fail to file such a statement within 20 days after the primary election of 1972. In Case No. 5476, the State charged that each of the defendants-appellees, Jim Corey, David Ellis, Herbert Minn, Clare Barton, G. Roddy Brilhante an Alvin Kekauoha, did fail to file such a statement within 20 days following the primary election of 1972.

On March 23rd, 1973, the district court rendered its decision and judgment in Case No. 5453, as follows: that HRS § 11-193 (Supp.1972) imposes a mandatory duty upon a candidate in a primary election who is not nominated for the ensuing general election to file his or her statement of expenses with the Lieutenant Governor within 20 days following the date after the result of the primary election is certified by the Lieutenant Governor; that Saturdays and Sundays are to be excluded from computing such 20 days; that the primary election of 1972 was held on October 7, 1972; and that since the results of the election were not certified by the Lieutenant Governor until October 14, 1972, each defendant-appellee who filed his or her statement of expenses on or before November 6, 1972, ⁴ complied with the provisions of HRS § 11-193 (Supp.1972). The district court, then, pursuant to its decision, dismissed the charges as to the following defendants-appellees: Don Miguel, who filed his statement of expenses on October 30, 1972; Richard Kageyama, who filed his statement of expenses on October 30, 1972; Norma Carr, who filed her statement of expenses on October 30, 1972; David Awong, who filed his statement of expenses on November 1, 1972; Eugene Tiwanak, who filed his statement of expenses on November 2, 1972; Alexander Suenaga, who filed his statement of expenses on November 3, 1972; and Ted Mina, who filed his statement of expenses on November 3, 1972.

In the same decision on file in Case No. 5453, the district court also dismissed the charges against the remaining defendants-appellees who filed their statements after November 6, 1972, the deadline to file these reports as determined by the district court, on the basis that these violations were de minimis under the Hawaii Penal Code § 236, ⁵ particularly under sub-paragraph (b) of subsection (1) thereof, since the filing of these statements after such date had no effect whatsoever to actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the statute in question, or if it did that the harm or evil caused or threatened was too trivial to warrant a conviction.

Thereafter, on April 26, 1973, the district court, based upon its decision rendered in Case No. 5453, dismissed the charges filed by the State in Case No. 5476, against defendants-appellees, Jim Corey, Herbert Minn, Clare Barton, G. Roddy Brilhante and Alvin Kekauoha, on the grounds that each of these defendants-appellees had filed his or her statement of expenses on or before November 6, 1972, and that each had complied with the requirements of HRS § 11-193 (Supp.1972). Also, in regard to defendant-appellee, David Ellis, the district court held that his violation was similarly de minimis, and the charge was also dismissed.

We quote the pertinent part of HRS § 11-193 (Supp.1972), applicable during the time period covered by these appeals, ⁶ as follows:

In case of any candidate . . . who was not nominated at the primary election as a candidate for the general election, the itemized statement of expenses shall be filed within twenty days following the primary election. . . .

It is well settled and established in this jurisdiction that courts are required to construe and interpret a statute where it is ambiguous, or, absent such ambiguity, where the literal application of the statute causes an absurd or unjust result and such literal application is clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute. On the other hand, where there is no ambiguity in the language of a statute, and the literal application of the language would not produce an absurd or unjust result, clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute, there is no room for judicial construction and interpretation, and the statute must be given effect according to its plain and obvious meaning. Matson Terminals, Inc. v. Hasegawa, 54 Haw. 563, 512 P.2d 1 (1973); Pacific Ins. Co. v. Oregon Auto Ins. Co., 53 Haw. 208, 490 P.2d 899 (1971); Twentieth Century Furniture, Inc. v. Labor & Industrial Relations Appeal Board, 52 Haw. 577, 482 P.2d 151 (1971); Appeal of Harper, 52 Haw. 313, 475 P.2d 53 (1970); Kauai v. McGonagle, 33 Haw. 915 (1936); Territory v. Narimatsu, 41 Haw. 398 (1956).

We think the term 'primary election' is a common, ordinary term used in our daily vernacular, and is not an expression that is obscure, unusual or in any way complicated. It seems to us that the ordinary people encounter the words 'primary election' and 'general election' so often in the media as well as in their daily verbal discourses that these words should be given the popular and usual signification. As so understood by ordinary people, the term 'primary election' means that election which closely precedes the general election for the election of candidates to public offices, and that the candidates for the general election are nominated at such earlier 'primary election.'

Moreover, Chapter 11, of HRS (Supp.1972), provides that certain words and phrases used in that chapter shall be construed as defined in HRS § 11-1 (Supp.1972), and this section defines 'primary' as 'a preliminary election in which the voters nominate candidates for office as provided for in chapter 12,' and it also defines 'election' as 'all elections, primary, special primary, general, special general, special, or county, unless otherwise specifically stated.' Chapter 12, of HRS (Supp.1972), deals with primary elections. There is no conflict in understanding the meaning of the term 'primary election' as defined in HRS § 11-1 (Supp.1972), and that term as commonly understood. In fact, the meaning of the term 'primary election' as so...