State v. Parker

• Decision Date: 10 March 1884
• Docket Number: Case No. 908.
• Citation: 61 Tex. 265
• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Parties: THE STATE OF TEXAS v. F. J. PARKER, ADM'R.

61 Tex. 265

THE STATE OF TEXAS

v.F. J. PARKER, ADM'R.

Case No. 908.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Mar. 10, 1884.

APPEAL from Hidalgo. Tried below before the Hon. John C. Russell.

This suit was brought in the name of the state of Texas as plaintiff, July 9, 1872, against Salvador Cardenas and others, and against Parker, administrator of Reynolds, alleging the title of the state to the salt lake notoriously known as “El Sal del Rey,” comprising about a square league, ouster therefrom by defendants, prayer to recover the same, and indorsement that the suit was brought as well to try title as for damages.

The defendant Parker pleaded his title under a patent from the state to H. M. Lewis, which issued December 20, 1847. Confirmation of the same and release to the patentee of the land therein granted, by act of the legislature, February, 1850, and conveyance by Lewis to his intestate, Reynolds, March 9, 1852, and he prayed judgment to quiet his title against the state and against his co-defendants.

Cardenas and others pleaded a grant from the viceroy of Spain, in 1798, to Juan Jose Belli; a sale of the premises in controversy to Cardenas and Lomitators; and during the pendency of the suit set up the recovery of a judgment against the state in the district court of Travis county, March 3, 1873, for this land. They also prayed a decree to annul and set aside the title under which Parker claimed, and to quiet their title.

The state dismissed as to the defendant Cardenas; denied the validity of the title to Lewis, and specially pleaded a joint resolution of the legislature of July 10, 1862, setting up title to said salt lake and requiring an agent for the state to take possession of it.

The decree of the court below, September 20, 1877, was that the state take nothing by her suit, and for recovery by Parker of the land set out in his patent.

Powers & Maxan, for appellant, cited: State v. Delesdenier, 7 Tex., 76;Goode v. McQueen's Heirs, 3 Tex., 255, 256;Mason v. Russell, 1 Tex., 729, 730; 1 Pasch. Dig., arts. 804, 4402; Law 1, title 18, book 9, of the Novisima Recopilacion, taken from law 47, title 32, of the Ordenamiento de Alcalá, framed by Alonzo the Wise; Chronicles of Don Alfonzo, ch. 37; Law 13, title 23, book 8, Recopilacion de las leyes de Indias; United States v. Repentigny, 5 Wall., 268;Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 605, and authorities; 21 Wallace, 660.

Ballinger, Mott & Terry, for appellee, cited: Art. VII, sec. 39, Const. of 1866; art. X, sec. 9, Const. of 1869; art. XIV, § 7, Const. of 1875; Robinson v. Varnell, 16 Tex., 389; Broom's Legal Maxims, 550; Potter's Dwarris, 128; Sedgwick on Construction, 227; Lewis v. San Antonio, 7 Tex., 288;Melton v. Cobb, 21 Tex., 541;Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters, 662.

WATTS, J. COM. APP.

At the time the act was passed validating the patent to Lewis, and relinquishing all the state's right to the land therein embraced, the act of June 3, 1837, reserving “salt springs, gold or silver mines, copper or lead, or other minerals,” had not been judicially examined and construed. And it may have been the object of the validating act to remove all doubt as to the validity of the patent, and to show that the land therein embraced was vested in Lewis and his vendees. It was, perhaps, a precautionary measure to obviate the effects of any adverse construction of the act of 1837 that might thereafter be had.

Subsequently, however, in Cowan v. Hardeman, 26 Tex., 219, the act of 1837 was judicially examined and construed, and it was there held that its effect was not to reserve the land from location and survey, but thereby the state reserved an easement, and had the right to enter upon the land, and gather, make, or dig for, and carry the salt away; and to make such use of the land as was necessary in the full enjoyment of the reserved right. That a patent to lands upon which there was a salt spring was not void.

If it should be conceded that the patent to Lewis was voidable on account of its including the salt lake, still the validating act removed all doubt, and made the patent regular and valid.

Even if that was not so, yet it could only be vacated at the instance of the state, in a direct proceeding brought for that purpose.

It does not appear to us that the validating act was a violation of the constitution in force at the time of its passage. Its title is as follows, viz.: “An act to validate certain patents therein designated.” By the first section this and other patents were ratified and confirmed, and by the second section the state of Texas relinquished all her right to the lands described in the patents to the grantees. Appellants claim that this act embraced more than one object, and was in violation of art. 7, sec. 24, of the constitution of 1845, which says, “Every law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one...