State v. Parker
| Decision Date | 09 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 2017-1575,2017-1575 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. PARKER, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary M. Frey, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Mark A. Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Erika B. Cunliffe, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
Kennedy, J. {¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from the Eighth District Court of Appeals, we confront a straightforward question of statutory interpretation: Does R.C. 2953.23(A) vest a common pleas court with authority to grant relief on an untimely or successive petition for postconviction relief when the petition asserts a claim based on a new state or federal right recognized by the Supreme Court of Ohio? Based on the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, the answer is no.
{¶ 2} R.C. 2953.23(A) provides limited exceptions to the statutory bar on untimely or successive petitions for postconviction relief. But although the General Assembly permits a common pleas court to entertain an untimely or successive petition based on a new state or federal right recognized by the United States Supreme Court, it provided no exception allowing an untimely or successive petition to be granted based on a new decision of this court.
{¶ 3} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying appellee Corey J. Parker's untimely request for postconviction relief. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 4} In 2011, Parker pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and having a weapon while under a disability. The aggravated-robbery conviction carried a notice-of-prior-conviction specification; pursuant to R.C. 2901.08(A), Parker's prior adjudication of delinquency for felonious assault was treated as a prior conviction. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of eight years in prison, and because of the specification, the entire sentence is mandatory. See R.C. 2929.13(F)(6).
{¶ 5} The court of appeals affirmed Parker's convictions and sentence in 2012, rejecting the argument that R.C. 2901.08(A) is unconstitutional because it treats a prior juvenile-delinquency adjudication as a prior conviction for purposes of enhancing a prison sentence for a subsequent offense. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97841, 2012-Ohio-4741, 2012 WL 4857801, ¶ 25.
{¶ 6} In 2013, we denied review, 134 Ohio St.3d 1471, 2013-Ohio-553, 983 N.E.2d 370, and denied reconsideration, 135 Ohio St.3d 1417, 2013-Ohio-1622, 986 N.E.2d 32.
{¶ 7} In 2016, this court announced State v. Hand , holding that R.C. 2901.08(A) violates the Due Process Clauses of the Ohio Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it is "fundamentally unfair" to treat a juvenile adjudication as a prior conviction that enhances the sentence for a subsequent offense. 149 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-5504, 73 N.E.3d 448, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 8} Parker then moved to vacate his mandatory sentence, arguing that enhancing his adult sentence based on a prior juvenile-delinquency adjudication was unconstitutional pursuant to Hand . The trial court denied relief.
{¶ 9} On appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals construed the motion to vacate as a petition for postconviction relief, 2017-Ohio-7484, 96 N.E.3d 1183, ¶ 10, and explained that the rule announced in Hand is a "new constitutional ‘substantive rule’ " that applies retroactively to cases that were final before its announcement, id. at ¶ 22. The appellate court held that "Parker has established, under R.C. 2953.21(A)(1) that while he preserved the error throughout the appellate process, he was unavoidably prevented from presenting this claim for relief until 2016." Id. at ¶ 17. Implicit in this analysis is a determination that the statutory bar on untimely or successive petitions did not apply. The court of appeals therefore reversed the trial court's denial of Parker's motion to vacate the mandatory sentence.
{¶ 10} We accepted the state's discretionary appeal.
Positions of the Parties
{¶ 11} Appellant, the state of Ohio, maintains that although the court of appeals correctly construed Parker's motion as a petition for postconviction relief, it grafted a new exception onto R.C. 2953.23(A)(1) when it suggested that a new constitutional right recognized by the Supreme Court of Ohio could be asserted in an untimely or successive petition. It contends that " [R.C.] 2953.23 is unambiguous: only a new right established by a United States Supreme Court decision, and no other court, confers jurisdiction upon a court to consider an untimely or successive petition." The state argues that even if the statute permitted the trial court to entertain the petition in this case, Hand , 149 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-5504, 73 N.E.3d 448, does not apply retroactively to convictions that were final when that decision was announced, because Hand did not announce a new substantive rule or a watershed rule of criminal procedure.
{¶ 12} Parker concedes that R.C. 2953.23 "provides no jurisdiction" for a motion seeking sentencing relief based on Hand , and he therefore does not contest the state's argument that a new constitutional ruling by this court will not sustain an untimely or successive petition for postconviction relief. Nonetheless, he contends that Hand established a new substantive rule and "necessarily applies retroactively to correct sentences improperly mandated under R.C. 2901.08(A)." Parker notes that the constitutional ruling in Hand was premised on the fundamental unfairness of equating juvenile-delinquency adjudications with adult convictions and that Hand articulated a new substantive rule that forbids the state from imposing a type of punishment on a specific class of offenders. He maintains that this court has the authority to apply its rulings retroactively regardless of whether they are deemed procedural or substantive, and he argues that his interest against serving an unconstitutional sentence supersedes any interest that the state might have in preserving its finality. Parker therefore contends that the trial court erred in failing to resentence him in accordance with Hand .
{¶ 13} This appeal, then, presents two issues: (1) whether Parker's motion to vacate his mandatory sentence is barred as an untimely petition for postconviction relief and, if not, (2) whether the new constitutional ruling in Hand applies retroactively to cases that were final at its announcement. Our resolution of the first issue makes it unnecessary to decide the second.
Law and Analysis
{¶ 14} In 1965, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2953.21 et seq., Am.S.B. No. 383, 131 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1610, as emergency legislation in response to docket congestion caused by a growing number of petitions seeking the writ of habeas corpus and in light of United States Supreme Court decisions requiring states to provide meaningful postconviction review of prisoner claims alleging the violation of federal constitutional rights. Von Ohlen, The Postconviction Review Dilemma in Ohio , 44 Ohio St.L.J. 537, 537, 540-541 (1983). In uncodified language, the General Assembly deemed this statutory remedy to be "the best method of protecting constitutional rights of individuals and, at the same time, providing a more orderly method of hearing such matters." Section 2, 131 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 1611.
{¶ 15} Relevant here, R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a) permits a petitioner to collaterally attack his or her judgment of conviction on the grounds that "there was such a denial or infringement of the person's rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States." With the exception of an appeal, a petition for postconviction relief is "the exclusive remedy by which a person may bring a collateral challenge to the validity of a conviction or sentence in a criminal case." R.C. 2953.21(K).
{¶ 16} We have explained that "[c]ourts may recast irregular motions into whatever category necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should be judged." State v. Schlee , 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 431, ¶ 12. And we have held that pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A)(1), "where a criminal defendant, subsequent to his or her direct appeal, files a motion seeking vacation or correction of his or her sentence on the basis that his or her constitutional rights have been violated, such a motion is a petition for postconviction relief as defined in R.C. 2953.21." State v. Reynolds , 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 160, 679 N.E.2d 1131 (1997) ; accord Schlee at ¶ 12 ().
{¶ 17} Parker's motion to vacate was filed subsequent to his direct appeal and sought to vacate his mandatory sentence on the basis that it was unconstitutional in light of this court's decision in Hand . It therefore was properly recast as a petition for postconviction relief.
{¶ 18} R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) requires a petition for postconviction relief to be filed no later than 365 days after the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals on direct appeal or, if no appeal is taken, no later than 365 days after the expiration of the time for filing an appeal. Parker sought postconviction relief more than four years after the filing of the transcript, and his filing is untimely.
{¶ 19} A trial court lacks authority to grant an untimely or successive petition unless one of two statutory exceptions applies. R.C. 2953.23(A) ; State v. Apanovitch , 155 Ohio St.3d 358, 2018-Ohio-4744, 121 N.E.3d 351, ¶ 36.
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