State v. Parks, 2006 Ohio 1352 (OH 3/23/2006)
Decision Date | 23 March 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 86312.,86312. |
Citation | 2006 Ohio 1352 |
Parties | State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eddie Parks, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, A. Steven Dever, Michelle D. Earley, Assistant County Prosecutors, 8th Floor Justice Center, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
John H. Lawson, 4403 St. Clair Avenue, The Brownhoist Building, Cleveland, Ohio 44103, for Defendant-Appellant.
JOURNAL ENTRY and OPINION
{¶ 1} Appellant Eddie Parks, Jr. appeals his guilty plea to the charge of murder. He assigns the following two errors for our review:
{¶ 2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we affirm Parks' conviction. The apposite facts follow.
{¶ 3} The Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Parks on one count of aggravated murder, with a firearm specification charge. The indictment alleged that Parks shot a man in the parking lot of Joe D's Bar located on 13411 Miles Avenue.
{¶ 4} Parks originally entered a not guilty plea, but later entered a plea to the lesser offense of murder with a three-year gun specification. The trial court sentenced Parks to a term of fifteen years to life, plus three years for the firearm specification.
{¶ 5} We will address Parks' assigned errors together because they both argue the trial court did not strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C) in accepting Parks' waiver of his constitutional rights. Parks argues the trial court did not engage him in a meaningful colloquy regarding the waiver of his constitutional rights because the court did not individually ask whether he waived each right, but asked whether he waived his constitutional rights after explaining all of the rights. He also argues the trial court did not explain his right to compulsory process in a reasonably intelligible manner.
{¶ 6} In determining whether the trial court has satisfied its duties under Crim.R. 11 in taking a plea, reviewing courts have distinguished constitutional and non-constitutional rights.1 The trial court must strictly comply with those provisions of Crim.R. 11(C) that relate to the waiver of constitutional rights.2 "Strict compliance" does not require a rote recitation of the exact language of the rule; rather, the focus on review is whether the "record shows that the judge explained these rights in a manner reasonably intelligible to the defendant."3
{¶ 7} As to the non-constitutional rights set forth in Crim.R. 11, only substantial compliance is required.4 Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.5
{¶ 8} In the instant case, the trial court stated the following in explaining the constitutional rights Parks would be waiving:
{¶ 9} The court then inquired:
{¶ 10} The Ohio Supreme Court has "strongly recommended" that when a trial court informs a defendant of his constitutional rights, the trial court should use the language contained in Crim.R. 11(C), stop after each right, and ask the defendant whether he understands the right and knows that he is waiving it by pleading guilty.8 However, the Supreme Court has further held that failure to so proceed does not necessarily invalidate a plea.9 Rather, because the underlying purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is to ensure that the defendant is adequately informed before entering his plea, the focus upon review is whether the trial court explained or referred to the right in a manner "reasonably intelligible" to that defendant.10 "To hold otherwise would be to elevate formalistic litany of constitutional rights over the substance of the dialogue between the trial court and the accused."11
{¶ 11} Here, although the trial court did not stop and ask Parks whether he waived each individual right, we conclude that the trial court referred to and explained the constitutional rights and the waiver thereof in a manner reasonably intelligible to Parks.
{¶ 12} The trial court prefaced its discussion of the waiver of rights by announcing to Parks that it was obligated to inform him of his constitutional rights at this time. The trial court then proceeded to discuss in short, clear sentences each of the separate rights including the right to a trial (before a jury or the court), the right to have the State prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to cross-examine the State's witnesses, the right to subpoena witnesses in his favor, and the right against self-incrimination.
{¶ 13} After stating each right, the trial court obtained a separate affirmative response confirming that Parks understood the right. At the conclusion of explaining the rights, the court inquired whether Parks waived these rights, to which Parks responded affirmatively. We cannot say under these facts the court failed to explain to Parks in a reasonably intelligible manner that he waived his constitutional rights.
{¶ 14} As to the specific right of compulsory process, the trial court advised the appellant as follows: 12 Parks responded that he understood. Parks contends because the trial court stated "subpoena" instead of "compulsory process" as set forth in Crim.R. 11(C) he was insufficiently advised of this right.
{¶ 15} As noted previously, the right to compulsory process is constitutionally protected.13 Thus, the trial court's explanation of the right to compulsory process is reviewed for strict compliance. Parks relies on this court's decisions in State v. Cummings14 and State v. Rosenberg,15 in support of his argument the trial court must specifically inform the defendant he has a right to "compulsory process." However, those cases are distinguishable.
{¶ 16} In Cummings, the trial court informed the defendant he had a right to "call witnesses." We held this was insufficient because this implied that the defendant could present only witnesses he was able to secure through his own efforts. Likewise, in Rosenberg, we held the trial court's advisement that the defendant "has a right to bring in witnesses to this courtroom to testify for your defense" was insufficient to apprise a defendant of his right to compulsory process.
{¶ 17} In the instant case, however, the trial court stated that Parks had a right to "subpoena and call witnesses." This court has held that the use of the word "subpoena" adequately informs the defendant of his right to compulsory process.16 Therefore, we conclude the trial court, by stating Parks had a right to subpoena witnesses, clearly informed Parks at the time of his plea of his right to compulsory process. Moreover, it does not appear Parks was confused by the terminology, because he stated on the record he understood when the trial court explained he had a right to subpoena and call witnesses.
{¶ 18} Under these circumstances, we find that the trial court strictly complied with the...
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