State v. Parramore, 22469-7-I

Decision Date27 February 1989
Docket NumberNo. 22469-7-I,22469-7-I
CourtWashington Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Devon Lamell PARRAMORE, Appellant.

Jesse Wm. Barton, Washington Appellate Defender, Seattle, for Devon Parramore.

Linda Jacke, Deputy, Seattle, for State of Wash.

PER CURIAM.

Devon Lamell Parramore has filed a motion for accelerated review. A commissioner has referred the motion to a panel of judges for consideration. 1

Parramore entered an Alford 2 plea to delivery of marijuana. Parramore was sentenced to serve 90 days in the King County Jail. In spite of Parramore's objection at sentencing, he was also placed under community supervision for one year on condition that he, among other things,

1. Comply with the following crime-related prohibitions.

a. Do not purchase, possess, have under your control or ingest any controlled substance without a prescription from a licensed physician. Report any prescription for controlled substance to the CCO within 24 hours of receipt.

b. Do not associate with drug users or drug sellers without the approval of the CCO.

2. Comply with the following monitoring measures as required by the community corrections officer:

a. Submit to urinalysis or breathalyzer as directed. Contact the community corrections officer for instruction regarding submission of urine sample.

Parramore challenges the conditions of community supervision requiring him to submit to urinalysis and breathalyzer testing.

RCW 9.94A.030(4) provides that:

"Community supervision" means a period of time during which a convicted offender is subject to crime-related prohibitions and other sentence conditions imposed pursuant to this chapter by a court. For first-time offenders, the supervision may include crime-related prohibitions and other conditions imposed pursuant to RCW 9.94A.120(5). For purposes of the interstate compact for out-of-state supervision of parolees and probationers, RCW 9.95.270, community supervision is the functional equivalent of probation and should be considered the same as probation by other states.

Since Parramore is not a first-time offender, the issue presented is whether the conditions imposed are "crime-related prohibitions." RCW 9.94A.030(7) defines a "crime-related prohibition" as

an order of a court prohibiting conduct that directly relates to the circumstances of the crime for which the offender has been convicted, and shall not be construed to mean orders directing an offender affirmatively to participate in rehabilitative programs or to otherwise perform affirmative conduct.

As David Boerner states in his treatise, Sentencing in Washington § 4.5 (1985) The authority to impose "crime-related prohibitions" does not carry with it the authority to require the performance of affirmative conduct. This express restriction is in keeping with the fundamental shift in sentencing philosophy the Sentencing Reform Act represents. This express prohibition is another example of the care with which the Act implements its purposes.

* * *

While this distinction may seem attenuated, it is crucial to the conceptual underpinnings of the Act. An offender may be offered the "opportunity to improve him or herself" but may not be coerced in to performing affirmative conduct. The point is not that the affirmative conduct in and of itself is ineffective or undesirable, but rather that to coerce such conduct is to take power over an individual's life in excess of what is deserved for the crime that was committed....

* * *

This concern, coupled with significant reservations as to the efficacy of coerced rehabilitation, resulted in the significant limitation contained in this definition. While the Legislature has allowed such powers to continue to be used within narrowly defined limits for "first-time offenders" and "sex offenders," the basic policy choice is clear. Persons may be punished for their crimes and they may be prohibited from doing things which are directly related to their crimes, but they may not be coerced into doing things which are believed will rehabilitate them.

Since the only prohibitions which may be ordered are those which "directly relate" to the crime for which the offender was convicted, only a relatively narrow range of conduct may be prohibited as a condition of a sentence....

The Act does not specify how certain the sentencing judge must be that the conduct being prohibited is directly related to the crime of conviction.... The existence of such a relationship will always be subjective, and such issues have traditionally been left to the discretion of the sentencing judge.

(Footnotes omitted. Emphasis added.)

In State v. Barclay, 51 Wash.App. 404, 405, 753 P.2d 1015 (1988), the defendant was convicted of first degree vehicle prowl and received a community supervision sentence subject to the condition that he not " 'violate any local, state or federal criminal statute, law or ordinance.' " The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that that condition of sentence was not directly related to Mr. Barclay's conviction of first degree vehicle prowl. The court held that "the court's condition of sentence is of a general nature not directly related to Mr. Barclay's conviction of vehicle prowling in the first degree." State v. Barclay, supra at 407, 753 P.2d 1015.

In this case, Parramore was convicted of selling marijuana. The condition requiring Parramore to submit to urinalysis is therefore directly related to his drug conviction. However, there is no evidence of any...

To continue reading

Request your trial
69 cases
  • State v. Teters
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 20 de fevereiro de 2019
    ...this condition; he was convicted of sex crimes against a child, and this condition aims to limit his future contact with children. Parramore, 53 Wn.App. at 531. Thus, condition 3 crime-related. As to Teters' argument that this condition is unconstitutionally vague for failing to provide him......
  • Joyce v. STATE, DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 11 de março de 2003
    ...officer over offender under community supervision similar to control parole officer exerts over probationer); State v. Parramore, 53 Wash.App. 527, 529, 768 P.2d 530 (1989) ("community supervision is the functional equivalent of probation"). See also footnote 5. In Bell, our Supreme Court h......
  • State v. Stevens
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 16 de julho de 1990
    ...have authority under the SRA to order affirmative participation in rehabilitation. See former RCW 9.94A.030(7); State v. Parramore, 53 Wash.App. 527, 529-30, 768 P.2d 530 (1989); D. Boerner, Sentencing in Washington § 4.5 This condition is deleted from Stevens' sentence. In all other respec......
  • Joyce v. STATE, DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 11 de março de 2003
    ...officer over offender under community supervision similar to control parole officer exerts over probationer); State v. Parramore, 53 Wash.App. 527, 529, 768 P.2d 530 (1989) ("community supervision is the functional equivalent of probation"). See also footnote 5. In Bell, our Supreme Court h......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT