State v. Parsons

• Decision Date: 13 December 1929
• Docket Number: 39930
• Citation: 228 N.W. 307,209 Iowa 540
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. HAROLD PARSONS, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

228 N.W. 307

209 Iowa 540

STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. HAROLD PARSONS, Appellant

No. 39930

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

December 13, 1929

Appeal from Marshall District Court.--B. F. CUMMINGS, Judge.

County attorney's information for bootlegging. Defendant was convicted, and appeals.

Affirmed.

Roy L Pell, for appellant.

John Fletcher, Attorney-general, and Neill Garrett, Assistant Attorney-general, for appellee.

MORLING J. ALBERT, C. J., and STEVENS, DE GRAFF, and WAGNER, JJ concur.

OPINION

MORLING, J.

I.

Defendant complains of the admission in evidence of the can containing intoxicating liquors, alleged to have been the subject of the sale in controversy, and also of a bottle found in defendant's car at the time of the sale. The ground of complaint is that identification was not complete. The evidence introduced was sufficient as a foundation for the introduction of the exhibits in evidence.

II. Defendant further complains that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. The testimony introduced in behalf of the State contains inconsistencies, and is largely contradicted by the testimony of defendant. However, the question of defendant's guilt was clearly one for the jury.

III. The information charged that defendant "did unlawfully and willfully and knowingly, by himself and through his servant or agent, carry around on his person and in a motor vehicle intoxicating liquor, with intent to sell the same, and * * * did sell the same, contrary to law." The defendant contends that, under this information, it was necessary for the State to prove sale, as well as carrying "around with intent to sell," and that the court should have so instructed the jury. Actual sale was not a necessary ingredient of the offense. Code, 1927, Section 1927. The fact that the information charged the commission of acts in excess of those essential to constitute the crime did not impose upon the State the necessity of proving more than the statute requires. The allegation that the defendant did sell is surplusage. State v. Stafford, 145 Iowa 285, 123 N.W. 167; 31 Corpus Juris 748.

IV. The court told the jury that, under the law of Iowa, all persons concerned or engaged in the commission of a crime, whether directly committing it or aiding and abetting its commission, may be tried and punished as principals. Defendant argues that the court should have charged, as a part of this instruction, that defendant must have knowingly aided and abetted the commission of the crime. The instruction complained of merely informed the jury, in substance, in the language of the statute, that:

"All persons concerned in the commission of a public offense, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid and abet its commission, though not present, must hereafter be indicted, tried, and punished as principals." Code, 1927, Section 12895.

See, also, Section 1925.

In this instruction the court did not undertake to define the essentials of the crime charged. That...