State v. Parsons, 880102

• Decision Date: 13 October 1989
• Docket Number: No. 880102,880102
• Citation: 781 P.2d 1275
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Joseph Mitchell PARSONS, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 1275

781 P.2d 1275

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Joseph Mitchell PARSONS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 880102.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Oct. 13, 1989.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 22, 1990.

James L. Shumate, Cedar City, for defendant and appellant.

R. Paul Van Dam, Dan R. Larsen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.

HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:

Upon a plea of guilty, defendant Joseph Mitchell Parsons was convicted of murder in the first degree, a capital offense in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1978, Supp.1989). A sentencing proceeding was conducted under section 76-3-207 (1978, Supp.1989), and a jury unanimously imposed the death penalty. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence.

In the late afternoon of August 30, 1987, defendant was hitchhiking on Interstate-15 near Barstow, California. The victim, Richard L. Ernest, stopped and offered him a ride. While defendant's ultimate destination was Florida, Ernest agreed to take him as far as Denver, Colorado. Earlier that day, Ernest had left his home in Loma Linda, California, to seek a job opportunity and a new environment in Denver. He was traveling alone with a carful of personal belongings and carpentry tools.

At approximately 3:00 the next morning, Ernest drove his car into the Lunt Park rest area on Interstate-15 near Cedar City, Utah. He said that he was too tired to continue driving, and he wanted to get some sleep. He remained in the driver's seat of the car and covered himself with a sleeping bag, while defendant rested his head against the passenger window and door in an attempt to sleep. According to defendant's testimony, Ernest reached over and put his hand on his thigh. Defendant pushed the hand away, stated "that's not my style," and requested that Ernest leave him alone. When Ernest again put his hand on defendant's thigh, he pushed the hand away and reached for the door when Ernest grabbed his left wrist and said, "You're not going anywhere." Defendant then pulled a five-inch double-edged knife from his sock and stabbed Ernest in the chest. Allegedly, a struggle ensued wherein Ernest received several more knife wounds. Eventually, defendant moved into the driver's seat and drove away from the rest area.

After traveling about a mile, defendant pulled the car to the shoulder of the highway, pushed Ernest's body out of the car, covered it with a sleeping bag, and drove another five miles to Beaver, Utah, where he stopped at a service station and convenience store. There, he changed his clothes and washed the victim's blood from himself and from inside the car, emptied the personal belongings and carpentry tools into a dumpster, and assuming the identity of Ernest, purchased food and gas with Ernest's credit card. He then drove to Richfield, Utah, where he again used the victim's money and credit cards to stay in a motel, cleaned his clothes at a laundromat, visited an optometrist for prescription lenses, and attempted to purchase several items, including carseat covers from a store.

Law enforcement officers had since discovered the victim's dead body alongside the highway and had also been alerted to the credit card transactions and unusual activities of defendant in Beaver and Richfield. At approximately 4:15 p.m. on August 31, defendant, while resting in the victim's car at the Red Creek rest area on Interstate-70, was arrested by a Utah Highway Patrol Officer and taken into custody. He was subsequently charged with murder in the first degree under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1978, Supp.1989), aggravated robbery under section 76-6-302 (1978, Supp.1988) (amended, Supp.1989), and theft of an operable motor vehicle under section 76-6-404 (1978).

On September 18, 1987, defendant pleaded guilty to all three counts. Specifically, in regard to the first degree murder charge, he pleaded guilty to the offense as defined in section 76-5-202(1)(h) (having intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another when having been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person). He elected to have a jury determine his sentence, and the death penalty was imposed.

I.

Defendant initially contends that the first degree murder statute under which he was charged and convicted is unconstitutional. In part, section 76-5-202(1)(h) provides:

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following circumstances:

....

(h) The actor was previously convicted of ... a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person.

First, defendant argues that the statute violates constitutional protections against double jeopardy by utilizing a previous conviction as a circumstance to elevate noncapital murder to a capital offense. Second, he argues that the statute denies him due process and the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury by allowing highly prejudicial evidence of his prior felony conviction to come before the jury during the guilt phase of trial. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Utah Const. art. I, §§ 7, 12.

As to his double jeopardy argument, we recently held in State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1989), that for the reasons there stated, section 76-5-202(1)(h) does not violate the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution. As to his second argument, the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled [A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea....

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235, 243 (1973).

The general rule applicable in criminal proceedings, and the cases are legion, is that by pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations. United States v. Lopez, 704 F.2d 1382, 1385 n. 3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 935, 104, S.Ct. 341, 78 L.Ed.2d 309 (1983); United States v. DePoli, 628 F.2d 779, 780-81 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843, 86 S.Ct. 89, 15 L.Ed.2d 84 (1965); State v. Moreno, 134 Ariz. 199, 200, 655 P.2d 23, 24 (Ct.App.1982); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct.App.1988). We followed this general rule in State v. Beck, 584 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1978), where we held that the defendant, by his plea of guilty to second degree murder, waived any claim of constitutional error regarding probable cause and search and seizure principles.

Some courts recognize exceptions to this general rule by allowing a defendant to challenge the validity of a conviction and sentence or the constitutionality of a statute on appeal if the issue was specifically reserved for appeal at the time the guilty plea was entered and the plea was conditional upon appellate determination. See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct.App.1988); State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Utah Ct.App.1988), cert. denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989); see also United States v. DePoli, 628 F.2d 779, 780-81 (2d Cir.1980). But see People v. Pharr, 696 P.2d 235, 236 (Colo.1984) ("Permitting a defendant to plead guilty and to reserve the right to test the constitutionality of a statute is not recognized by either rule or statute, and we specifically disapprove the procedure."). We need not consider this exception in the instant case, however, because defendant's guilty plea was unconditionally entered without limitations. He moved for a sentence of life imprisonment at the sentencing proceeding and again after the death verdict was returned on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional, but he failed to attack the constitutionality of the statute prior to his plea or to conditionally plea and preserve the issue for appeal.

Defendant does not attack the voluntary and intelligent character of his unconditional guilty plea to capital murder. It is clear from the record that great care was taken to ascertain the voluntariness of his plea. We cannot now recognize his efforts to vacate his conviction or sentence by raising independent issues attacking the constitutionality of section 76-5-202(1)(h) on the assertion that he would not have received a fair trial by an impartial jury. We stated in State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248, 1249 (Utah 1977), "The right to a jury trial is constitutionally guaranteed but it may be waived, and when no issue is raised as to innocence, there is nothing to try. Once a plea of guilty is knowingly and voluntarily entered, there are no issues for trial." Because defendant's conviction is based on the guilty plea rather than on evidence which defendant alleges would have unconstitutionally come before the jury during the guilt phase of a trial, he can only challenge the validity of the plea itself. One cannot voluntarily waive his right to trial and then seek relief on grounds that the trial, if it had occurred, may have been constitutionally flawed.

II.

The remaining issues raised by defendant concern alleged defects in the sentencing proceeding conducted under section 76-3-207 after the guilty plea and subsequent convictions were entered. He requests that this Court vacate his death sentence and order a sentence of life imprisonment.

Defendant asserts that the jury was misled to conclude that it could find only aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances in determining his sentence. Specifically, he argues that the lower court misled the jury by giving special verdict instructions and...