State v. Partlow
| Decision Date | 31 October 1884 |
| Citation | 91 N.C. 550,49 Am.Rep. 652 |
| Parties | STATE v. REBECCA PARTLOW. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
INDICTMENT for selling liquor tried at Spring Term, 1884, of GASTON Superior Court, before MacRae, J.
The defendant is indicted for selling one quart of spirituous liquor to one Rutherford within three miles of Mount Zion church, in the county of Gaston, in violation of the act of 1881, ch. 234.
It was in evidence that the liquor was sold as alleged; and that there were two churches, (about fifteen miles apart) each called “Mount Zion church,” in said county--one for the white people, and the other for the colored people. And there was nothing in the statute indicating to which of these two churches the name applied or had reference.
With a view to apply the statute, the state introduced a witness who was a senator in the general assembly at the time the act in question was passed, and the court allowed him to testify, after objection, that it was intended to apply to the church mentioned by himself and the other witnesses, and this he knew, because the provision of the act in respect to Mount Zion church was inserted upon his motion, made in response to petitions praying for the prohibition of the sale of spirituous liquor within three miles of Mount Zion colored church, signed by colored people whom he knew. The defendant excepted, and further insisted that the statute was ambiguous and therefore void.
Verdict of guilty; judgment; appeal by the defendant.
Attorney-General, for the State .
Messrs. Hoke & Hoke, for defendant .
The act of 1881, ch. 234, prohibits the sale of spirituous liquors within designated distances from many churches and other places named therein. So much of it as is material to this case provides, “that the sale of spirituous liquors shall be prohibited within three miles of * * * Mount Zion church in Gaston county.”
It appeared on the trial that there were two churches bearing the name “Mt. Zion” in Gaston county, and there is nothing in the statute indicating to which of them it applies.
It is plainly the duty of the court to so construe a statute, ambiguous in its meaning, as to give effect to the legislative intent, if this be practicable. Its meaning in respect to what it has reference and the objects it embraces, as well as in other respects, is to be ascertained by appropriate means and indicia, such as the purposes appearing from the statute taken as a whole, the phraseology, the words ordinary or technical, the law as it prevailed before the statute, the mischief to be remedied, the remedy, the end to be accomplished, statutes in pari materia, the preamble, the title, and other like means. But the maening must be ascertained from the statute itself, and the means and signs to which, as appears upon its face, it has reference. It cannot be proved by a member of the legislature or other person, whether interested in its enactment or not. A statute is an act of the legislature as an organized body. It expresses the collective will of that body, and no single member of it, or all the members as individuals, can be heard to say what the meaning of the statute is. It must speak for and be construed by itself, by the means and signs indicated above. Otherwise, each individual might attribute to it a different meaning, and thus the legislative will and meaning be lost sight of. Whatever may be the views and purposes of those who procure the enactment of a statute, the legislature contemplates that its intention shall be ascertained from its words as embodied in it. And courts are not at liberty to accept the understanding of any...
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State v. Green
...will, and the courts will interpret the language to give effect to the legislative intent. As this Court said in State v. Partlow, 91 N.C. 550[, 552] (1884), the legislative intent "... is to be ascertained by appropriate means and indicia, such as the purposes appearing from the statute ta......
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...674 (1936). But, as stated in Hobbs v. Moore County, 267 N.C. 665, 149 S.E.2d 1 (1966): 'However, as was said in State v. Partlow, supra (91 N.C. 550, 49 Am.Rep. 652 (1884)), 'It is plainly the duty of the court to so construe a statute, ambiguous in its meaning, as to give effect to the le......
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...(6th Cir. 2000).[60] . Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779 (S.C. 1997).[61] . In re Banks, 244 S.E.2d at 389 (quoting State v. Partlow, 91 N.C. 550 (1884)).[62] . Jeffries, Note 1, supra, at 198; see Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 682 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[I]n light o......
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§ 5.04 Strict Construction of Statutes (Rule of Lenity)
...840 (6th Cir. 2000).[60] Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779 (S.C. 1997).[61] In re Banks, 244 S.E.2d at 389 (quoting State v. Partlow, 91 N.C. 550 (1884)).[62] Jeffries, Note 1, supra, at 198; see Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 682 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[I]n light of ......