State v. Patterson

• Decision Date: 28 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 109,995.,109,995.
• Citation: 49 Kan.App.2d 1001,319 P.3d 588
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Dontae M. PATTERSON, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

49 Kan.App.2d 1001

319 P.3d 588

STATE of Kansas, Appellant,

v.Dontae M. PATTERSON, Appellee.

No. 109,995.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Feb. 28, 2014.

Syllabus by the Court

1. As a general statement of law, it is well settled that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects not only an individual's residence from unreasonable searches and seizures, but also the area surrounding the house called the “curtilage.”

2. In Kansas, it has been generally held that a search warrant describing only the residence will authorize a search of any buildings or vehicles within the curtilage even though they are not specifically described in the warrant.

3. The ultimate question in determining whether property is embraced by a premises' curtilage is whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home's umbrella of Fourth Amendment protection. Four principle factors guide whether the area is under the “umbrella” of the curtilage: (1) how near the area is to the home; (2) whether any enclosures surrounding the home embrace the area in question; (3) how the area is used; and (4) whether the resident has acted to protect the area from observation by people passing by.

4. The driveway and automobile in this case were so intimately tied to the home itself that they should be placed under the umbrella of the curtilage for purposes of the search warrant. For that reason, the officers did not exceed the scope of the warrant by searching the automobile.

Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant.

Richard Ney, of Ney, Adams & Shaneyfelt, of Wichita, for appellee.

Before GREEN, P.J., SCHROEDER, J., and JAMES L. BURGESS, District Judge Retired, assigned.

BURGESS, J.

Officers executed a search warrant that authorized them to search the premises of a specific Wichita address. While on the property, officers searched not only the residence but also a white Mercedes parked in the driveway. Officers recovered evidence of drug offenses from the Mercedes. Subsequent to the search, Dontae M. Patterson was charged with a number of offenses stemming from the evidence recovered in the house and car. Patterson filed two motions: one to suppress all the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant and one to separately suppress the evidence recovered from the Mercedes. The district court granted the latter motion, determining that the search warrant did not extend to the Mercedes because it did not constitute part of the residence's curtilage. The State appeals, arguing first that the Mercedes was within the residence's curtilage and second that the officers searching the vehicle did so in good faith.

Facts

On November 8, 2012, the Wichita Police Department applied for a warrant to search “[t]he premises of 2720 N. Erie, Wichita, Sedgwick County, Kansas.” The application for the search warrant indicated that a Wichita police officer had twice in the last few months discovered marijuana residue in trash bags at that location. The application also noted that Patterson, his son, and two other individuals—an adult woman and a young adult male—lived at the residence. A district judge approved the warrant on the same day. The particularity with which the warrant described the address in question is not at issue in this appeal.

In the evening of that same day, Wichita police officers executed the search warrant. Upon arriving at the residence, officers encountered a white Mercedes parked in the driveway with the rear of the car facing the house and the front facing the street. A juvenile, later identified as Patterson's teenage son, was seated in the front seat of the vehicle. After officers secured the residence, one member of the team proceeded to search the Mercedes in the driveway. Inside the car, the officer discovered a laundry basket containing clothing; a clear glass container reminiscent of a beaker; a box of plastic sandwich bags; a digital scale with a white, powdery residue on it; and a handgun. Officers declined to search a red Mercedes parked on the street outside the residence.

Patterson, as well as the young adult male named in the application for the warrant, were inside the house with a young juvenile when officers entered. In a bedroom within the residence, officers discovered a title document that indicated that Patterson owned a white Mercedes. In other rooms of the house, officers uncovered a second gun and a variety of other evidence of drug offenses, including cocaine residue and a quantity of marijuana.

A few days later, Patterson was charged with three charges stemming from the search of the residence and the Mercedes: possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, criminal possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of cocaine. In January 2013, the charges were amended to also include receipt of criminal proceeds and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia.

Patterson subsequently filed two motions to suppress: one advocating for the suppression of all evidence obtained under the search warrant and one focused solely on the evidence seized from the Mercedes. The district court denied the motion regarding all evidence obtained under the warrant. However, the district court granted the motion to suppress the evidence from the Mercedes. In its decision, the district court focused on whether the car parked in the driveway was sufficiently within the curtilage of the residence and thus within the scope of the search warrant. Ultimately, the district court concluded that the scope of the warrant did not include the Mercedes, rendering the search illegal.

The State timely filed an interlocutory appeal.

Analysis

In appealing the suppression of the evidence from the Mercedes, the State argues first that the warrant's scope extended to the entire curtilage of the residence, including any vehicles within the curtilage. Additionally, the State reasons that even if the warrant itself did not extend to the Mercedes, the officer searching the car did so under a good-faith belief that it was included within the warrant's scope. Patterson, however, counters these arguments, contending that the warrant's scope did not extend to the Mercedes, that the Mercedes was not within the curtilage of the property, and that good faith did not support searching the vehicle.

Did the search warrant extend to the Mercedes parked in the driveway at the residence?

After an examination of the caselaw, the district court determined that the search of the Mercedes exceeded the scope of the search warrant because the car was not part of the curtilage of the property at the residence. The district court based its decision entirely on legal precedent and that precedent's applicability to the specific facts of Patterson's case.

The question of whether a particular seizure occurred within the curtilage of a residence is a mixed question of fact and law. An appellate court reviews the district court's factual findings for substantial competent evidence and reviews de novo the district court's legal conclusion of whether the seizure occurred within the curtilage. State v. Fisher, 283 Kan. 272, 286, 154 P.3d 455 (2007). However, as the district court's decision relies solely on legal precedent, this appeal centers solely around a legal question over which this court exercises unlimited review. See 283 Kan. at 286, 154 P.3d 455.

As a general statement of law, it is well settled that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects not only an individual's residence from unreasonable searches and seizures, but also the area surrounding the house called the “curtilage.” United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987). This protection exists to conserve the “sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886).

In discussing this principle and its application in Kansas, this court stated in an opinion affirmed and adopted by our Supreme Court that “it has been generally held that a search warrant describing only the residence will authorize a search of any buildings or vehicles within the ‘curtilage’ even though they are not specifically described in the warrant.” State v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 266, 807 P.2d 162,aff'd249 Kan. 584, 821 P.2d 327 (1991). Operating under this general principle, this court and our Kansas Supreme Court have upheld searches of a shed behind a residence, a trash can in the rear of the yard of a residence, and an individual standing outside a residence. State v. McClelland, 215 Kan. 81, 84–85, 523 P.2d 357 (1974) (individual); State v. Ogden, 210 Kan. 510, 519, 502 P.2d 654 (1972) (trash can); Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d at 269, 807 P.2d 162 (shed). Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has repeatedly upheld searches of vehicles and other objects within the curtilage of a residence because “outbuildings and vehicles within the curtilage of a residence are considered part of that residence for purposes of a search warrant ... even when not named in the warrant.” United States v. Finnigin, 113 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir.1997); see United States v. Porter, No. 97–8016, 1997 WL 639318, at *1 (10th Cir.1997) (unpublished opinion).

The specific inquiry in this case—whether the scope of a warrant extended to a vehicle located on the curtilage of the resident to be searched—is a novel one in Kansas. Only one case from this state, State v. Coker, No. 89,851, ––– Kan.App.2d ––––, 2003 WL 22697577 (Kan.App.2003) (unpublished opinion), directly addresses this issue. In Coker, a search warrant authorized officers to search a specific vehicle and three addresses, all owned by the focus of the warrant, Steve Rowland. Rowland lived at one of the named addresses and operated a business at another of the named addresses, which...