State v. Peabodt

• Decision Date: 06 May 1903
• Citation: 25 R.I. 178,55 A. 323
• Parties: STATE v. PEABODT.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

55 A. 323

25 R.I. 178

STATE

v. PEABODT.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 6, 1903.

A complaint was instituted in the district court against Francis S. Peabody, charging him with nonsupport of his children. He was convicted, and appealed to the common pleas division, where he was again convicted on trial by jury. He thereupon filed a petition for a new trial. Pending this petition, complainant died, and now defendant moves in arrest of judgment. Motion denied.

Argued before STINESS, C. J., and TILLINGHAST and DOUGLAS, JJ.

A. B. Crafts, for the State.

Thomas H. Peabody and Nathan B. Lewis, for defendant.

TILLINGHAST, j. The defendant moves in arrest of judgment on the ground that the complainant is dead. The record shows that one John P. Burdick, of Westerly, instituted a criminal complaint against the defendant on the 9th day of August, 1901, under the provision of Gen. Laws R. I. 1896, c. 281, $ 24, charging him with nonsupport of his children. The complainant, not being a pub lie official authorized by section 25 of said chapter to make such complaint, 'gave surety for costs in the usual way. See State v. Woodmansee, 19 R. I. 651, 35 Atl. 961. The record further shows that the defendant was tried and convicted of said offense in the district court of the Third Judicial District; that he thereupon took an appeal to the common pleas division, where, upon trial by a jury, he was again convicted of said offense. He then filed in this court a petition for new trial, and pending this petition the complainant has deceased, and the defendant now moves in arrest of judgment as aforesaid.

We think it is clear that this motion must be denied. A motion in arrest of judgment raises only those objections which are apparent upon the record, and such as would be fatal on demurrer. State v. Paul, 5 R. I. 189; Bull v. Mathews, 20 R. I. 100, 37 Atl. 536; Dunn v. Sullivan, 23 R. I. 605, 51 Atl. 203; 1 Black on Judg. (2d Ed.) § 98, and cases cited. There is no apparent or demurrable defect in the case now before us. The proceeding is entirely regular on its face. The defendant has been twice convicted of the offense which is charged against him (first in the district court, and, second, in the common pleas division upon trial by jury), and nothing remains to be done (unless the petition for new trial is prosecuted) except for the court, upon motion, to impose sentence upon the defendant.

The position taken by defendant's counsel that the death of the complainant operates as an abatement of the proceeding is untenable. The state is the real party in all criminal prosecutions. The individual complainant simply sets the criminal law in operation, as he may rightfully do, but the state is the real prosecutor. It is the peace and dignity of the state which has been violated in the commission of any crime or offense, and hence no one but the state can, in any true sense, prosecute the offender for such a wrong. It is true that private complainants are required to become responsible for the costs to which the state may be subjected in case the prosecution fail. This requirement is probably for the purpose of preventing the bringing of complaints which may be instigated by personal spite or malice, or of bringing those which are not well founded in fact. But the mere fact that a private individual is the complainant does...