State v. Pearson
| Decision Date | 04 June 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-1301,79-1301 |
| Citation | 405 N.E.2d 296,62 Ohio St.2d 291,16 O.O.3d 332 |
| Parties | , 16 O.O.3d 332 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. PEARSON, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. R.C. 2923.03(D) can prohibit convictions for principal offenses, as well as prohibit convictions for the complicity offenses described in R.C. 2923.03(A).
2. In order for the prosecution to satisfy the corroboration requirement of R.C. 2923.03(D), independent evidence must support an accomplice's testimony, and must tend to connect the accused with the alleged crime or must tend to identify the accused as a guilty actor. (State v. Myers, 53 Ohio St.2d 74, 372 N.E.2d 356, approved and followed.)
On April 2, 1975, the body of Joseph D. Witcraft, operator of a gasoline service station, was found lying alongside a highway in Warrensville Heights, Ohio. Witcraft had been shot six times, and had been robbed of a large quantity of money. Witcraft was last seen alive at his service station prior to his entering an automobile with two apparent customers to go for a test drive.
In September 1976, some 17 months later, Avila Chambliss implicated himself, appellee, Thomas Pearson, and one Samuel Taylor in the above offenses. As a result, appellee, Chambliss and Taylor were indicted for aggravated murder with specifications, aggravated robbery and kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2903.01, 2911.01 and 2905.01. At his arraignment, appellee entered a plea of not guilty.
Appellee was tried individually before a jury which returned verdicts of guilty on all three charges. In accordance with these verdicts, the trial court entered judgment and sentence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed all three convictions, ruling that appellee was entitled to a discharge pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(D) as interpreted in State v. Myers (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 74, 372 N.E.2d 356, and State v. Vorys (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 107, 383 N.E.2d 115, for reason that the only evidence connecting appellee with the Witcraft offenses was the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, Avila Chambliss.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.
John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., Robert V. Housel and George J. Sadd, Asst. Pros. Attys., for appellant.
Fink & Green Co., L.P.A., Janet R. Burnside, and Michael C. Hennenberg, Cleveland, for appellee.
R.C. 2923.03(D) provides:
"No person shall be convicted of complicity under this section solely upon the testimony of an accomplice, unsupported by other evidence."
In its first proposition of law, the state argues that, literally construed, R.C. 2923.03(D) only prohibits convictions "under this section," i. e., convictions for the complicity offenses described in R.C. 2923.03(A), 1 and does not prohibit convictions for principal offenses. Thus, since appellee was convicted for the principal offenses of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery and kidnapping pursuant to R.C. 2903.01, 2911.01 and 2905.01, respectively, the state contends that R.C. 2923.03(D) does not prohibit appellee's convictions. The state asks that we reconsider our decision in State v. Myers, supra, where we applied R.C. 2923.03(D) to prohibit a conviction under R.C. 2911.01 for aggravated robbery, a principal offense. Upon reconsideration, we reject the state's argument and explicitly approve of our application of R.C. 2923.03(D) to principal offenses.
To restrict the application of R.C. 2923.03(D) to the complicity offenses described in R.C. 2923.03(A) would be to exalt form over substance. Under R.C. 2923.03(F), " * * * (a) charge of complicity may be stated (at the option of the prosecution) in terms of * * * (R.C. 2923.03(A)) or in terms of the principal offense." Moreover, under R.C. 2923.03(F), a person accused of complicity is "prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal offender." Indeed, if we were to sanction the state's construction of R.C. 2923.03(D), it is unlikely that a prosecutor would ever charge an accused with complicity. Rather, he would charge the accused with the underlying principal offense and thereby avoid R.C. 2923.03(D). Since the serious infirmities associated with accomplice testimony 2 are unrelated to the way in which the prosecution states its charges, the above construction of R.C. 2923.03(D) could not have been the General Assembly's intent. We therefore refuse to give literal effect to the phrase "under this section" in R.C. 2923.03(D), and hold that R.C. 2923.03(D) can prohibit convictions for principal offenses, as well as prohibit convictions for the complicity offenses described in R.C. 2923.03(A).
In its second proposition of law, the state alternatively argues that it introduced sufficient evidence to satisfy the corroboration requirement of R.C. 2923.03(D). The state has conceded that it introduced no evidence corroborating the testimony of appellee's alleged accomplice, Avila Chambliss, tending to connect appellee with the commission of the alleged crimes. On the other hand, there is no dispute that the state introduced ample evidence corroborating Chambliss' testimony as to other material circumstances of the respective crimes. Thus, we need to determine whether the corroboration requirement of R.C. 2923.03(D) prohibits an otherwise sustainable conviction where no evidence has been introduced which corroborates the testimony of an accomplice tending to connect an accused with the commission of an alleged offense. The state explicitly asks that we reevaluate our holding in State v. Myers, supra, at page 75, 372 N.E.2d at page 357, that an "(accomplice's) testimony must be corroborated by some other fact, circumstance, or testimony which also points to the identity of the one he accuses as a guilty actor." Accord State v. Vorys, supra, 56 Ohio St.2d at page 110, 383 N.E.2d 115. Upon reconsideration, we reaffirm our holding in State v. Myers, supra.
The state argues that corroboration of an accomplice's testimony concerning any of the material circumstances of an alleged crime, apart from an accused's connection therewith, should be sufficient to satisfy the corroboration requirement of R.C. 2923.03(D). Apparently, the justification for the state's position is that since corroboration of an accomplice's testimony concerning any of the material circumstances of an alleged crime enhances the accomplice's credibility, a jury should be permitted to believe the accomplice's uncorroborated testimony concerning the accused's connection with the alleged crime. At best, however, corroboration of an accomplice's testimony concerning the material circumstances of a crime, apart from the accused's connection therewith, demonstrates that the accomplice was connected with the crime. It does little to allay one's concern that the accomplice is being untruthful concerning the accused's connection with the crime, especially since the accused's connection therewith would ordinarily be the primary if not sole contested issue in such cases. 3
Thus, we reaffirm our holding in State v. Myers, supra, and herein reemphasize that, in order for the prosecution to satisfy the corroboration requirement of R.C. 2923.03(D), independent evidence must support an accomplice's testimony, and must tend to connect the accused with the alleged crime or must tend to identify the accused as a guilty actor. 4
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Although I concur in this court's construction of R.C. 2923.03(D), I must express serious reservations about that provision and its operation.
The General Assembly in R.C. 2923.03(D) has enacted an inflexible rule that provides that all accomplice testimony is inherently unreliable. In so doing, the General Assembly has taken much of the evaluation of witness credibility away from the jury. In our legal system the jury, on a case-by-case basis, not the legislature in an intractable, stony provision, ordinarily assesses witness credibility. State v. Tuttle (1903), 67 Ohio St. 440, 66 N.E. 524. A jury's personal assessment of witness credibility is a much better method of weighing accomplice testimony than an inflexible statutory rule such as the one contained in R.C. 2923.03(D).
Obviously there are reasons for distrusting accomplice testimony, but they are not a proper basis to constitute an automatic exclusion resulting in a discharge of a criminal offender. There...
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State v. Tyler
...accomplice's testimony connecting the accused with the alleged crime or identifying him as a guilty actor. State v. Pearson (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 291, 16 O.O.3d 332, 405 N.E.2d 296, paragraph two of the syllabus. However, the corroborating evidence need not by itself prove guilt beyond a re......
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State v. Williams
...of an accomplice, unsupported by other evidence." 12 This court held in paragraph two of the syllabus in State v. Pearson (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 291, 16 O.O.3d 332, 405 N.E.2d 296, "In order for the prosecution to satisfy the corroboration requirement of R.C. 2923.03(B), independent evidence......
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State v. Woods
...other evidence." Although the statute refers only to complicity offenses, it applies equally to principal offenses. State v. Pearson (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 291, 405 N.E.2d 296 , paragraph one of the syllabus. In Pearson, the court stated in the second paragraph of the "In order for the prose......
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State v. Vincent Dickerson
... ... MURDER, WHICH WAS MADE AT THE CLOSE OF ALL OF THE ... EVIDENCE." ... Appellant relies upon R.C. 2923.03(D) which prohibits ... convictions based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of ... an accomplice. In State v. Pearson (1980), 62 Ohio ... St.2d 291, the court wrote: ... "In order for the prosecution to satisfy the ... corroboration requirement of R.C. 2923.03(D), independent ... evidence must support an accomplice's testimony, and must ... tend to connect the accused to the alleged ... ...