State v. Peats
| Decision Date | 08 October 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 2030,2030 |
| Citation | 475 P.2d 238,106 Ariz. 254 |
| Parties | The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Stephen Earl PEATS, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Carl Waag, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.
William A. Coffeen, Yuma, for appellant.
On March 2, 1963, appellant, Stephen Earl Peats, was convicted after a jury trial in Yuma County, Arizona, for first degree murder. The jury recommended imprisonment in the State Prison for life. No timely appeal was taken from the conviction and sentence, but, on the 16th of May, 1969, Peats filed a motion in this court under Supreme Court Rule 16(a), 17 A.R.S., to take a delayed appeal, setting forth that he did not appeal within the mandatory 60 days because he had not been advised by his then lawyer that he had a right to appeal. The Attorney General filed a response to Peats' motion, recommending that Peats be given an out of time appeal, and the Superior Court of Yuma County, having found that Peats was indigent, appointed an attorney to act on his behalf and ordered that a record be furnished at the County's expense.
The record discloses that on the morning of September 29, 1962, Peats and a friend were traveling from Los Angeles, California to the State of Louisiana. At a roadside rest area east of Yuma they saw a small black automobile pulled off the road with the driver, alone in the seat, asleep. Peats and his companion then endeavored to rob the driver, but a fight ensued in which the driver was shot to death. Peats and his companion hid the victim's body and took his billfold, watch, and other items of value. There is evidence that Peats had been taking drugs for several days prior to this incident and had only a vague recollection of what occurred.
The court instructed the jury that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was either premeditated or committed in the perpetration of a robbery; and that, to consider the claim of robbery, the State had to prove that at the time the crime was committed the defendant had a specific felonious intent to steal. Immediately following, the court gave this instruction requested by the State:
Peats now urges that the instruction was so erroneous as to require a reversal of his conviction.
In considering his argument, it should be first stated that no objection was made at the trial to have giving of the instruction. Ordinarily, errors in instructions to which no objections are made will be considered as waived. This principle was recently stated in State v. Norgard, 103 Ariz. 381, 383, 442 P.2d 544, 546 in this language:
It is urged that the instruction permitted the jury to find a specific intent to rob even though defendant was 'intoxicated to such a degree as to render him fully oblivious to his acts or conduct.' Peats ascribes to the word 'oblivious' the meaning of lacking conscious knowledge or awareness, thereby suggesting that the jury could believe that even if defendant was so intoxicated from liquor or drugs that he was consciously unaware of what he was doing at the time of the offense, and hence lacking a specific intent, he could still legally commit the crime of robbery.
However, the word 'oblivious' has another well understood meaning. Webster's Third International Dictionary also defines oblivious as 'lacking remembrance, memory, or mindful attention: characterized by forgetfulness.' We think it was in this latter sense that the court intended and the jury must have understood the word 'oblivious.' Particularly we think this was true in the light of the setting of this criminal case. First, because the defendant's case presented testimony that he could remember only some of the details of the homicide, and, second, because the court unequivocally required that the State prove that Peats had a specific felonious intent to steal at the time of the homicide. In the sense that the instruction means that a lack of remembering is not a defense to a crime it was not erroneous. Without an appropriate objection, the claimed error is not so fundamental that it is manifest the defendant did not receive a fair trial.
Moreover, the defendant in his proposed instruction number seven requested that the court charge the jury in the language of the statute, A.R.S. § 13--132, on the legal effect of intoxication as a defense to a criminal charge. For reasons which are not disclosed, the defendant later modified his proposed instruction, eliminating any reference to the statute. By § 13--132, where a crime requires the formulation of a specific intent, the intoxication of the accused may be shown as a defense. See State v. Roqueni, 94 Ariz. 72, 381 P.2d 757. Apparently the defense was...
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State v. Moody
...Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 161, 568 P.2d 1054, 1059 (1977) (citing State v. Jensen, 111 Ariz. 408, 531 P.2d 531 (1975), and State v. Peats, 106 Ariz. 254, 475 P.2d 238 (1970)). Rather, "[t]he decision to refuse a jury instruction is within the trial court's discretion, and this court will not rev......
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State v. Cornell
...Ariz. 408, 410, 531 P.2d 531, 533 (1975) (defendant not entitled to instruction on disposition even if requested); State v. Peats, 106 Ariz. 254, 256, 475 P.2d 238, 240 (1970) The jury was to decide the question of sanity, not the propriety of the law governing disposition after a finding o......
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State v. SAIERS
...of an insanity verdict is improper. The court affirmed the trial court's refusal to give two such instructions in State v. Peats, 106 Ariz. 254, 256, 475 P.2d 238, 240 (1970), We think the two proposed instructions tended to inform the jury concerning matters which were not properly their c......
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State v. Doss
...This position has previously been rejected by this court in State v. Jensen, 111 Ariz. 408, 531 P.2d 531 (1975) and State v. Peats, 106 Ariz. 254, 475 P.2d 238 (1970). There was no error in the refusal of the trial court to give the defendant's requested instruction on the consequences of a......