State v. Pendergrass
| Decision Date | 21 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 27814,27814 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Gerald PENDERGRASS, Defendant-Appellee |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by HEATHER N. JANS, Atty. Reg. No. 0084470, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor's Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
JEFFREY R. McQUISTON, Atty. Reg. No. 0027605, 130 West Second Street, Suite 1818, Dayton, Ohio 45402, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of a re-indictment issued on September 13, 2017, against Defendant-appellee, Gerald Pendergrass. Raising two assignments of error, the State argues that the trial court misconstrued R.C. 2907.04(B)(4) and, in the alternative, that the trial court erred by dismissing the re-indictment in its entirety, rather than allowing the case to proceed on lesser included offenses. We find that the trial court erred by dismissing the re-indictment pursuant to R.C. 2907.04(B)(4) ; therefore, we sustain the State's first assignment of error and reverse the trial court's judgment of November 14, 2017. The State's second assignment of error is consequently overruled as moot.
{¶ 2} On August 4, 2016, a Montgomery County Grand jury issued an indictment against Pendergrass in Case No. 2016 CR 02355. The indictment charged him with two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, fourth degree felonies pursuant to R.C. 2907.04(A) and (B)(1), in relation to events that allegedly occurred "between the dates of October 1, 2015[, and] December 1, 2015." Pendergrass pleaded guilty to one of the two counts, and on September 30, 2016, the trial court docketed a termination entry reflecting the plea and the sentence imposed.
{¶ 3} In the instant case, a subsequent Montgomery County grand jury issued another indictment against Pendergrass on or about August 31, 2017. Again, Pendergrass was charged with two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, also fourth degree felonies pursuant to R.C. 2907.04(A) and (B)(1), but these new charges related to events that allegedly occurred "between the dates of May 19, 2013[, and] May 19, 2014." At his arraignment on September 5, 2017, Pendergrass entered a plea of not guilty.
{¶ 4} On September 13, 2017, Pendergrass was re-indicted on nearly the same charges. The re-indictment, however, alleged that the underlying events occurred between May 19, 2013, and May 19, 2015, and specified that Pendergrass had "been previously convicted * * * on September 30, 2016, for the offense of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor in [C]ase [N]umber 2016 CR [0]2355." In light of the previous conviction, the offenses in the re-indictment were charged as second degree felonies pursuant to R.C. 2907.04(A) and (B)(4). Pendergrass again entered a plea of not guilty when he appeared for arraignment on the re-indictment on September 14, 2017.
{¶ 5} On September 22, 2017, Pendergrass moved to dismiss the re-indictment under Crim.R. 12(C)(2). Effective October 11, 2017, the trial court entered a nolle prosequi without prejudice, at the State's request, with respect to the initial indictment. On November 14, 2017, the trial court sustained Pendergrass's motion to dismiss the re-indictment, and on November 22, 2017, the State timely filed a notice of appeal to this court.
{¶ 6} For its first assignment of error, the State contends that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PENDERGRASS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE RE-INDICTMENT BASED ON ITS CONCLUSION THAT PENDERGRASS' PRIOR CONVICTION FOR UNLAWFUL SEXUAL CONDUCT WITH A MINOR COULD NOT SERVE AS A PRIOR CONVICTION THEREBY INCREASING THE DEGREE OF FELONY.
{¶ 7} In its decision sustaining Pendergrass's motion to dismiss, the trial court determined that his conviction in Case No. 2016 CR 02355 "is actually * * * a conviction subsequent to the violations alleged in the re-indictment," because the events that gave rise to the conviction occurred after the events on which the re-indictment is based. (Emphasis sic.) Decision & Entry Sustaining Mot. to Dismiss Re-indictment 2-3, Nov. 14, 2017 [hereinafter Decision ]. The State argues that the trial court erred by predicating its decision on the sequence in which the underlying events occurred, rather than the sequence in which the legal proceedings occurred. We find that the trial court erred by dismissing the re-indictment.
{¶ 8} A "motion to dismiss [under Crim.R. 12(C)(2) ] tests the legal sufficiency of [an] indictment, regardless of the quality or quantity of the evidence that may be introduced [at trial either by] the state or [by] the defendant." (Citations omitted.) State ex rel. Steffen v. Court of Appeals , 126 Ohio St.3d 405, 2010-Ohio-2430, 934 N.E.2d 906, ¶ 34 ; State v. Pointer , 193 Ohio App.3d 674, 2011-Ohio-1419, 953 N.E.2d 853, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing Steffen at ¶ 34. When presented with a motion to dismiss an indictment, a trial court should determine only "whether the allegations [describe one or more] offenses under Ohio criminal law." State v. Patterson , 63 Ohio App.3d 91, 95, 577 N.E.2d 1165 (2d Dist.1989) ; see also Crim.R. 7(B). The question of whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction must be left for a trial on the merits. (Citation omitted.) Pointer at ¶ 16. On appeal, a trial court's ruling on a motion under Crim.R. 12(C)(2) is reviewed de novo. (Citation omitted.) State v. Thornsbury , 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 12CA9, 2013-Ohio-1914, 2013 WL 1932938, ¶ 6.
{¶ 9} R.C. 2907.04(A) prohibits any "person who is eighteen years of age or older" from "engag[ing] in sexual conduct with [a minor] who is not the offender's spouse," if the "offender" either "knows the [minor] is thirteen years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age" or "is reckless in that regard." Under R.C. 2907.04(B), if "the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of * * * [R.C.] 2907.04," then "unlawful sexual conduct with a minor is a felony of the second degree." The term "conviction" generally means " ‘the state of having been proved guilty.’ " State v. Baker , 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 12, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 335 (7th Ed.1999). As the term is used in the Ohio Revised Code, " ‘a "conviction" consists of a guilty verdict and the imposition of a sentence or penalty.’ " (Emphasis sic.) See State v. Ulrich , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23737, 2011-Ohio-758, 2011 WL 579239, ¶ 40, quoting State v. Whitfield , 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, ¶ 12.
{¶ 10} Here, Pendergrass argues that because the word "offender," instead of the word "defendant," is used in R.C. 2907.04(B)(4), the phrase "previously has been convicted * * * or pleaded guilty" relates to the time at which he allegedly engaged in the conduct described in the re-indictment, rather than to the date on which he was convicted in Case No. 2016 CR 02355. See Appellee's Br. 4. The trial court concurred. Decision 2-3. Interpreting the statute accordingly, the trial court reasoned that for Pendergrass to have been validly re-indicted for a second degree felony on the basis of a previous conviction, the previous conviction must already have been a matter of record at the time he committed the acts cited in the re-indictment. See id. at 3.
{¶ 11} The trial court found support for its interpretation in the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Smith , 104 Ohio St.3d 106, 2004-Ohio-6238, 818 N.E.2d 283. Decision 3. In its opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court considered the question of "whether [a] conviction [for a] sexually violent offense may be used as the conviction * * * to support [a] sexually violent predator specification [where the defendant was charged with the offense and the specification] in the same indictment." (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 1. Answering the question in the negative, the Court held that the specification could only be based on "a conviction that existed prior to the indictment of the underlying offense." (Emphasis added.) Id.
{¶ 12} The trial court's interpretation of R.C. 2907.04(B)(4), however, discounts the meaning of the word "conviction," which is defined exclusively by reference to legal proceedings. Compare Smith at ¶¶ 1 and 18, with Baker , 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 12, and Ulrich , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23737, 2011-Ohio-758, ¶ 40 ; see also Decision 3. For that matter, the holding in Smith appears to have limited relevance to this case given the narrowness of the issue presented for the Court's review. See Smith at ¶¶ 1 and 31-32.
{¶ 13} On its face, the statute is not ambiguous. R.C. 2907.04(B)(4) makes no reference to the chronological order in which a person commits violations of R.C. 2907.04(A) but, instead, refers exclusively to the order in which "the offender" is "convicted of" or "plead[s] guilty to" such violations. Compare State v. Brantley , 1 Ohio St.2d 139, 205 N.E.2d 391 (1965), syllabus. Moreover, the word "offender" must be construed within the context in which it appears. R.C. 2907.04(B) states that "[w]hoever violates [ R.C. 2907.04(A) ] is guilty of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor." The "offender," then, is the person who has violated R.C. 2907.04(A), and the use of the verb "to violate" in the present tense indicates that the violation in question is the current violation, as opposed to the violation or violations that resulted in the previous conviction or guilty plea. Consequently, R.C. 2907.04(B)(4) could be paraphrased as follows: "If the person who is found guilty of, or pleads guilty to, a violation of R.C. 2907.04(A) has already been convicted of a sex offense under R.C. 2907.02, 2907.03 or 2907.04, then the violation is a felony of the second degree."
{¶ 14}...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Pendergrass
...the 2017 indictment could include the enhancement, even though the charged criminal activity predated the prior conviction. 2018-Ohio-3813, 111 N.E.3d 120, ¶ 17 ; id. at ¶ 26 (Froelich, J., concurring).The statutory text{¶ 5} In interpreting a statute, we begin with the statutory language. ......
- Wilson v. Wilson, E-17-042