State v. Pendleton, s. 61501
Decision Date | 24 August 1993 |
Docket Number | 63345,Nos. 61501,s. 61501 |
Citation | 860 S.W.2d 807 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Mark PENDLETON, Appellant. Mark PENDLETON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
S. Paige Canfield, St. Louis, for appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., David B. Cosgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
Before GARY M. GAERTNER, C.J., and PUDLOWSKI and SIMON, JJ.
Appellant, Mark Pendleton, appeals his conviction in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis for first degree assault, RSMo § 565.050 (1986), and armed criminal action, RSMo § 571.015 (1986). He was sentenced by the Honorable Charles A. Shaw as a prior offender to consecutive terms of thirty and fifteen years; respectively. Appellant also appeals the denial of his postconviction relief motion without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
In the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence established that on the evening of February 21, 1991, appellant was visiting Shirley Taylor at her home. At some point during the evening, Danny Lawson, having just been to the liquor store, arrived on the scene. The three began drinking.
During the evening, an argument ensued. Ms. Taylor had owned two rifles which she kept in her house. However, about two weeks before the evening in question, Mr. Lawson had pawned one of the rifles for $50. Appellant began to question Lawson as to why he had stolen Taylor's gun. Appellant then went into another room, got the second rifle owned by Ms. Taylor, and returned to where Ms. Taylor and Mr. Lawson were talking. Ms. Taylor took the gun away from appellant and put it back in the other room. However, appellant again obtained the rifle and demanded that Lawson tell him why he had taken Taylor's gun. Ms. Taylor distracted appellant while Mr. Lawson escaped out the front door, but appellant followed. As Lawson was opening the front gate, appellant fired. The bullet hit Lawson, traveling through his left elbow and into his chest. Lawson continued through the gate, ran across the street to a friend's house, and collapsed.
The police arrived and Lawson was rushed to the hospital, where he spent the next eight days. The bullet had severed Lawson's brachial artery. He also suffered a lacerated spleen and kidney and underwent surgery twice.
In speaking with Officer Michael Lauer, Mr. Lawson identified appellant as the person who shot him. Officer Lauer then questioned appellant. Lauer testified appellant initially told him that the gun accidently went off during an argument with Lawson. Appellant told Lauer that Lawson tried to take the gun to commit a robbery. According to appellant's story, Lawson grabbed the barrel end of the rifle with both hands, trying to take it from appellant. The gun then went off as appellant and Lawson struggled. However, Officer Lauer told appellant that Lawson's injuries could not have happened in that manner. Appellant then recanted his story.
Appellant next told Officer Lauer that the argument was really over a gun Lawson had stolen from Taylor. Appellant told Officer Lauer that he had followed Lawson out the front door pointing the rifle at him, but had only pulled the trigger when Lawson turned and said, "Lets fight."
Appellant was convicted by a jury on all charges. On January 31, 1992, the Honorable Charles A. Shaw sentenced appellant as a prior offender to forty-five years' imprisonment.
Appellant filed a pro se Rule 29.15 motion on September 12, 1992. Counsel was appointed and an amended motion was filed on November 16, 1992. Judge Shaw denied appellant's motion without an evidentiary hearing. We have consolidated appellant's appeals pursuant to Rule 29.15(l ).
Appellant's first contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his Batson motion. 1 Appellant contends the State's articulated reasons for striking one juror, Venireperson Garner, were weak and pretextual. He adds that the State's use of five of six strikes to remove blacks from the jury panel was indicative of purposeful discrimination. We disagree.
The record reveals that after strikes for cause, the jury panel consisted of thirteen whites and eleven blacks. The state used its peremptory strikes to remove five blacks and one white. Noting this, and the fact that the defendant was black, the Court required the state to give reasons for its peremptory strikes. The following dialogue concerning Venireperson Garner ensued:
The Missouri Supreme Court, in State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo. banc 1992), formed a three-step procedure which courts must follow when encountered with a timely Batson challenge.
First, the defendant must raise a Batson challenge with regard to one or more specific venirepersons struck by the state and identify the cognizable racial group to which the venireperson or persons belong. The trial court will then require the state to come forward with reasonably specific and clear race-neutral explanations for the strike. (Citations omitted). Assuming the prosecutor is able to articulate an acceptable reason for the strike, the defendant will then need to show that the state's proffered reasons for the strikes were merely pretextual and that the strikes were racially motivated. (citations omitted)
However, the prosecutor's explanation will be regarded as race-neutral unless discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation. Id. at 934, 939 n. 6.
In the present case, the State's proffered reasons for striking Venireperson Garner were: 1) she had a nephew approximately the same age as the defendant who had been recently arrested; and 2) the venireperson was a strong-willed woman who might then influence the other jurors. The white venirepersons appellant contends were similarly situated women were both crime victims, and thus attractive to the prosecution. We agree with the trial court that there is no racial motivation inherent in the State's explanation.
At trial, appellant did not challenge the State's proffered reasons for striking the other four black venirepersons. If the trial court and the appellant were satisfied with the State's explanations at trial, this court is not in a position to dispute them. State v. Gray, 849 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Mo.App., E.D.1993). We will therefore not consider these in appellant's Batson challenge.
Additionally, appellant contends that the act of striking five of six black venirepersons is "purposeful discrimination" in and of itself. This theory totally bypasses the Supreme Court's analysis of Batson challenges and will not be considered here. See State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 939. Point denied.
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his Rule 29.15 motion without an evidentiary hearing. Appellant alleges his counsel was ineffective in failing to call Shirley Taylor as an eyewitness who would have corroborated his testimony. We disagree.
We note our review of a Rule 29.15 motion is limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the motion court are clearly erroneous. State v. Gray, 849 S.W.2d at 118. The findings and conclusions of the motion court are not clearly erroneous unless, upon a review of the entire record, the appellate court is left with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Id. "A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if: (1) his Rule 29.15 motion alleges facts, not conclusion, warranting relief; (2) those facts raise matters unrefuted by the record; and (3) the matters complained of resulted in prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 118-119. No evidentiary hearing is necessary if the motion, files and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief. Rule 29.15(g); State v. Gray, 849 S.W.2d at 119.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to secure a defense witness' testimony, the defendant must show: "(1) the witness could have been located through reasonable investigation; (2) the witness, if called, would have testified; and (3) the testimony would have provided a viable defense." Id. at 119.
In the present case, we cannot find the motion court erred in denying appellant a hearing on his claim of ineffective counsel. In his motion for postconviction relief, appellant only alleged that defense counsel failed to call Shirley Taylor, and that she could have substantiated movant's testimony. We agree with the motion court that movant failed to allege his attorney was ever made aware of what the substance of Ms. Taylor's testimony would be....
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