State v. Perala
| Decision Date | 16 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 23171-2-III.,No. 23149-6-III.,No. 23162-3-III.,No. 23441-0-III.,No. 23442-8-III.,No. 23170-4-III.,No. 23153-4-III.,No. 23152-6-III.,No. 23161-5-III.,No. 23159-3-III.,No. 23157-7-III.,No. 23150-0-III.,No. 23168-2-III.,No. 23169-1-III.,No. 23440-1-III.,No. 23151-8-III.,No. 23155-1-III.,No. 23348-1-III.,No. 23158-5-III.,No. 23154-2-III.,No. 23445-2-III.,No. 23443-6-III.,No. 23167-4-III.,No. 23166-6-III.,23151-8-III.,23149-6-III.,23150-0-III.,23152-6-III.,23153-4-III.,23154-2-III.,23155-1-III.,23157-7-III.,23158-5-III.,23159-3-III.,23161-5-III.,23162-3-III.,23166-6-III.,23167-4-III.,23168-2-III.,23169-1-III.,23170-4-III.,23171-2-III.,23348-1-III.,23440-1-III.,23441-0-III.,23442-8-III.,23443-6-III.,23445-2-III. |
| Citation | 132 Wn. App. 98,130 P.3d 852 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Buckley James PERALA, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Tye J. Hendrickson, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Leeah June Lopez, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Steven Ray Costello, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Melinda K. McCollum, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Jane Marie Enfield, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Shelly Lynn Davis, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Jeffery John Cole, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Hector Anibal Alvarez Flores, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Ruben Tamez Jasso, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Felipe Cortes Barajas, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Michael Henry Villegas, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Pavel Danilovitch Grib, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Heidi Ann Hawk, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Dustin Gene Abrams, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Shane Edward Robinson, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Dagan Denson Anderson, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Dagan Denson Anderson, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Maria Socorro Chipres Zepeda, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Jennifer Jean Rogers, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Alfredo Diaz Quintero, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Timothy A. McDonald, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Kimberly Ann Stark, Respondent. State of Washington, Appellant, v. Gregory Alexander Clark, Respondent. |
John D. Knodell, Prosecuting Attorney, Gerald J. Moberg, Canfield & Associates Legal Department, Ephrata, WA, for Appellant.
William J. Plonske, Attorney at Law, Steven D. Talbot, Carl N. Warring, Warring Law Firm PS, Moses Lake, WA, Ronald A. Hammett, Attorney at Law, Okanogan, WA, Clarke W. Tibbits, Bell Law Office, Earl Wesley Hensley, Attorney at Law, Wenatchee, WA, Mark Stansfield, Brian M. Chase, Attorneys at Law, Quincy, WA, for Respondents.
¶ 1 This case is consolidated from over 20 different actions brought by the State and Grant County (hereinafter referred to as the State). However, the allegations of error in these multiple actions all hinge on resolution of the same issues. The State in each case challenges the failure of the Grant County Superior Court judges to recuse themselves and the judges' subsequent decisions regarding compensation for court appointed counsel. The State first alleges that the trial courts abused their discretion in denying the State's motions for recusal of all Grant County Superior Court judges from any motions for approval of attorney fees for indigent defense services. Second, the State argues that the trial courts lacked authority to award attorney fees since the funds were not appropriated by law. Finally, the State claims that the fees awarded by the courts were excessive.
¶ 2 Although these cases were all tried separately in superior court, many of the hearings were held back to back on the same days. Because we have chosen to consolidate the appeals, we will refer to the various trial courts in the singular.
¶ 3 As a preliminary matter, the State has made a motion to this court to supplement the record with various materials, including correspondence between the trial court and the Grant County Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as board of county commissioners or board).
¶ 4 The State's original motion to supplement the record was granted by the trial court. However, the trial court appears to have believed that authority to supplement the record was limited by RAP 7.2(e). RAP 7.2(e) permits the trial court to decide postjudgment motions that are authorized by civil rules, criminal rules, or statutes. However, if the trial court's decision would change a decision then being reviewed by the appellate court, permission of the appellate court must be obtained before the trial court can enter a formal decision. RAP 7.2(e). The trial court was uncertain as to whether its decision to permit the State to supplement the record would change a decision in a case currently before this court. For this reason the trial court directed the State to seek permission from this court.
¶ 5 The trial court already had the inherent authority to include these supplemental materials as part of the trial record under RAP 7.2(b). Pursuant to RAP 7.2(b) the trial court has the authority to settle the record on appeal. This authority includes the authority to supplement or expand the record where it is incomplete. See RAP 7.2(b).
¶ 6 The trial court granted the State's motion to supplement the record by letter. This letter states that these documents were reviewed by the trial court in considering the motions for recusal. Because it was within the trial court's authority to permit these materials to be incorporated into the trial record, we permit formal entry of the trial court's decision.
¶ 7 In February 2004, Grant County terminated its contract with the contract public defender, Thomas Earl, based on his suspension from practice pending disbarment. As a result, Grant County was without a felony public defender. Mr. Earl had approximately 60 active cases at that time and new criminal cases arose in the county at the rate of over 90 per month.
¶ 8 There were other public defender subcontractors who initially tried to absorb the indigent defense cases. Unfortunately, this resulted in the subcontractors receiving 21 cases in addition to their regular caseload, which the trial court determined was too significant an increase for the public defense subcontractors to manage effectively. In the absence of available criminal indigent defense counsel, the trial court sought volunteer attorneys who would be willing to provide defense services for reasonable compensation.
¶ 9 However, the volunteer attorneys quickly became overwhelmed with the volume of cases that they were being assigned and the trial court exhausted the local bar for volunteers. Therefore, the court began appointing attorneys from the local bar in Grant County. Initially, 49 attorneys were placed on a roster for appointments as defense counsel. This system quickly became untenable since many of the attorneys on the list had no criminal defense background and not only were the interests of indigent defendants potentially jeopardized but the attorneys themselves were at risk of committing malpractice.
¶ 10 From the 49 attorneys, the trial court decided to appoint 14 who had some experience in criminal defense. The trial court also was forced to appoint attorneys from neighboring counties to take on a small number of criminal cases in exchange for reasonable compensation. The trial court determined that a preliminary figure of 82.5 percent of the appointed attorneys' normal billing rate was the presumptive rate of compensation; but the court also reserved the right to adjust the figure up or down.
¶ 11 After almost two months without any public defense system, the county signed public defense contracts with other attorneys on April 12, 2004. The county urged the trial court to immediately transfer the 103 pending cases that were being handled by appointed counsel to the new contractors. Based on the current and backlogged caseloads that the contract public defenders were already handling, the trial court decided that the new public defenders were unable to take on the additional cases that were assigned to appointed counsel.
¶ 12 Throughout the period during which Grant County lacked a public defense system, the trial court (primarily through Judge Evan Sperline) and the board of county commissioners maintained contact and correspondence in order to create and implement the emergency public defense system. Over time, these communications began to center on the dispute involving payment to appointed counsel.
¶ 13 The State by motion asked all Grant County Superior Court judges to recuse themselves from any hearings setting compensation for appointed counsel. The motion was filed on May 26, 2004, the same day hearings were set for determining the compensation issue on a number of cases. The State argued that it would create an appearance of impropriety for any of these judges to hear arguments regarding reasonable compensation since the judges had previously established a general policy to pay appointed counsel 82.5 percent of their regular fee for criminal defense work. The State further asserted that by instituting and supporting such a policy with regard to compensation the trial court was engaging in advocacy on behalf of appointed counsel.
¶ 14 At the same time, the State also challenged the trial court's authority to disburse any funds to compensate appointed counsel based on the constitutional requirement that these funds must first be appropriated by law. The appointed counsel did not receive copies of any of the State's briefs prior to May 26.
¶ 15 The trial court proceeded to hold hearings in order to determine and award reasonable compensation for appointed counsel. In each case, the trial court considered the precise number of hours each attorney spent on his or her case; the normal fee that the attorney charged for criminal defense services, overhead costs of his...
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