State v. Perkins

• Decision Date: 10 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. 60A94,60A94
• Citation: 481 S.E.2d 25,345 N.C. 254
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Sammy Crystal PERKINS.

Page 25

481 S.E.2d 25

345 N.C. 254

STATE of North Carolina v. Sammy Crystal PERKINS.

No. 60A94.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. 10, 1997.

Michael F. Easley, Attorney General by Charles M. Hensey, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.

Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender by Janine M. Crawley, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.

PARKER, Justice.

Defendant Sammy Crystal Perkins was tried capitally on indictments charging him with first-degree murder and first-degree rape. The jury found defendant guilty as charged. Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended a sentence of death; and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. The trial court also imposed a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment for first-degree rape. For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that the jury selection, guilt-innocence phase, and capital sentencing The State presented evidence tending to show that during the early morning hours on 19 April 1992, defendant sexually assaulted seven-year-old LaSheena Renae "JoJo" Moore and smothered her to death.

proceeding of defendant's trial were free from prejudicial error and that the death sentence is not disproportionate.

On 18 April 1992 defendant was living with his mother in Greenville. After visiting with his family and drinking several beers, defendant went to the home of Theia Esther Moore, a woman he had been dating for two months and had known for ten or eleven years. Moore lived in the house with her two children and four grandchildren, one of whom was the victim. Moore shared a room with two of her grandchildren, three-year-old Michael "Champ" Moore and the victim, who slept together on a daybed.

After leaving the Moore house for a short time, defendant returned and drank more beer and smoked crack cocaine. At approximately 3:00 a.m. on 19 April, defendant entered Moore's bedroom, where she and her two grandchildren were present. Defendant watched a pornographic video and then tried to have sex with Moore, who was surprised that he was in the room. Moore discovered a large butcher knife under her pillow, and defendant explained that he had used it to open a can of beer.

Moore ordered defendant out of the house. As she walked him to the door, Champ rose from his bed and claimed that defendant had bitten his finger. After defendant left, he called Moore twice to insist that he had not bitten Champ. Moore then went to sleep; when she awoke at around 9:00 a.m., she observed that Champ's finger was swollen. At approximately 11:30 a.m., while the family was preparing to go to church for Easter services, Moore discovered that JoJo was dead.

The evidence tended to show that sometime early that morning, defendant had mounted the victim, held a pillow over her face, and had sex with her. The medical examiner determined that the victim died of suffocation and estimated that the victim's mouth and nose were covered for a period of between three to seven minutes before she became unconscious.

Defendant testified that on the night and morning in question, he had been drinking and smoking crack cocaine. He stated that JoJo awoke while he was having sex with Moore. He put a pillow over her face so that she would not see them. He said that he administered CPR, which he thought was successful in resuscitating her. He then went to the kitchen for a beer, used a knife to open the can, and placed the knife by Moore's bed. Sometime in the morning, he took Champ to the bathroom. Champ stuck his finger in defendant's mouth, and defendant bit it. He said Moore threw him out of the house after discovering the knife and the biting incident.

Defendant, who was in a wheelchair by the time of trial, explained that he suffers from a debilitative muscular disease called myasthenia gravis. His disability precluded him from having sexual intercourse in any position where he would have to support himself with his arms. On cross-examination defendant admitted that he had a prior conviction for attempted rape in 1981 and was released from prison in 1986. He also had prior convictions for possession with intent to sell and deliver heroin and cocaine in 1988 and 1989.

The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree rape and guilty of first-degree murder under the theories of premeditation and deliberation and felony murder. The jury found all three submitted aggravating circumstances: (i) that defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of use of violence; (ii) that the murder was committed by defendant while defendant was engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit first-degree rape; and (iii) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The jury also found one statutory and five nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. The jury found that the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances and that the aggravating circumstances were sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty. The jury recommended the death penalty.

Additional facts will be presented as necessary to address specific issues.

JURY SELECTION

In his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erroneously excused a prospective juror for cause based on the juror's answers to the court's death-qualification questions. He argues that excusing the juror for cause violated the principles set out in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). He further contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allow defendant to attempt to rehabilitate the juror. See State v. Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 430 S.E.2d 905 (1993). We disagree with both contentions.

During death-qualification the trial court explained to prospective juror William E. Jackson the basic principles of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof and outlined the capital sentencing procedure. Jackson stated that he understood the law as presented by the court. The following colloquy then occurred:

THE COURT: Please listen very carefully, Mr. Jackson, to the following questions. Consider your responses carefully before you respond. If you are selected to serve as a juror in this case, can and will you follow the law as it will be explained to you by the Court in deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of first-degree murder or of any other lesser offense?

JUROR: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of those things necessary to constitute first-degree murder, can and will you vote to return a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder even though you know that death is one of the possible penalties?

JUROR: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Considering your personal beliefs ... about the death penalty, please state for me whether you would be able or unable to vote for a recommendation of the death penalty even though you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the three things required by law concerning the aggravating and mitigating circumstances previously mentioned.

JUROR: I don't know whether I could vote on the death penalty.

THE COURT: Is that response an able or an unable response, sir?

JUROR: Unable to respond to that.

THE COURT: Unable. Thank you.

Mr. Staten--Jackson, excuse me. If the defendant is convicted of first-degree murder, can and will you follow the law of North Carolina as to the sentence recommendation to be made by the jury as the Court will explain it?

JUROR: Yes, sir.

The State challenged Jackson for cause. Defendant then requested that he be allowed to ask a few questions of Jackson, and the court denied his request. The court excused the juror for cause on the grounds that

as a matter of conscience regardless of the facts and circumstances ... he would be unable to render a verdict with respect to the charge ... and ... that the juror's views concerning the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with the Court's instructions and the juror's oath.

Defendant first contends that Jackson was improperly excused because his responses to the questions asked did not support the conclusions of the court and did not render him unqualified to serve.

The standard for determining when a potential juror may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital punishment is "whether the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' " Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-52 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 , 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589 (1980)); accord State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 621-22, 386 S.E.2d 418, 425 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 905, 110 S.Ct. 2587, 110 L.Ed.2d 268 (1990). Prospective jurors with reservations about capital punishment must be able to "state clearly that State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 511-12, 453 S.E.2d 824, 839-40, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 223, 133 L.Ed.2d 153 (1995).

they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law." Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 [106 S.Ct. 1758, 1766], 90 L.Ed.2d 137, 149 (1986); State v. Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 43, 430 S.E.2d 905, 907-08 (1993). However, a prospective juror's bias or inability to follow the law does not have to be proven with unmistakable clarity. State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. [239,] 248, 415 S.E.2d [726,] 731-32 [ (1992) ]; State v. Davis, 325 N.C. at 624, 386 S.E.2d at 426. "[T]here will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.... [T]his is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 426 [105 S.Ct. at 853], 83 L.Ed.2d at 852-53.

Jackson told the court that he could...