State v. Perkins

• Decision Date: 08 June 1964
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 49985,49985,2
• Citation: 380 S.W.2d 433
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent. v. Lola Lorene PERKINS, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 433

380 S.W.2d 433

STATE of Missouri, Respondent. v. Lola Lorene PERKINS, Appellant.

No. 49985.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

June 8, 1964.

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court En Banc Denied

July 13, 1964.

Thomas F. Eagleton, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Theodore C. Beckett, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Kansas City, for respondent.

Emanuel Williams, St. Louis, for appellant.

BARRETT, Commissioner.

Lola Lorene Perkins and her husband, the Reverend Matthew Perkins, were charged under the second section of the rather new and simplified 'stealing' statute; 'It shall be unlawful for any person to intentionally steal the property of another, either without his consent or by means of deceit.' RSMo 1959, Sec. 560.156, V.A.M.S. While the prosecuting witness, Robert N. Amacker, and his Hollybrook Land Company claim to have been bilked of the total sum of $267,800.82, the information charges that Lola and her husband directly and deceitfully stole the sum of $79,661. Upon her separate trial Lola has been found guilty and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

One of the assignments in the motion for a new trial (there was also a motion to dismiss the information) is that the particular subsection of the statute, Sec. 560.156 (sub. 2), under which she was convicted is unconstitutional in that it is 'Vague, indefinite and uncertain, fails to set forth a standard of acts, conduct or deeds which would constitute an offense and fails to define such conduct or offense or set forth under what circumstances any such acts, conduct or deeds would constitute an offense, fails to define the term Deceit and leaves the question of the commission of any offense under said section to be legislated and determined by * * * the courts.' While the legislature must inform the citizen with some degree of specificity just what acts are prohibited, thus affording 'an understandable rule of conduct,' the definition and punishment of crime in general is a legislative function upon which the courts may not encroach. 14 Am.Jur. Criminal Law Sec. 19, p. 773; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law Sec. 151(6), p. 769. It is not necessary here to examine into the history and purpose of the statute in detail, that was done in State v. Zammar, Mo., 305 S.W.2d 441, two years after the passage of the act. The appellant singles out of context the one subdivision relating to stealing by deceit. But as was pointed out in State v. Zammar, eight or nine states had then adopted similar statutes, the purpose of the enactment was to eliminate the technical and confusing distinctions between larceny, embezzlement and obtaining money or property by false pretenses. The statute as a whole attempts to deal with all forms of 'stealing' including false pretenses and as the title to the act states, in repealing more than fifty statutes, relates to 'offenses against property.' Laws Mo. 1955, p. 507. But the substantive offense is stealing, not deceit (which is the means by which a theft is accomplished and need not be defined in the act). The statute does not broaden the crime of larceny or 'designate as criminal that which was previously innocent' (State v. Gale, Mo., 322 S.W.2d 852), but as a consideration of the information and record will plainly illustrate 'to intentionally steal the property of another * * * by means of deceit' is a species of the ancient and well known offense of obtaining money or property by false pretenses (RSMo 1949, Sec. 561.370, V.A.M.S.) and the legislature has not violated any principle of constitutional law in enacting this same offense in a modern, simplified form.

As further background and insofar as material to six other assignments of error, the information charges that Lola 'in the City of St. Louis, between June 20, 1959 and the 5th day of February 1961, did unlawfully, feloniously and intentionally steal, take and carry away' $79,661.00, the property of Hollybrook Land Company in the care and custody of Robert N. Amacker, 'by means of certain false pretenses, representations and deceit, to wit' that Lola falsely represented to Amacker that she 'was the executrix under the will of one Magnolia J. Ward (Pittman) deceased; that there was certain real and personal property which were assets in the estate * * * that the value of the assets in said estate was greatly in excess of the amount of the monies of the Hollybrook Land Company * * * so obtained as aforesaid from Robert Amacker, and that the advancement of said monies by the said Robert Amacker to said Lola Lorene Perkins * * * would enable her to close and settle the aforesaid estate, and that she would then so close and settle said estate and would, out of the assets of said estate' repay the sums advanced by Amacker, that said representations and pretenses were known to Lola to be false and untrue and were relied on by Amacker with the result that Lola got and stole $79,661.

It will be observed that the first quotation from the information in classic language charged the former offense of grand larceny (RSMo 1949, Sec. 560.156, V.A.M.S.), while, as indicated, the longer quotation in time honored form charged the offense of obtaining money by false pretenses, RSMo 1949, Sec. 561.370, V.A.M.S. Added to the information is other language from the revised statute (Sec. 560.156 (sub. 2)), such as 'deceit,' indicating plainly that the charge is under the statute and includes stealing by deceit. It is not necessary to consider the claims of error in detail, it is sufficient to say that the information meets the challenge of vagueness, indefiniteness and due process even though the theft by deceit was alleged to have occurred over a period of more than a year and a half, 'between June 20, 1959 and the 5th day of February 1961.' Sup.Ct.Rule 24.11(5)(6), V.A.M.R. It was not necessary to negative the existence of the estate of Magnolia J. Ward (V.A.M.S. Sec. 545.030) and the quotations refute the assertion that the information 'on its face indicates that the prosecution is predicated upon the failure of the defendant to pay a debt.' It is neither necessary nor desirable that informations under the revised statute be reduced to a rigid formula; it is sufficient to say that this information plainly describes an offense defined in the statute and, as will appear from a recital of the facts, concisely covers the conduct relied on as constituting a theft by deceit. Therefore the court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars. While particular informations have not been specifically approved, cases supporting the validity of this information under the revised statute are State v. Samis, 296 Mo. 471, 246 S.W. 956; State v. Mandell, 353 Mo. 502, 183 S.W.2d 59 and State v. Fenner, Mo., 358 S.W.2d 867.

The prosecuting witness is Robert N. Amacker, 63, a lifelong resident of Lake Providence, Louisiana. Modestly Mr. Amacker calls himself a farmer, he is in fact a Louisiana planter and has an annual personal income of $30,000. He is also interested in an insurance company, a grain elevator, a cotton gin and other enterprises and has had thirty-six years' experience loaning money. He graduated from high school, attended the University of Arkansas one year and Soule Business College six months. Hollybrook Land Company is an Amacker family-owned corporation and owns 9300 acres of land on the Mississippi River upon which it 'grows' cotton, rice, soybeans, wheat, oats and corn, and sometimes the corporation loans money. Mr. Amacker is treasurer of the corporation and had almost unlimited authority in the handling of its money. He had known the appellant, Lola Perkins, since 1927 when she lived in the vicinity of Lake Providence and had 'a day squad' and hoed and picked cotton for other planters. Even in those days, 1927 to 1935, when he knew she had but little if any property, Mr. Amacker made Lola several loans of $500 to $1500 which she repaid with interest. He had also known Lola's mother, Amelia Lewis (later known as Drucilla Green), and he had a recollection of Magnolia Ward but it was 'more of a name.' After 1935 these people passed out of Mr. Amacker's life for almost twenty-five years, reappearing in 1959.

The appellant, Lola Lorene Perkins, was the founder and Supreme Ruler of the United Rock of Charity, a charitable organization (said to have a charter from the State of Missouri) engaged in raising money for churches and 'to help the needy.' A large part of the Amackers' $267,800.82 passed through this charitable corporate organization. There were a large number of officers, sometimes as many as 22, 'Honorable Daughter' the equivalent of a vice-president, 'Finance Captain' and 'assistant deputy finance captain,' the latter had the duty of '(h)andling a little of the property and part of these automobiles' and sometimes 'I was appraiser on some of it.' One witness did remember an instance in which at Lola's direction funds of $420 from the United Rock kept a needy widow from 'being set out of doors.' Then two or three officers in the organization remembered that funds were advanced to churches, the Sunny Mount Missionary Baptist Church in St. Louis and the Harris Temple south of Little Rock. By a down payment of $2,500 a $100,000 farm was purchased in Arkansas and down payments were made on numerous pieces of property in St. Louis and Little Rock. It turned out that a select group of officers in United Rock, including Lola, lived in the St. Louis properties rent free. At least five automobiles, Cadillacs and Chrysler Imperials, were purchased on credit plans and Lola and her retinue used them 'to go back and forward to Little Rock and render programs there and here.' To close out the Little Rock 'chapter' and eventually the Magnolia Ward will the charity engaged the famous singer of spirituals, Mahalia Jackson, and in the end that performance cost Mr. Amacker an additional $11,900.

This is a very brief but necessary background to the...