State v. Person

• Decision Date: 28 November 2000
• Docket Number: (AC 20189)
• Citation: 761 A.2d 269,60 Conn. App. 820
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL PERSON
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

60 Conn. App. 820

761 A.2d 269

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL PERSON

(AC 20189)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 14, 2000.

Officially released November 28, 2000.

Lavery, C. J., and Foti and Landau, JS. Lisa J. Steele, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Michael Dearington, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

LAVERY, C.J.

The defendant, Michael Person, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a¹ and criminal trespass in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-107 (a) (2).² On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) improperly instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, thereby creating the reasonable possibility that the jury was misled, and (2) abused its discretion by failing to order an examination of him pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 17a-566.³ We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The relevant facts pertaining to the defendant's arrest were set out by our Supreme Court in State v. Person, 236 Conn. 342, 673 A.2d 463 (1996).⁴ "The defendant and [the victim, Leshea Pouncey] had been romantically involved and had planned to marry. Pouncey, however, terminated their engagement, after which she commenced a relationship with Donald Moody. The defendant testified that on May 19, 1991, he had forcefully entered Pouncey's apartment while she was away in order to recover his personal belongings. While the defendant was in the rear bedroom gathering his possessions, Pouncey returned home with her child. The defendant further testified that after speaking on the telephone, Pouncey had confronted him in the bedroom with a can of Mace in one hand and two knives in the other. According to the defendant, Pouncey had instigated a struggle by spraying Mace in his eyes. In the course of the struggle, the defendant stabbed Pouncey. The defendant then fled the apartment and later surrendered himself at the New Haven police station." Id., 346. The defendant confessed to killing the victim. At trial, the defendant asserted the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance pursuant to § 53a-54a.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance because it failed to explain that when considering the defendant's "situation," the jury should take into account testimony regarding his mental illness. We disagree.

A

As a preliminary matter, we address the state's assertion that we should decline to review this claim because it was not properly preserved for appeal. "To preserve a challenge to the jury charge, the defendant must make a written request to charge, or take exception to the jury instructions when they are given by the trial court.... This court is not bound to review claims of instructional error if the party raising the claim neither submitted a written request to charge, nor excepted to the charge given by the trial court. Practice Book § 852 [now § 42-16]. The purpose of [Practice Book § 42-16] is to alert the court to any claims of error while there is still an opportunity for correction in order to avoid the economic waste and increased court congestion caused by unnecessary retrials." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faria, 254 Conn. 613, 632, 758 A.2d 348 (2000).

Although the defendant submitted proposed jury instructions, his proposal did not contain a request to elucidate the word "situation." The defendant requested that the court emphasize the testimony regarding his mental state to underscore the subjective element of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance.⁵ As a result, the defendant's exception did not specifically refer to an explanation of the term "situation." Nevertheless, the court has "an obligation to do justice and to be vigilant and vigorous in protecting individuals." State v. Sirimanochanh, 224 Conn. 656, 665, 620 A.2d 761 (1993). Indeed, although this court is not bound to do so, it will review the defendant's claim despite his technical noncompliance with the rules of practice.⁶ See State v. Williams, 59 Conn. App. 771, 781, 758 A.2d 400 (2000). The requirement that a party distinctly state the matter to which it objects serves the purpose of alerting the court to any claims of error while there is still an opportunity for correction. State v. Deptula, 31 Conn. App. 140, 146, 623 A.2d 525 (1993), appeal dismissed, 228 Conn. 852, 635 A.2d 812 (1994). The defendant's "situation" and mental state raise an issue that falls within the subjective-objective portion of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. Thus, although the defendant's exception⁷ could have been more specific, it put the court on sufficient notice that the instructions might contain deficiencies and thereby satisfies the purpose of Practice Book § 42-16. We conclude, therefore, that the defendant properly preserved the present claim for review.

B

Our Supreme Court's standard of review regarding claims of improper jury instruction is well established. "[A] charge to the jury is not to be critically dissected for the purpose of discovering possible inaccuracies of statement, but it is to be considered rather as to its probable effect upon the jury in guiding them to a correct verdict in the case.... The charge is to be read as a whole and individual instructions are not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge.... The test to be applied to any part of a charge is whether the charge, considered as a whole, presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faria, supra, 254 Conn. 634. "As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury ... we will not view the instructions as improper." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

Here, the defendant claims that the charge, viewed as a whole, may have misled the jury in analyzing the defendant's affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance.⁸ We disagree. The court provided the jury with comprehensive instructions regarding the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The defendant submitted preliminary and final requests to charge.⁹ In the proposed charges, the defendant requested that the court instruct the jury that it should consider the defendant's mental illness as part of the reasonable explanation or excuse for his extreme emotional disturbance. That is not required under State v. Ortiz, 217 Conn. 648, 588 A.2d 127 (1991), or State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114, 622 A.2d 519 (1993). In those cases, in which the defendants presented evidence of mental illness, our Supreme Court held that jury instructions, precisely like the ones here, properly explained the law.

We conclude, therefore, that despite the court's rejection of the defendant's proposed charges, the instructions that the court gave accurately explained the law, and it was not reasonably possible that the charge, when considered as a whole, misled the jury. Although the word "situation" may not usually mean mental illness, "[j]ury instructions must be read as a whole and... are not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge.... [A]n error in the [charge] requires reversal only if, in the context of the whole instruction, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury was misled in reaching its verdict." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sanders, 54 Conn. App. 732, 740, 738 A.2d 674, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 913, 739 A.2d 1250 (1999).

Indeed, although the defense raises a novel argument, we respectfully disagree with the assertion that the term "situation," without further elucidation, might have misled the jury into thinking that it could not consider the evidence of the defendant's mental state. In State v. Elliott, 177 Conn. 1, 4-5, 411 A.2d 3 (1979), the seminal case on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, our Supreme Court found the language of our murder statute to be identical to that of New York Penal Law § 125.25 (1) (a). We agree with the following language in People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, 680, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 427 N.Y.S.2d 769, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842, 101 S. Ct. 122, 66 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1980): "[W]e believe that what the Legislature intended in enacting the statute was to allow the finder of fact the discretionary power to mitigate the penalty when presented with a situation which, under the circumstances, appears to them to have caused an understandable weakness in one of their fellows. Perhaps the chief virtue of the statute is that it allows such discretion without engaging in a detailed explanation of individual circumstances in which the statute would apply, thus avoiding the `mystifying cloud of words' which Mr. Justice Cardozo abhorred."

"Situation," as it is used in this case, is not a term of limitation, but a term that allows all of the facts brought forth to be considered. Because the court properly instructed the jury as to the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and the jury concluded that the defendant was guilty of murder, we find no basis for reversal of the judgment on the ground that the court did not give a jury instruction that explained the word "situation."

Accordingly, we conclude that there was no reasonable possibility that the jury misunderstood the court's instructions regarding the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and, therefore, those instructions could not have misled the jury.

II

The defendant next claims that the court improperly failed to order an examination of him pursuant to § 17a-566. It is well settled that "[t]his court will...