State v. Peters, WD

• Citation: 695 S.W.2d 140
• Decision Date: 11 June 1985
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. William M. PETERS, Appellant. 35989.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

Page 140

695 S.W.2d 140

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. William M. PETERS, Appellant.

No. WD 35989.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

June 11, 1985.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer

to Supreme Court Overruled

and Denied July 30, 1985.

L. Patrick O'Brien, Austin F. Shute, Kansas City, for appellant.

John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., T. Chad Farris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before TURNAGE, C.J., and SHANGLER and MANFORD, JJ.

SHANGLER, Judge.

The defendant Peters was arrested in his residence on the charge of rape. The entry by the police for that purpose was without warrant to arrest or to search. When the defendant opened the door of the residence to the knock, they saw on a table inside, some five feet away, a handgun and next to the gun, some opaque bags with green leafy content, and other square packets. These items were seized and rooms of the house were systematically searched. One of the packets was found to contain cocaine. The defendant was charged with the possession of a controlled substance in violation of § 195.020, RSMo 1978, and was convicted. We determine that the entry into the home to arrest without a warrant was unlawful, and that the consequent seizure of the narcotics on the table was unlawful.

The case was tried to the court on the transcript of the evidence taken on the pretrial Motion to Suppress and on additional stipulated facts.

The victim Jane Cassady was raped at about 2 o'clock on the morning of January 9, 1983. She reported the incident to the police later that morning, at about 6 o'clock. The victim [and, presumably her husband] gave a party at the residence. The defendant was among the guests. She knew him only as "Bill," although they were acquaintances, and her husband had conducted business with Bill over a period of a year--the sale of a motorcycle included. The defendant "left to get some beer," and Jane Cassady accompanied him. He drove them in a blue Volkswagon to a residence north of I-29 on 112th Street off Prairie View Road in Platte County, and raped her there inside those premises. She did not know the address, but was able to describe the house and told officers that a tow truck was parked in the driveway. She described her assailant as "a little over 6 foot, 200 pounds, and brown hair, wearing a purple shirt and blue jeans." Ms. Cassady told the officers that she saw a revolver on a table, but that Bill never threatened her with it. The evidence does not explain how the victim was restored to her residence, or why the elapse of four hours between the time of the assault and the report to the police.

The police received the report at 6 o'clock that morning, arrived at the Cassady residence at about 6:20 a.m., and about an hour later, four armed police officers, in four separate cars, converged on the premises readily found from the description of location and appurtenances given by the victim. One officer was stationed at the rear of the premises, and the other three advanced to the front door [one armed with a shotgun]. They rapped on the door, the defendant opened, and answered affirmatively when asked whether his name was "Bill." The police informed him he was in arrest for rape. He made no resistance, but stepped back somewhat, the police then swarmed into the house and handcuffed him behind the back. A table was open to view through the doorway, and on the table a handgun, some green leafy substance in clear, plastic bags, and another container with six folded packets. These were searched, and the entire house, in turn.

The defendant contends on appeal that the police entry into his home to arrest without a warrant or consent violates the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and so the evidence taken after the entry was unlawful and the conviction may not stand. We agree and order the defendant discharged.

The arbitrary invasion of the privacy of the home is the chief evil the Fourth Amendment ¹ addresses. United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). Thus, in the case of a dwelling, in terms that apply equally to seizures of property and seizures of persons, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) lays down the principle [l.c. 590, 100 S.Ct. 1382]:

"[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant." [emphasis added]

The Fourth Amendment, therefore, expounds a basic principle that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 447, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2028, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). The entry into a home to make an arrest or to conduct a search without a warrant, however, may be excused by exigency or consent. Payton v. New York, supra, 445 U.S., l.c. 590, 100 S.Ct. 1382; Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 1647, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981)

The prosecution argues that the police conduct was not an in-home arrest or, if so, then the entry to arrest without warrant was justified by exigent circumstances. The contention as formulated, is that the police officers were not in the residence when "they initially placed him [Bill] under arrest," and that they entered the dwelling only "because of actions by appellant himself: he backed toward a table and was within arm's length of a handgun resting on the table." Once entered to protect against the weapon [the necessary corollary of the argument must be], the police were authorized to seize the narcotics contraband in plain view.

That argument amounts to a contention that the arrest of the defendant was in a public place, and hence beyond the pale of Payton altogether. There is no reason to doubt that there was probable cause for the police to arrest the defendant for rape, or that if such arrest was executed in a public place, the defendant was amenable to custody--and to search as an incident--without a warrant and without infringement of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 828, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). An arrest made by entry into a dwelling of the suspect without a warrant--even on probable cause--however, is an altogether different matter. That is because the Fourth Amendment protects not only a liberty interest, but a privacy interest as well. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350, 88 S.Ct. 507, 510, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). A public arrest involves no invasion of privacy, and thus the probable cause that the suspect committed a felony suffices, on entrenched common law principles, to render the seizure of the person not unreasonable within the formulation of the Fourth Amendment, even without a warrant. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 419, 96 S.Ct. 820, 825, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 354, 97 S.Ct. 619, 629, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977).

The arrest encounter was described by officers of the police contingent assigned to the front door. The home was readily found from the description given by the victim. One of the four officers was posted at the rear door, and the other three approached from the front. The officers were armed, and one of the three wielded a shotgun. Sgt. Bennett recounted the sequence of events: He rapped on the front door, the door opened inward, and either Officer Bliss or Officer Teichmann asked:

" 'Are you Bill?' or something to that effect, and he said, 'Yeah,' and, at that point, he was told that he was under arrest for rape, he backed off a little bit from the door inside, and we followed him then right on in ... He was then placed under arrest, and handcuffed."

Officer Teichmann recounted:

"Well, we knocked at the door, and the door opened up, and Mr. Peters was standing in the door, and the only thing I knew was, the suspect of the rape's name was supposed to be Bill, called--named Bill, and I said 'Bill,' and he said 'Yeah.' ... Well, he kind of stepped back about--into the house from the door, and naturally we surged right in, and took him under arrest."

Officer Bliss confirmed the other accounts of the episode:

"The defendant answered the door. At that time Officer Teichmann stated 'Bill,'--that was the name we were given as the suspect's name--and he answered 'Yes' or 'What,' I can't remember exactly, then, I believe, Officer Teichmann stated something like 'Well, you're under arrest for rape,' or something to that effect. At that time he kind of stood back, stepped back a little bit ... and, at that time, all three of us kind of rushed in around him and got him handcuffed at that point."

There is no contention that the defendant was not physically placed in his private premises when he opened the door, and that, since the door opened inward, he remained lodged within the private premises as the door opened wider. The testimony of Officer Teichmann confirms that the execution of the arrest--the physical caption of the suspect by handcuffs and other means--was conducted some three feet within the premises of the dwelling. The testimony of the officers agrees that whatever prompted Bill to "step back," that gesture was not understood as a resistance to the police presence, and their surge into the house was not induced by that movement. The prosecution argument is, however, that the police were outside the premises when the arrest was announced to Bill, vis-a-vis, and hence they executed a public arrest on probable cause--an exercise of police authority lawful even without a warrant.

In terms of the general Fourth Amendment definition, a person is "seized" in arrest when--whether by means of physical force or show of authority--"a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d...