State v. Peterson, 15253

• Decision Date: 18 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. 15253,15253
• Citation: 700 P.2d 85,108 Idaho 463
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Alan PETERSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 85

700 P.2d 85

108 Idaho 463

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Alan PETERSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15253.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

April 18, 1985.

Gar Hackney, Lynn, Scott & Hackney, Boise, for defendant-appellant.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

WALTERS, Chief Judge.

Alan Peterson was found guilty by a jury of possession of a controlled substance, cocaine. I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1). The court entered an order withholding judgment of conviction, and granted probation to Peterson. Peterson appeals. He seeks review of an order of the trial court denying a motion to suppress the cocaine later admitted in evidence at trial. We affirm.

The issue in this case concerns seizure of a quantity of cocaine found by law enforcement officers in Peterson's bedroom, after Peterson had been arrested under a warrant. Peterson argues that the evidence seized was "fruit of the poisonous tree," tainted because of alleged illegal activities of the officers in effecting his arrest.

The following facts, regarding Peterson's arrest and the seizure of the cocaine, were found by the trial court in deciding the motion to suppress. Armed with an arrest warrant, ¹ several state and federal law enforcement agents knocked on the door of Peterson's residence, shortly before midnight on May 12, 1982. Peterson, clad only in a pair of pants, opened the door. The doorway was lit both by an outside light and by an interior light in the foyer. Upon answering the door, Peterson was informed that the visitors were police officers who had a warrant for his arrest. One of the officers asked Peterson if they could step inside the house. Peterson responded "only if you have a search warrant." Another officer said "we'll take care of this inside" and motioned Peterson aside as the officers walked into the foyer. Once all of the officers were inside the house, the arrest warrant was read to Peterson and the officers made a "protective sweep" of the premises.

After the arrest warrant had been read to Peterson and he had been advised of his Miranda rights, Peterson was asked if he had any firearms in the house and if they were loaded. Peterson disclosed that there were firearms in his bedroom closet and that he did not know whether they were loaded. Peterson testified that an officer then asked him to show them the guns and that, when walking to the bedroom, Peterson asked if he could put on some clothes. The only officer who testified at the suppression hearing, stated that he was not aware of any conversation requesting Peterson to point out where the guns were stored, but that Peterson asked if he could put on a shirt, another pair of pants and shoes before going down to the station. The court found it was not disputed that the officers informed Peterson he would have to be escorted to his bedroom where his clothes were located. Peterson showed no signs of refusal and led the officers to his bedroom. An officer then requested Peterson to point to the shirt he wanted to wear and it was pulled out of a drawer. When asked which pair of pants he wanted, Peterson pointed to a pair hanging in a closet. As an officer reached for the pants, the officer observed, in plain view, a plastic bag containing a white powdery substance on the floor of the closet. The officers performed a field test on the substance and determined it was cocaine. It was seized as evidence.

Peterson moved to suppress the cocaine, contending the officers were not lawfully in a place where they were authorized to be, when they observed the bag of cocaine on the closet floor. ² He contends the officers, when confronted by Peterson at his front door, immediately should have effected the arrest and taken him to the station without ever entering the house. The entry into his house, Peterson submits, was illegal and tainted any evidence the officers might have thereafter seen and seized.

The trial court agreed with Peterson that the entry into the house was illegal. The court held there was sufficient illumination at Peterson's doorway to read the arrest warrant without entering into the residence. The court also held that Peterson did not consent to the officers' entry; that the entry was not authorized in performance of a search incident to an arrest because it involved an area beyond Peterson's immediate control; and that there were no exigent circumstances. The court further found the conduct of the officers in entering the house was not justified by their right to make a protective sweep in order to secure the premises because they had no articulable reason to believe there was any danger in effecting the arrest.

However, the trial court found that the observation of the cocaine was not accomplished by exploitation of the officers' unlawful protective sweep or unlawful entry, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Citing Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 812, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982), the court held that once Peterson was arrested the officers were justified in accompanying Peterson to the bedroom to obtain clothing, in order to ensure their own safety and to prevent an escape. The court concluded that the officers were lawfully in Peterson's bedroom when the cocaine was observed in plain view.

The record supports the trial court's finding that no valid reason was shown for the officers' entry into Peterson's house. The arrest of a person "is a species of seizure required by the [fourth amendment] to be reasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1379, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). It has been held that where officers have an arrest warrant, and have observed the person to be arrested outside of the arrestee's residence, the officers may not deliberately delay the arrest until the arrestee is inside the premises in order to give officers an opportunity to observe what is inside by conducting a "raid." In such circumstances, the officers' entry into the premises is illegal and any evidence seized as a direct result must be suppressed. Abbott v. United States, 138 A.2d 485, (D.C.1958).

Similarly, we believe that where, as in this case, there is no impediment to making an arrest in a doorway, and the arrestee does not attempt to retreat into the house, the officers may not intrude into the house over the objection of the arrestee, simply to complete effectuation of the arrest and put the officers into a position where they can more fully observe the interior of the premises--absent any other reasonable justification for the entry, such as consent to a search, response to an emergency, hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, for safety purposes where a serious and demonstrable potential for danger exists, or to prevent destruction or removal of evidence. See generally, Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970). We agree with the trial court that the entry into Peterson's house, without a warrant to search the premises and when he easily could have been arrested on his doorstep, was an impermissible invasion of Peterson's right of privacy and to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.

It does not follow, however, that any evidence later obtained from Peterson's house must be suppressed as "fruit" of the officers' unlawful entry. The United States Supreme Court said in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. at 417:

We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more...