State v. Kubit, 99-1213.

• Decision Date: 31 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-1213.,99-1213.
• Citation: 627 N.W.2d 914
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Danette Marie KUBIT, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

627 N.W.2d 914

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Danette Marie KUBIT, Appellant.

No. 99-1213.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 31, 2001.

Ryan B. Moorman, West Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Denise A. Timmins, Assistant Attorney General, Denver D. Dillard, County Attorney, and Laurie J. Craig, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered en banc.

SNELL, Justice.

This case calls upon us to determine the scope of authority to enter a suspect's dwelling afforded by an arrest warrant. The district court held that the arrest warrant alone provides police with the right of entry into a suspect's motel room to effectuate the arrest. Thus, evidence in plain view may be seized. Because we determine that the arrest warrant'sauthority is not so broad, we reverse the district court's ruling and remand for a new trial.

I. Factual Background and Procedure

The defendant, Danette Marie Kubit, was occupying a motel room at the Shady Acres Motel when police received an anonymous phone call regarding a great deal of human foot traffic near her room. Police determined that the occupant's name was Danette Kubit, and that she had two active Scott County warrants for her arrest on felony drug charges. This occurred in mid-January. No attempt to arrest Kubit was made at this time.

The police believed that the constant, short-term foot traffic around Kubit's room was a telltale sign of narcotics dealing. This made police suspicious of Kubit's activities and curious to view the inside of the room. Several days later, two plain-clothes officers arrived at the motel room to execute the arrest warrants. One remained in an unmarked car while the other knocked on the door to the room, which opened to the outside. A woman inside the room peered out, but would not open the door. Uniformed police officers were then called to give assistance.

At this point, the remaining facts are in dispute. When uniformed officers again knocked, a woman opened the door and partially stepped out in an apparent attempt to leave. Upon seeing the uniformed officers, she attempted to close the door. One version suggests the woman was inside and trying to keep the officers out. The other version indicates the woman was outside and trying to close the door behind her. Officer Chris Usher prevented her from closing the door by placing his foot in the jam. The plain-clothes officer then approached and identified himself as Officer Stephen Spicher. He told the woman they had two warrants for the arrest of Danette Kubit. At this time, the officers pushed their way into the room for the supposed purpose of confirming the identity of the woman at the door as Danette Kubit. Several different versions of this encounter were described by those present.

While inside, police viewed a baggie in the wastebasket in plain view, consistent with a baggie used for drugs. After a closer look, Officer Spicher observed what he believed to be marijuana residue inside the baggie. Kubit was placed under arrest for possession of the marijuana in the wastebasket and the evidence was seized. On this charge, Kubit filed a motion to suppress the baggie evidence taken from her motel room on the ground that police had no right to enter her room under the guise of executing the arrest warrants.

Kubit's suppression motion was denied. The district court held: "By virtue of the fact [police] are armed with arrest warrants, they do have authority to enter." Kubit agreed to a stipulated trial on the minutes of testimony. She was convicted of one count of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to twenty days incarceration in the county jail, fined $300, and her license revoked for 180 days. See Iowa Code § 124.401(5) (1999). She appeals this conviction. The issue before us today is whether police violate a defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when they force their way into a suspect's motel room to execute an arrest warrant after coming in contact with the suspect at the door to her room.

II. Scope and Standard of Review

Kubit challenges the district court's ruling on her suppression motion. This motion involved Fourth Amendment issues. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. Because the basis for this motion rested on constitutional principles, we review such a ruling de novo. State v. Prior, 617 N.W.2d 260, 262-63 (Iowa 2000); State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Iowa 1999) ("We review this constitutional question de novo in light of the totality of the circumstances."). Under this independent evaluation, we are bound only by the district court's factual determinations based upon substantial evidence. Canas, 597 N.W.2d at 492. As such, we may search the entire record to aid our review. State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1998).

In the present case, the district court made no factual findings. It held that regardless of the discrepancies in testimony given by the officers and the suspect, the arrest warrant alone justified the officers' entry. Because our review is de novo, we need not give deference to this holding. As such, we are not bound by the district court's decision and are free to accept or reject any facts presented to us in the record.

III. Issue on Appeal

An arrest warrant does not give police the same authority of access to a suspect's home that a search warrant authorizes. We take any government intrusion into a citizen's dwelling very seriously. See State v. Brant, 260 Iowa 758, 763, 150 N.W.2d 621, 625 (1967) ("[T]he right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is of grave concern...."). Therefore, uninvited entry into a suspect's home without a search warrant must be constitutionally justified. "A search conducted without a valid warrant is per se unreasonable unless a valid exception to the warrant requirement exists." State v. Cadotte, 542 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1996) (citing State v. Cullor, 315 N.W.2d 808, 811 (Iowa 1982)). Those exceptions include: (1) a search with consent, (2) a search based on probable cause and exigent circumstances, (3) a search of items in plain view, or (4) a search incident to a lawful arrest. Id.; accord State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Iowa 2000). It is the State's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless search is justified by one of the above exceptions. Cadotte, 542 N.W.2d at 836.

The presence of a valid arrest warrant is not a recognized exception. Rather, the exception under which the State justifies seizure of the baggie in this case is plain view of the evidence. The question then is do the officers have a right to enter Kubit's motel room to execute arrest warrants. For the plain view exception to apply, police must be rightfully in the place that allows them to make the observation. State v. Vincik, 436 N.W.2d 350, 353-54 (Iowa 1989); State v. Smith, 178 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Iowa 1970). The fact that this was a motel room instead of a home is of no consequence. We note that "[a] hotel room can clearly be the object of Fourth Amendment protection as much as a home or an office." Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301, 87 S.Ct. 408, 413, 17 L.Ed.2d 374, 381 (1966); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490, 84 S.Ct. 889, 893, 11 L.Ed.2d 856, 861 (1964).

Kubit makes two arguments against the validity of the officers' presence in her motel room. The first one can be disposed of easily. Kubit maintains that because the officers' execution of the warrants against her was pretextual for entry into her room, their actions cannot be justified under the rules for executing arrest warrants. Our court has, on countless occasions, refused to apply a subjective test when determining if the protections of the Constitution were afforded. See, e.g., State v. Hofmann, 537 N.W.2d 767, 769-70 (Iowa 1995); State v. Garcia, 461 N.W.2d 460, 463-64 (Iowa 1990). Instead, we look for an objective basis to justify the official conduct. "So long as the officer is legally permitted and objectively authorized to do so, an arrest is constitutional." Hofmann, 537 N.W.2d at 770.

Support of our objective test also comes from the Supreme Court. "Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time and not on the officer's actual state of mind...." Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 L.Ed.2d 370, 378 (1985) (citation omitted); accord United States v. Clayton, 210 F.3d 841, 843-44 (8th Cir.2000). Here, as long as a valid reason for the officers' presence exists, the officers' real motives are of no usefulness.

Kubit's better argument is that an arrest warrant that can be executed from the outside of a dwelling does not authorize entry into the dwelling. Support for this contention can be found in Canas, 597 N.W.2d at 493. Our court invalidated the search of a motel room following the arrest of its occupant while outside the room. Id. at 493, 497. Canas involved a tip that a suspect, for whom there was an outstanding arrest warrant, might be staying at a local motel. Three law enforcement officers went to the motel to execute the warrant. When they arrived, they observed Canas standing outside his room. Upon seeing police, he immediately ran inside and slammed the door. The officers then knocked at the motel room, and when Canas opened the door, police pulled him outside to arrest him. Following Canas's arrest, police entered his motel room to conduct a search where they found drug paraphernalia. This search was the subject of a motion to suppress.

The State tried to justify their presence in and search of the motel room under the search incident to a lawful arrest exception. We rejected this argument because Canas was never able to re-enter the room after his arrest. Id. at 492-93. We concluded:

The warrantless search of defendant's motel room was not a valid search

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