State v. Pettis
Decision Date | 06 March 2019 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2D17-2973 |
Citation | 266 So.3d 238 |
Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Derrick Jammell PETTIS, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jason M. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
Robert A. Love, St. Petersburg, for Appellee.
The State appeals the trial court's order suppressing contraband found in Derrick Jammell Pettis's car. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(B). As framed by the trial court's order, the issue for us is whether the car was within the curtilage of the house where it was parked. If so, law enforcement officers needed a warrant to search the car and seize the contraband. See Collins v. Virginia, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 1663, 1668, 201 L.Ed.2d 9 (2018) ( ).
Initially, however, we must confront Mr. Pettis's standing to challenge the search and seizure involved here. Although standing was not raised below, the State correctly observes that it may raise lack of standing for the first time on appeal. See Hendley v. State, 58 So.3d 296, 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (); McCauley v. State, 842 So.2d 897, 900 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ().
Because the standing issue was not developed in the trial court, we reverse the order on appeal and remand for the trial court to conduct a suppression hearing to determine Mr. Pettis's standing to challenge the search and seizure.
A police officer in an unmarked cruiser saw Mr. Pettis fail to make a complete stop at a stop sign. Mr. Pettis continued on for a short while until he parked his car near his mother's house. He exited the vehicle, ambled up to the house, and joined his mother on the front porch. About a minute later, six or seven police cruisers converged on the scene. Officers approached and announced that they wanted to speak with Mr. Pettis. He told the officers that he had no desire to speak with them and began to go into the house. The officers restrained him, and a scuffle ensued.
During the course of walking from their cruisers to the house, some officers walked by Mr. Pettis's car. They observed through the front windshield a large unlabeled pill bottle containing baggies of what appeared to be either cocaine or heroin. The officers did not seize the bottle at the scene. Rather, after arresting Mr. Pettis for his unruly behavior, officers seized his car keys from his pocket, and an officer drove the car to the police station.1 There, the substance tested positive for heroin.
In granting the suppression motion, the trial court found that there was neither hot pursuit nor any other exigent circumstance that would justify the warrantless entry into Mr. Pettis's locked car and the seizure of heroin. Although the written order does not explicitly say so, in orally announcing its ruling, the trial court stated that the car was "on the curtilage" of his mother's house.
During the evidentiary hearing, the parties elicited scant testimony or other evidence explaining Mr. Pettis's connection to the house. This omission detracts from our determination of the extent of protection afforded Mr. Pettis under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Washington, 884 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) ( ). Compare Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90-91, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998) ( ), with Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) ( ).
To invoke Fourth Amendment protections, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) ; cf. U.S. v. Puliese, 671 F.Supp. 1353, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 1987) ( ).
The expectation of privacy must originate from "a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12, 99 S.Ct. 421. The capacity to claim constitutional protection depends upon the person and not merely upon a property right in the invaded place. Id. at 143, 99 S.Ct. 421 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ). Thus, Mr. Pettis's status at the house is a necessary part of our Fourth Amendment analysis.
In turn, his status will inform whether he is entitled to the Fourth Amendment protections afforded to a house and its curtilage, because, after all, "[t]he Fourth Amendment protects the curtilage of a house." Abel v. State, 668 So.2d 1121, 1122-23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) ; see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) ; Powell v. State, 120 So.3d 577, 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) ; Pinyan v. State, 523 So.2d 718, 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (); United States v. Maestas, 639 F.3d 1032, 1036-37 (10th Cir. 2011) ().
We utilize a mixed standard of review in examining a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress:
The trial court's
State v. K.S., 28 So.3d 985, 987 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (quoting State v. Clark, 986 So.2d 625, 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ). Our review of the surveillance CD supports the trial court's finding that Mr. Pettis parked his car within the curtilage of his mother's house. But that determination does not automatically compel the conclusion that a warrant was necessary to search the car. Cf. State v. Rickard, 420 So.2d 303, 305 (Fla. 1982) .
The extent of Fourth Amendment protection afforded to Mr. Pettis is cabined by the a priori determination of whether he had standing in the first place to challenge the search and seizure of the car. See Washington, 884 So.2d at 98 . "A search violates a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights only if (1) a defendant demonstrates that he or she had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the property searched and (2) a defendant establishes that society would recognize that subjective expectation as objectively reasonable." Hicks v. State, 929 So.2d 13, 16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ; see also Nieminski v. State, 60 So.3d 521, 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) ( ...
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