State v. Pfeifer
Decision Date | 29 November 1976 |
Docket Number | No. KCD,KCD |
Citation | 544 S.W.2d 317 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kieran Lee PFEIFER, Defendant-Respondent. 28412. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
John H. Fraze, Pros. Atty., Nodaway County, Maryville, for plaintiff-appellant.
John E. Downs, Downs & Pierce, St. Joseph, for defendant-respondent.
Before DIXON, P.J., PRITCHARD, C.J., and WASSERSTROM, J.
The State has appealed the dismissal by the trial court of an information as insufficient. The appeal is under Rule 28.04. The information was originally filed in the Magistrate Court of Nodaway County, Missouri and was ultimately disposed of on a motion to quash after change of venue and a variety of continuances in the Circuit Court of Holt County.
The information alleged, first, a misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated on the 7th day of November, 1970, in the Magistrate Court of Polk County, a conviction and sentence upon said offense of a fine of $100 with subsequent payment of the fine. After that preamble, the information charges the instant offense on the 20th day of September, 1974, at the County of Nodaway and charges that an automobile was operated by the defendant while he was in an intoxicated condition contrary to Section 564.440 RSMo 1969.
It is thus apparent that the prosecutor was attempting to charge a violation under 564.440, subparagraph (2), a misdemeanor offense requiring the imposition of a term of not less than 15 days and not more than one year in the county jail. The motion to quash filed in response to this information is as follows:
'MOTION TO QUASH
Comes now the defendant, Kieran Lee Pfeiffer, and moves that the information filed against him be quashed, dismissed and held for naught in that the alleged facts set down in paragraph 1 thereof recite that the defendant was duly convicted of driving while intoxicated, a misdemeanor. The alleged conviction is void, being violative of Rule 29.02 of the Supreme Court of State of Missouri, and is violative of the Constitution of the State of Missouri and the United States, in that pursuant to the exhibits attached hereto and made a part hereof, the defendant, Kieran Lee Pfeiffer was not personally present when the alleged plea of guilty was made. Nor did the court and prosecuting attorney consent to such trial in the absence of defendant.'
In support of the motion to quash, the defendant testified that he had been arrested and taken before a judge in Polk County in 1970. Upon his appearing before the judge, he had posted bond, that he had a lawyer, but that he never went to court nor appeared in Polk County again. Further, that he never authorized his lawyer to plead guilty for him. The records of the Polk County court were in evidence, and they disclose the following judgment entry:
The specific attack leveled at the information under the motion, evidence and the argument of counsel was that the prior conviction in Polk County was invalid as being in violation of Rule 29.02. The instant information therefore being void in attempting to allege the offense of intoxicated driving under Subsection (2) of Section 564.440.
The specific issue here presented has not been ruled upon by the courts of Missouri. This court must initially decide what constitutes the offense comprehended within Section 564.440. Clearly, the statute prescribes but a single offense, that enunciated in the initial sentence of the statute, 'No person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition.' The balance of the statute relates to the characterization of the offense as a misdemeanor or a felony and prescribes the punishment to be assessed, dependent upon whether it is the first, second or third offense. The statute has obvious similarities to the Second Offender Act, Section 556.280 RSMo 1969. The case law of this State, in construing Section 564.440, has noted that a prior conviction, in order to increase the range of punishment for a second conviction for the offense must be pleaded in the same manner as a prior conviction under the Second Offender Act. State v. Barker, 490 S.W.2d 263 (Mo.App.1973).
Thus, the analogy between Section 564.440 and the Second Offender Act has been recognized judicially. It follows that cases interpreting the Second Offender Act will be persuasive on the issue at hand. The case law interpreting the Second Offender Act has held that that statute does not create a separate and distinct offense, nor permit conviction upon the charge of being a habitual criminal. Proof of the prior conviction is not a substantive part of an offense subsequently committed, and any conviction must be for the offense charged in the information. The Second Offender Act merely provided for enhanced punishment. State v. Gillette, 277 S.W.2d 680 (Mo.App.1955); State v. Foster, 251 S.W.2d 675 (Mo.1952); State v. Humphrey, 357 Mo. 824, 210 S.W.2d 1002 (1948). Accord, State v. Rose, 428 S.W.2d 737 (Mo.1968), which held that the filing of a subsequent information charging a prior felony did not change the substance of the primary charge.
The provisions of subsections 1, 2 and 3 of Section 564.440 also constitute an enhancement of the punishment for the basic offense of driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Thus, it follows that the same rule must apply with respect to the validity of any such prior conviction offered for the purpose of enhancing the punishment as in the instance of a prior conviction under the Second Offender Act. It is clear that if the offense offered in support of the conviction under the Second Offender Act is invalid, the enhancement of punishment cannot occur. The prior conviction or convictions offered to impose the progressively enhanced penalties of Section 564.440(2) and (3) must be valid to support the enhanced punishment.
Turning now to the question of the validity of the prior offense, on the face of this record, this conviction is void and cannot provide the basis for enhanced punishment in this case. Rule 29.02 requires, 'No person shall be tried upon an indictment or information for a felony unless he be personally present during the trial; nor shall any person be tried for or be allowed to enter a plea of guilty of a misdemeanor unless he be personally present or the court and prosecuting attorney consent to such trial or plea in the absence of the defendant.' (Emphasis added).
Although the rule seems to permit the proceedings to carry forth in the absence of a defendant if it is agreeable to both the court and the prosecuting attorney, such is not the interpretation given it by the Missouri Supreme Court. In State v. Norton, 347 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. banc 1961), the defendant had failed to appear for a court date on a traffic offense, his attorney did appear and successfully argued a motion to dismiss the information, and the question on appeal was the propriety of the forfeiture of defendant's appearance bond. The court upheld the forfeiture and the scire facias proceeding to enforce the forfeiture. In doing so, the court said at page 852, 'The provision of Sup.Ct.R. 29.02 (see § 546.030) that no person shall be tried for a misdemeanor 'unless he be personally present or the court and prosecuting attorney consent to such trial . . . in the absence of the defendant' is subject to such consent being in response to a request by the accused.' The court further noted in Norton that the record before them disclosed no request by defendant that the case be tried in his absence.
In State v. Cook, 432 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. banc 1968), the defendant was charged with the misdemeanor of speeding. On the date set for trial, the State appeared, the defendant did not appear, but his attorney did and announced not ready for trial since his client was not present. The case proceeded to trial, and the defendant was found guilty by a jury and fined $500. On appeal, it was contended the trial court erred in proceeding with the trial in defendant's absence. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, citing Rules 29.02 and 29.04 for the proposition that:
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