State v. Pfirman

Decision Date03 October 1989
Docket NumberNo. 23107,23107
Citation300 S.C. 84,386 S.E.2d 461
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. Mel PFIRMAN, Appellant. . Heard
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Deputy Chief Atty. Elizabeth C. Fullwood and Asst. Appellate Defender Joseph L. Savitz, III, S.C. Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Asst. Atty. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr., and Sol. James C. Anders, Columbia, for respondent.

GREGORY, Chief Justice:

Appellant was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to twenty-one years imprisonment. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

Appellant was arrested for robbing a convenience store while armed with a knife. During questioning, appellant told police officers that his cousin, Oliver Goff, committed the robbery. Goff was also arrested. He gave a statement indicating appellant robbed the convenience store while he, Goff, acted as lookout and that after the robbery appellant gave Goff the knife and stolen money.

At appellant's trial, the State called Goff as a witness. Before Goff took the stand, the solicitor informed the court he expected Goff would be uncooperative because he had already told the solicitor he did not want to testify and would deny his statement. Goff testified he did not remember the night in question because he was intoxicated, nor did he remember giving a statement to police. Over appellant's objection, the State was allowed to introduce Goff's statement into evidence through the testimony of the police officer who questioned Goff upon his arrest.

It is well-established that the State may not impeach its own witness through a prior inconsistent statement unless the witness is first declared hostile upon a showing of actual surprise and harm. State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989); State v. Hamlet, 294 S.C. 77, 362 S.E.2d 644 (1987). Undeniably, the State could not have shown surprise in view of the solicitor's statement to the court anticipating Goff would be uncooperative. The trial judge concluded, however, the statement was admissible as substantive evidence under State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982). This was error.

Under Copeland, a prior inconsistent statement may be used as substantive evidence when the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination. When, however, the declarant refuses to admit the statement imputed to him, the accused is denied effective cross-examination in violation of his...

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5 cases
  • State v. Stokes
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • February 17, 2009
    ...statement violated his right to confrontation. Appellant cites two of this Court's cases to support his argument: State v. Pfirman, 300 S.C. 84, 386 S.E.2d 461 (1989); and Simpkins v. State, 303 S.C. 364, 401 S.E.2d 142 (1991). The State argues that Pfirman and Simpkins are no longer good l......
  • State v. Mitchell
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • May 22, 2008
    ...S.E.2d 451, 454 (1987) (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 539, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986)). Two years later, however, in State v. Pfirman, the court appeared to take a decidedly more restrictive view toward allowing hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant. Under Pfirma......
  • Simpkins v. State, 23323
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • February 4, 1991
    ...was denied effective cross-examination of the victim regarding this crucial evidence supplied by Ms. Hammack. Cf. State v. Pfirman, 300 S.C. 84, 386 S.E.2d 461 (1989). We therefore conclude the admission of Ms. Hammack's testimony unfairly prejudiced petitioner and constituted reversible Ha......
  • Charleston County Dept. of Social Services v. Father, Stepmother, and Mother
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • October 19, 1994
    ...making the findings of unavailability and trustworthiness required by the statute. Judge Mallard ruled that under State v. Pfirman, 300 S.C. 84, 386 S.E.2d 461 (1989), Victim was unavailable to testify and Mother had asserted a viable ground for relief from judgment. We First, none of the s......
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